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WHO MAY BE HELD? MILITARY 
DETENTION THROUGH THE HABEAS LENS 
Robert M. Chesney* 
Abstract: We lack consensus regarding who lawfully may be held in mili-
tary custody in the contexts that matter most to U.S. national security to-
day—i.e., counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. More to the point, 
federal judges lack consensus on this question. They have grappled with it 
periodically since 2002, and for the past three years have dealt with it con-
tinually in connection with the flood of habeas corpus litigation arising 
out of Guantanamo in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 2008 deci-
sion in Boumediene v. Bush. Unfortunately, the resulting detention juris-
prudence is shot through with disagreement on points large and small, 
leaving the precise boundaries of the government’s detention authority 
unclear. The aim of this Article is to flesh out and contextualize these dis-
agreements, and to locate them in relation to larger trends and debates. 
Introduction 
 Who lawfully may be held in military custody without criminal 
charge? It seems a simple question, and in some settings it is.1 But in 
the settings that matter most at the moment—counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency—it is not simple at all. The very metrics of legality 
are disputed in these contexts, with sharp disagreement regarding 
which bodies of law are relevant and what, if anything, each actually 
says about the scope of the government’s authority to detain (the “de-
tention-scope issue”).2 
 This problem has been with us for some time. It has lurked in the 
background of U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan since 20013 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2011, Robert M. Chesney, Charles I. Francis Professor in Law, University of Texas 
School of Law. I am grateful to the organizers and participants at the Naval War College’s 
annual law of war conference for their comments and criticisms, to the Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel of the Department of Defense for the opportunity to present this work in 
progress, and to Daniel Jackson for outstanding research assistance. 
1 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A), 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW]. 
2 See infra notes 350–586 and accompanying text. 
3 See, e.g., 1 Ctr. for Law & Military Operations, U.S. Army, Legal Lessons 
Learned from Afghanistan and Iraq 53 (2004) (describing uncertainty regarding the 
status of the initial detainees in Afghanistan in late 2001). 
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and in Iraq since 2003.4 And it is central, of course, to the controversies 
surrounding the use of detention at Guantanamo and within the Unit-
ed States itself.5 More than one hundred thousand individuals have 
been detained without criminal charge across these settings,6 giving 
rise to an immense amount of scholarship, advocacy, and litigation 
along the way.7 Remarkably, however, the question of who lawfully may 
be detained remains unsettled in important respects. 
                                                                                                                     
 This problem exists along two distinct dimensions, only one of 
which is addressed in this Article. First, we have indeterminacy at the 
group level: there is disagreement as to whether any military detention 
authority currently possessed by the U.S. government extends to enti-
ties other than al Qaeda and the Taliban, and there is disagreement 
regarding which entities are sufficiently affiliated with al Qaeda or the 
Taliban so as to be indistinguishable from them for purposes of this 
inquiry.8 Second, even if we had agreement regarding which groups 
 
 
4 See Robert Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives from the 
Other War, 2003–2010, 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 549, 557–58 (2011). 
5 See infra notes 64–212 and accompanying text. 
6 More than one hundred thousand persons have been detained without charge in Iraq 
alone since 2003. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 553. The U.S. detention facility in Parwan, 
Afghanistan holds approximately one thousand individuals at a time, and the prior primary 
detention facility in Afghanistan—the Bagram Theater Internment Facility—held approxi-
mately six hundred to eight hundred at a time. See Editorial, Backward at Bagram, N.Y. Times, 
May 31, 2010, at A26 (giving the figure for Bagram); Spencer Ackerman, U.S. Scans Afghan 
Inmates for Biometric Database, Wired: Danger Room (Aug. 25, 2010, 12:37 PM), http://www. 
wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/military-prison-builds-big-afghan-biometric-database/ (giv-
ing the figure for Parwan). Between 2002 and 2008, approximately 779 individuals were held 
at Guantanamo. See Benjamin Wittes & Zaahira Wyne, Brookings, The Current De-
tainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empirical Study 1 (2008). Three more individu-
als—including one who was held at Guantanamo for a time—also were held in military cus-
tody inside the United States. See infra notes 215–349 (discussing these cases). 
7 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004), superseded by statute, Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 §§ 1001, 1003–1004, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (cod-
ified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)), as recognized in Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723; Benjamin 
Wittes, Detention and Denial: The Case for Candor After Guantánamo 5–7 (2010). 
8 Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047, 2113 (2005) (“Terrorist organizations that act as agents of 
al Qaeda, participate with al Qaeda in acts of war against the United States, systematically 
provide military resources to al Qaeda, or serve as fundamental communication links in the 
war against the United States, and perhaps those that systematically permit their buildings 
and safehouses to be used by al Qaeda in the war against the United States, are analogous to 
co-belligerents in a traditional war.”), and Robert Chesney, More on the AQ/AQAP Issue, Includ-
ing Thoughts on How the Co-Belligerent Concept Fits In, Lawfare (Nov. 4, 2010, 12:23 AM), http:// 
www.lawfareblog.com/2010/11/more-on-the-aqaqap-issue-including-thoughts-on-how-the-co- 
belligerent-concept-fits-in/ (exploring the co-belligerent issue), with Kevin Jon Heller, The 
ACLU/CCR Reply Brief in Al-Aulaqi (and My Reply to Wittes), Opinio Juris (Oct. 9, 2010, 9:10 
2011] Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens 771 
are relevant for purposes of the detention issue, however, indetermi-
nacy also manifests at the individual level: we lack agreement as to the 
mix of conditions that are necessary or sufficient to justify the deten-
tion of a particular person.9 This Article aims to shed light on the set of 
questions that arises at this second, individual level. 
                                                                                                                     
 That we lack consensus with respect to individualized detention 
criteria and constraints, despite nearly a decade’s worth of litigation 
and debate,10 reflects our preoccupation with other questions associ-
ated with military detention—above all the seven years’ war regarding 
federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction over the Guantanamo detainees.11 
Yet even prior to the resolution of that jurisdictional dispute in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush,12 courts had sev-
eral occasions to address the detention-scope issue; they just did not 
develop a consensus as a result.13 On the contrary, the courts splintered 
sharply in those cases, advancing an array of incompatible views regard-
ing the applicable law.14 
 Matters have improved somewhat in the aftermath of Boumediene.15 
Many district and circuit court judges, in the context of the Guan-
 
PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/10/09/the-acluccr-reply-brief-in-al-aulaqi-and-my-reply-to-
wittes/ (denying that the co-belligerent concept applies, as a matter of international law, in 
the context of non-international armed conflict). 
9 See infra notes 213–586 and accompanying text. 
10 For particularly useful treatments of the issue, see Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, 
Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 445, 504–14 (2010); 
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 2107–33; Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict, 103 Am. J. Int’l L. 48, 51–60 (2009); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Interna-
tional Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2653, 2654–58 
(2005); Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Be-
yond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 Yale J. Int’l L. 369, 370–75 (2008); Ganesh Sita-
raman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1745, 1821 
(2009); Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain 
Whom?, 3 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 1, 17–23 (2009). 
11 The first habeas petition arising out of Guantanamo was filed within weeks of the 
first detainees’ arrival there in January 2002. See Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 729 (9th 
Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court finally settled the question as a constitutional matter in the 
summer of 2008, after two rounds of legislative intervention. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 
732–33; see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (holding that the government failed to provide 
adequate process to a U.S. citizen held in military custody on grounds of membership in 
the Taliban); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (holding that the federal habeas statute as then written 
provided jurisdiction over the claims of Guantanamo detainees). 
12 553 U.S. at 732–33. In Boumediene, the Court held that the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 violated the Suspension Clause insofar as it forbade Guantanamo detainees from 
seeking habeas relief in federal court. See id.; infra notes 352–396 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 215–349 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 215–349 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 397–586 and accompanying text. 
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tanamo habeas litigation, have had the opportunity to address who law-
fully may be detained.16 Their decisions reflect a consensus that the 
government does have authority to detain without criminal charge in at 
least some circumstances.17 And most hold that these circumstances 
include at least some scenarios involving persons who are “part of” al 
Qaeda or the Taliban (whether the consensus extends to membership 
in other groups is less clear).18 But beyond these points, disagreement 
reigns.19 
 Whether a person is “part of” a group may be an administrable in-
quiry in the context of a regular armed force, but it does not map easily 
onto scenarios involving clandestine non-state actors with indistinct and 
unstable organizational structures. As a result, judges who agree that 
members of such groups may be detained do not necessarily agree as to 
what conduct actually counts as membership in this context.20 Further-
more, these judges most definitely have not reached consensus as to 
whether detention lawfully may be used in the distinct situation in which 
a non-member provides support to these groups;21 in fact, the executive 
branch itself now appears divided on the propriety of using support as a 
stand-alone detention predicate.22 Perhaps most remarkably, an appar-
ent consensus regarding the relevance of the laws of war to these ques-
tions recently came unglued in January 2010 in al-Bihani v. Obama, with 
a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit declar-
ing that the matter should turn exclusively on domestic law considera-
tions,23 and a subsequent assertion by a majority of the active judges of 
that court in turn declaring that assertion to be dicta.24 
 Although these issues are interesting in the seminar setting, one 
might fairly question whether they actually matter in practice. By and 
large, the merits determinations in the Guantanamo habeas cases have 
turned on the sufficiency of the government’s evidence (or lack thereof), 
and not on the legal boundaries of the government’s notional deten-
                                                                                                                      
16 See infra notes 412–586 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 412–417 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 418–586 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 412–586 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 418–586 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 418–586 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 532–547 and accompanying text; see also Charlie Savage, Obama Team 
Split on Tactics Against Terror, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2010, at A1. 
23 See infra notes 507–520 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra note 522 and accompanying text. 
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tion authority.25 For better or worse, moreover, habeas jurisdiction has 
not (yet) been extended to overseas military detention operations in-
volving noncitizens at locations other than Guantanamo.26 Thus, it may 
be tempting to conclude that any problems resulting from the judici-
ary’s persistent inability to resolve the detention-scope question will be 
confined to a finite and shrinking set of cases. 
 In actual practice, however, the question of who lawfully may be 
detained matters a great deal. As a threshold matter, the two premises 
mentioned above may prove to be incorrect. Much Guantanamo ha-
beas litigation is yet to come, and it may well be that future cases will 
turn on this very issue. Similarly, the precise boundaries of habeas ju-
risdiction have not yet been fixed; though currently jurisdiction does 
not extend to Afghanistan, that question remains the subject of current 
litigation.27 Even if the above-mentioned premises remain valid, other 
considerations ensure the relevance of the detention-scope question.28 
 First, the answers judges give to this question have spillover effects 
beyond the immediate context of habeas.29 They overhang any other 
detention operations conducted under the rubric of the same underly-
ing detention authority, regardless of whether those operations are sub-
ject to judicial review; government and military lawyers will not simply 
ignore judicial pronouncements regarding the scope of that authority, 
and may be expected to advise commanders and policymakers accord-
ingly.30 By the same token, judicial decisions regarding the notional 
scope of detention authority may be applied to questions of targeting 
with lethal force in the field pursuant to that same authority, notwith-
standing that targeting decisions ordinarily are not directly subject to 
                                                                                                                      
25 For a review of a broad range of issues in the post-2008 habeas litigation, including 
the centrality of evidentiary questions, see generally Benjamin Wittes, Robert Chesney 
& Rabea Benhalim, Brookings, The Emerging Law of Detention: The Guantánamo 
Habeas Cases as Lawmaking (2010). 
26 Cf. al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98–99 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that habeas ju-
risdiction does not extend to Afghanistan, though noting caveats that preserve the possi-
bility of a different outcome upon different factual predicates). 
27 See al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98–99; see also al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265, slip op. at 1 
(D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010) (order denying appellees’ petition for panel rehearing), available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Bagram-order-7-23-10.pdf (noting 
that detainees, in an attempt to obtain a rehearing, made reference to evidence not in the 
record, and stating that the denial of habeas petition is “without prejudice to [detainees’] 
ability to present this evidence to the district court in the first instance”). 
28 See infra notes 588–613 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 588–613 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 588–606 and accompanying text. 
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judicial review.31 Future conflicts unrelated to 9/11 may also be im-
pacted because many of the habeas decisions have included interpreta-
tions of key terms and concepts from both international and domestic 
law—such as “direct participation in hostilities” (“DPH”) and “all nec-
essary and appropriate force” —that will be relevant in most if not all 
future armed conflicts.32 The judges involved in the habeas litigation 
have thus become, for better or worse, the central U.S. government 
institution engaged in the critical—and ultimately unavoidable—task of 
tailoring the laws governing military activity to suit the increasingly im-
portant scenario in which states classify clandestine non-state actors as 
strategic threats requiring a military response. 
 In addition, the detention-scope question will remain relevant well 
into the future because the habeas litigation story—as it relates to this 
question—functions as a case study in the dynamic relationship be-
tween law and strategic context.33 More specifically, habeas litigation 
exemplifies two significant trends in the legal regulation of hostilities, 
one that is somewhat familiar and one that is somewhat novel.34 The 
first and somewhat-familiar trend involves the increasing significance of 
national courts in developing the international laws of war (at a time 
when the prospects for revisions to foundational treaties, such as the 
Geneva Conventions, are exceedingly slim, and when the role of inter-
national courts remains constrained).35 The second and more novel 
trend involves the emergence of domestic law as a rival to the interna-
tional laws of war in the context of extraterritorial conflict (at a time 
when most scholarly attention focuses instead on the rivalry between 
the laws of war and international human rights law).36 From this point 
of view, the habeas litigation may herald increasing fragmentation of 
the law relating to hostilities—and, for good or ill, more occasions for 
national courts to grapple with the consequences. 
 This Article proceeds in four parts. It begins at a high level of ab-
straction in Part I, surveying the various elements that could be used to 
define the scope of detention authority at the individual level.37 This 
                                                                                                                      
31 See infra notes 607–610 and accompanying text. But see Josh Gerstein, Treasury to Al-
low Anwar al-Awlaki Lawsuit, Politico (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.politico.com/news/ 
stories/0810/40616.html (noting that the ACLU plans to sue to stop the lethal use of force 
by the U.S. government against an American citizen in Yemen). 
32 See infra notes 611–613 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 635–656 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 657–672 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 657–665 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 666–672 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 42–63 and accompanying text. 
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Part aims to convey a rich sense of the possibilities before exploring the 
positions advanced by the U.S. government since 9/11, the counter-
arguments advanced by various detainees, and the reactions of federal 
judges to these competing positions. Part II then provides additional 
context by drawing attention to two strands of debate that complicate 
the task of determining whether particular detention criteria are for-
bidden, required, or permitted by law: (1) disagreement regarding 
which bodies of law actually apply in a particular instance, and (2) dis-
agreement as to what a particular body of law has to say about employ-
ing particular criteria in a detention standard.38 
 Against this backdrop, Part III describes how judges, since 2002, 
have addressed the question of individual detention criteria, emphasiz-
ing that which has been settled and that which remains in dispute.39 In 
brief, judges largely agree that detention authority lawfully extends to 
persons who are functional members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or asso-
ciated forces; they do not agree, however, as to what membership 
means in this setting or whether detention authority also extends to 
non-members who provide support to such groups.40 Part IV explains 
that these lingering disagreements are problematic not simply because 
they create an uncertain atmosphere for the Guantanamo habeas litiga-
tion, but also because uncertainty in this context may spill over into 
other critical areas, such as detention operations in Afghanistan and 
decisions about the use of lethal force in the field; Part IV therefore 
calls on Congress to address this confusion by crafting a detailed deten-
tion standard.41 
I. Disaggregating the Potential Elements of an  
Individual Detention Standard 
 Substantive detention standards, much like criminal laws or civil 
tort rules, cannot truly be understood at a high level of generality. To 
appreciate their real reach, one must disaggregate them into their con-
stituent variables and identify, as precisely as possible, the calibration of 
each of these variables. Bearing this in mind, and to set the stage for 
the discussions that follow, the goal of this Part is to establish a vocabu-
lary and frame of reference suitable for: (1) gauging the extent to 
                                                                                                                      
38 See infra notes 64–212 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 213–586 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 587–672 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 587–676 and accompanying text. The Article’s specific proposals for 
Congress are set out infra notes 633–644 and accompanying text. 
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which various bodies of law already address this topic (the subject of 
Part II);42 (2) parsing and comparing the positions advanced by the 
government, detainees, and judges in the ongoing post-9/11 habeas 
litigation (the subject of Part III);43 and (3) commenting on alterna-
tives (addressed in Part IV).44 
 Although there is no comprehensive list of elements that might be 
included in a substantive, individualized detention standard, Section A 
identifies and explores a handful of variables that seem particularly rel-
evant.45 Section B describes the manner in which each variable might be 
calibrated so as to expand or contract the resulting authority.46 Such 
selection and calibration decisions provide the true measure of a deten-
tion standard.47 
A. Detention Predicates 
 Three variables seem most likely to be used or proposed as the af-
firmative basis for seeking to detain an individual. At a high level of 
generality, they can be referred to as: (1) personal conduct, (2) associa-
tional status, and (3) collateral utility. 
 An individual’s “personal conduct” is one of the more obvious 
predicates for a detention standard. That is, one might premise detain-
ability, in whole or part, on whether an individual has personally com-
mitted a particular act. The nature of the requisite act, in turn, might 
be defined strictly or loosely depending on the scope of detention au-
thority sought. 
 In the context of military detention, for example, personal con-
duct could be defined very narrowly, so as to encompass only personal 
and direct participation in violent actions.48 More permissively, this var-
iable could be defined to include the act of knowingly assisting others 
with a specific act of violence. Further, it could be calibrated to reach 
the knowing provision of assistance to others in furtherance of nonspe-
cific violence that might one day occur—or to reach any support, even 
                                                                                                                      
42 See infra notes 64–212 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 213–586 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 587–672 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 48–57 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. 
47 None of this is to suggest that any particular combination of variables and calibra-
tions is lawful. Lawfulness is a conceptually distinct inquiry. That is to say, there is a differ-
ence between determining what detention authority has been asserted in a particular in-
stance and determining whether that asserted scope of authority falls within whatever legal 
boundaries may be applicable. 
48 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 2115–16. 
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where a nexus with violence is entirely lacking. Most permissively, the 
variable could be dropped from the detention standard altogether; in 
that case, there would be no need to show any particular conduct on 
the individual’s part. 
 A second possible variable is associational status: the extent of a 
person’s affiliation with an organization.49 Like support, degree of af-
filiation can vary. A person may be a leader or member of an organiza-
tion, for example, or may associate in other ways with it.50 
 From the point of view of the state, the great virtue of using associa-
tional status as a basis for detention is that it enables the state to act even 
in the absence of proof that a person has committed or is planning to 
commit a particular act.51 Associational status, in this sense, is a preven-
tion-oriented criterion. Thus, in the context of international armed 
conflict, the Third Geneva Convention makes clear that states need not 
wait until an enemy soldier commits or attempts a belligerent act, but 
instead can detain (or target) that person based simply on his member-
ship in the enemy’s armed forces.52 But for much the same reason, as-
sociational status can be a problematic criterion. Using it as a detention 
predicate can smack of guilt-by-association and may seem to be in ten-
sion with the principle that guilt should be personal rather than im-
puted from the actions of others. Accordingly, particular care must be 
taken when calibrating associational status as a detention variable. 
 Furthermore, for many organizations, a binary, formalistic concep-
tion of associational status (the idea that one is either a member of that 
organization or is not) maps poorly onto ground truth. Consider, for 
example, the difficulties that arise when a “membership” concept is 
applied to youth gangs in the United States, as occurs often in the con-
text of state criminal law.53 As Babe Howell has observed, “social scien-
tists and sociologists have long focused on . . . the difficulty of defining 
both ‘gangs’ and ‘membership’ in [a] gang,” identifying a substantial 
gap between the membership concept typically employed by law en-
                                                                                                                      
49 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 
391–92, 397 (4th Cir. 2005). 
50 One might object that “associational status” is not meaningfully distinct from “per-
sonal conduct,” but rather is a catchall term for certain patterns of conduct involving in-
teractions with other persons. No doubt there is some truth to that, but it remains useful 
to treat associational status as a distinct variable given the significant role it turns out to 
play in the detention debate. See infra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
51 Cf. GPW, supra note 1, art. 4(A). 
52 Id. 
53 See K. Babe Howell, Fear Itself: The Impact of Allegations of Gang-Affiliation on Pre-Trial 
Detention, 23 St. Thomas L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1). 
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forcement “and the decidedly more complex and nuanced relationship 
between youth in neighborhoods dominated by street gangs evidenced 
in the social science literature.”54 Drawing on the work of Lewis Yablon-
sky, Howell suggests that the typically sweeping definition of “member-
ship” must be disaggregated to account for distinctions among core 
and fringe members; active and inactive members; and actual members 
and “[g]roupies . . . who do not ordinarily participate in criminal gang 
activity but hang out with gangsters and dress and talk like them,”55 
mere co-located residents of gang-infested neighborhoods who “find it 
necessary to their survival to identify with the gang,”56 and even “for-
mer gangsters” who have aged out or otherwise left behind the active 
gang life.57 It also may be necessary to distinguish those who consider 
themselves independent of an organization but nonetheless actively 
and perhaps repeatedly cooperate with its members—either out of a 
sense of shared mission or for other self-interested reasons. 
 Bearing all this in mind, what is the range of options when it 
comes to calibrating an associational status variable in the detention 
setting? There are several possibilities, ranging from agency to fleeting 
forms of affiliation. To keep the category narrow, we could require that 
an individual be subject to the command-and-control of an organiza-
tion—an agent of the organization, in effect. Further narrowing the 
category, we might require that the person be an agent not of the or-
ganization as a whole, but specifically of its militarized “wing.” Going 
even further, we might require that this agency relationship be more 
than merely notional but instead has actually been borne out in prac-
tice. Alternatively, we could broaden the variable by relaxing one or 
more of these elements. We might relax or even outright relinquish the 
requirement of past obedience to a group’s commands. We might 
abandon the distinction between a group’s militarized wing and the 
overall group. We might relax the requirement of agency, accepting 
instead other forms of association—perhaps formal membership would 
suffice, if that concept can meaningfully be applied—or even more 
fleeting types of connection. Apart from all this, we might tweak the 
calibration of the variable by treating various formal indicia as neces-
sary or sufficient conditions. Examples might include an oath of alle-
                                                                                                                      
54 Id. (manuscript at 2–3). 
55 Id. (manuscript at 27–28). 
56 Id. (manuscript at 28) (quoting Lewis Yablonsky, Gangs in Court 10 (2d ed. 
2008)). 
57 Id. 
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giance, inclusion on a payroll, or inclusion in a group-sponsored train-
ing program or housing complex. 
 Not every potentially relevant variable links the detainee in a per-
sonal way to violence or danger. Consider a final possibility: that a state 
might wish to detain persons for collateral reasons. Two examples of this 
approach come to mind. First, a detention standard might permit de-
tention of a person simply as a means of pressuring a third party to take 
or refrain from some action—a decidedly problematic detention predi-
cate smacking of hostage-taking. Second, a detention standard might 
permit detention of a person simply because he or she is thought to 
possess useful intelligence, even if only by happenstance (as in the case 
of a neighbor who happens to see what insurgents are doing nearby). 
B. Constraint Criteria 
 A fully realized substantive detention standard may consist of much 
more than some combination of the aforementioned detention predi-
cates.58 It may also incorporate any number of constraint conditions. 
The possibilities are endless, but several are particularly likely to be rele-
vant, including: (1) citizenship, (2) geography, (3) timing, (4) the exis-
tence of less-restrictive alternatives, and (5) future dangerousness.59 
 First, detention authority could be constrained with reference to a 
person’s citizenship. A state might attempt to exclude its own citizens 
from its detention authority, for example, or seek to define its deten-
tion authority affirmatively with reference to citizenship in some other 
state(s). 
 Second, detention authority could be constrained with reference 
to the geography of capture. At its most demanding, this constraint 
could be calibrated to require that an individual be physically located 
on a conventional battlefield at, or at least shortly before, the time of 
capture. Or the variable could be relaxed so as to require merely that 
the individual be located within the geographic boundaries of a state in 
which violence is occurring at some particular level of intensity and 
repetition (rising to the level of “armed conflict,” for example). Most 
permissively, the question of location could be omitted altogether. 
                                                                                                                      
58 See supra notes 48–57 and accompanying text. 
59 See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. Bearing in mind the “child soldier” is-
sue and the presence of several teenage detainees in Afghanistan and then later in Guan-
tanamo, one might add an age constraint to this list. Cf. Charlie Savage, Deal Averts Trial in 
Disputed Guantánamo Case, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2010, at A12. 
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 A third consideration involves timing. Mary Dudziak has observed 
that we tend not to notice the role of temporal conceptions when we 
examine law relating to war, and that even when we do note the rele-
vance of temporal frames, we tend not to think carefully about them.60 
These insights are applicable to the detention debate. Just as one can be 
relatively strict or generous in terms of physical proximity to violent ac-
tivity, so too can one be relatively strict or generous in terms of how 
much time may pass before past satisfaction of a detention predicate 
ceases to count. If participation in violence is the predicate, one could 
require that the person be captured in the act, the immediate aftermath 
of the act, or within a few days; for maximum flexibility, there could be 
no limitation period at all. One could similarly use a temporal lens to 
refine the calibration of a geographic constraint variable: one could re-
quire that the geographic criterion be satisfied at the moment of cap-
ture, immediately beforehand, or within the past year, and so forth. 
 Fourth, detention authority could be constrained by adopting a 
least restrictive alternative test. For example, the state could be pre-
cluded from using detention except in circumstances where the courts 
are not open or where prosecution is possible but unlikely to succeed. 
The impact of such a constraint would turn both on the substantive 
condition imposed and on the degree of confidence the state must pos-
sess with respect to whether that condition has been satisfied. Consider, 
as an illustration, the difficulty of operationalizing a standard that re-
quires that criminal prosecution be unlikely to succeed. 
 Finally, detention authority could be constrained by requiring a 
showing of the detainee’s “future dangerousness.” The notion of future 
dangerousness as a detention constraint is closely related to the use of 
past personal conduct and associational status as affirmative predicates 
for detention. One’s past acts and associations, after all, may matter 
from the detention perspective precisely because they signal that a per-
son may be harmful in the future if not detained. Nevertheless, past 
acts and associations do not exhaust the future dangerousness concept. 
One may not have engaged in any past violent acts or have any particu-
lar sort of associational status and yet may still be potentially dangerous 
in light of other indicators (e.g., statements indicating intent to carry 
out a harmful act in the future, or past attendance at a military-style 
training camp). Conversely, one might have been involved in violence 
                                                                                                                      
60 See Mary L. Dudziak, Unlimited War and Social Change: Unpacking the Cold War’s Impact 
2–4 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch., Legal Studies Paper No. 10-15, 2010), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1676460. 
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or have associated with a relevant organization, but not personally ap-
pear to pose a threat. 
 In any event, a future dangerousness variable can be calibrated in 
much the same way as a past conduct or associational status variable. At 
the strict end of the spectrum, future dangerousness might refer to the 
likelihood of an individual committing (or assisting) a particular vio-
lent act. More flexibly, it could refer to the likelihood of an individual 
committing (or assisting) violence as a general matter, without linkage 
to a particular act. More broadly still, it could refer to the likelihood of 
an individual being involved in activity that supports some particular 
group, without linkage to violence. As with all possible detention predi-
cates, moreover, the bite of a future dangerousness variable would de-
pend at least as much on the degree of certainty required for its satis-
faction as on the particular substantive calibration decision. 
 The foregoing discussion provides a typology of potentially rele-
vant detention predicates and constraints, as well as a sense of how each 
might be calibrated in a more-or-less expansive direction.61 The list is 
not exhaustive, but, as we will see in Part III, it does go far toward en-
compassing the range of positions that have been advanced in post-
9/11 debates regarding the scope of detention authority asserted by the 
U.S. government.62 Importantly, the typology also helps us understand 
the extent to which existing bodies of law actually speak to the indi-
vidualized detention question—the subject of the next Part.63 
II. Contested Metrics of Legality 
 Nearly a decade has passed since the United States began employ-
ing military detention without criminal charge in circumstances relat-
ing to al Qaeda and the Taliban.64 Nonetheless, the question of who 
lawfully may be held in that manner—if anyone—remains the subject 
of bitter disagreement. 
 Before examining how litigants and judges have attempted to re-
solve these disagreements in the habeas setting, it is worth pausing to 
describe why, at a high level of abstraction, the parties to these debates 
so often appear to be speaking past one another. There are two over-
arching problems that contribute to that state of affairs. First, there is 
disagreement at the threshold with respect to which bodies of law— 
                                                                                                                      
61 See supra notes 42–60 and accompanying text. 
62 See infra notes 213–586 and accompanying text. 
63 See infra notes 64–212 and accompanying text. 
64 See Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 728 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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such as domestic law, the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”), and interna-
tional human rights law (“IHRL”)—actually apply to this question. This 
might be called the “domain” debate and is explored in Section A.65 
Second, with respect to each of these potentially applicable bodies of 
law, there is disagreement as to what, if anything, it has to say regarding 
which detention predicates and constraints are necessary or permissi-
ble. This might be called the “content” debate and is explored in Sec-
tion B.66 Finally, Section C examines an additional factor that compli-
cates the detention-scope debate: the prospect of legal change.67 
 The aim is not to settle the domain and content debates, but ra-
ther simply to orient the reader to their basic features. Combined with 
the typology of detention predicates and constraints provided in the 
preceding Part,68 this orientation will equip the reader to appreciate 
fully the points of consensus and disagreement emerging from the ha-
beas litigation, which are discussed in Part III.69 
A. The Domain Debate: Disagreement Regarding Which Bodies of Law Apply 
 Which bodies of law are relevant with respect to the detention-
scope question? The answer to this question of course may depend on 
the circumstances, and thus it may be most accurate to say that there are 
many answers to it rather than just one. This Section first examines 
three of the candidate legal regimes: (1) domestic law (statutory or con-
stitutional), (2) LOAC or international humanitarian law, and (3) 
IHRL.70 It then considers how the need to resolve overlaps and conflicts 
between LOAC and IHRL further complicates the domain debate.71 
1. Domestic Law 
 At one extreme, the question of who lawfully may be held might 
require solely a domestic law analysis. Under this view, for example, one 
might first consider what the September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use 
of Military Force (AUMF)72 has to say about the topic—or what might 
be gleaned from the U.S. Constitution as a direct source of detention 
                                                                                                                      
65 See infra notes 70–103 and accompanying text. 
66 See infra notes 103–168 and accompanying text. 
67 See infra notes 169–212 and accompanying text. 
68 See supra notes 48–63 and accompanying text. 
69 See infra notes 213–586 and accompanying text. 
70 See infra notes 79–96 and accompanying text. 
71 See infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
72 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
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power73—and then note any other limitations that might be derived 
from the Constitution, other statutes, or prior U.S. case law. If the gov-
ernment’s claim of detention authority is consistent with these sources, 
the debate ends. 
 Of course, treaties are part of domestic law as the Constitution 
makes them supreme law of the land.74 Thus, the “domestic-only” view-
point does not necessarily exclude consideration of LOAC and IHRL 
instruments. If those treaties are not self executing or have been “un-
executed” by a subsequent statute, however, some argue that they are 
relevant solely in a diplomatic sense.75 At least with respect to IHRL 
instruments, moreover, the U.S. government has long maintained that 
they simply do not apply to U.S. government conduct occurring out-
side of formal U.S. territory.76 
 In any event, the notion of a purely domestic approach to deter-
mining the legal boundaries of detention authority is no mere aca-
demic invention. As Part III discusses, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit adopted precisely this view in its January 2010 decision al-
Bihani v. Obama.77 There are, however, other models. 
2. The Law of Armed Conflict 
 The second model accepts the legal, rather than just the diplo-
matic, relevance of LOAC. On this view, LOAC might matter in either 
                                                                                                                      
73 Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 587 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Although 
the President very well may have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our 
troops, I agree with the plurality that we need not decide that question because Congress has 
authorized the President to do so.”). Because the current administration rests its detention-
related arguments solely on the AUMF, and because it is not clear that the analysis ultimately 
turns on this issue, for the most part this Article refers only to the AUMF as a source of do-
mestic detention authority. See Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s 
Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, Hamlily v. Obama, 
616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 05-0763) [hereinafter Hamlily Memorandum]. 
74 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that treaties are the “supreme Law of the 
Land”). 
75 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and 
the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 73, 88 (2007) (examining various arguments 
relating to self-executing treaties and legislative efforts to “unexecute” these treaties in 
relation to the Geneva Conventions). 
76 See U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Government’s 1-Year Follow-Up Report to the 
Committee’s Conclusions & Recommendations 1–2 (2007), available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/documents/organization/100845.pdf. On the general issue of extraterrito-
riality, see generally Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? The 
Evolution of Territoriality in American Law (2009). 
77 U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 76, at 1–2; see infra notes 507–520 and accompany-
ing text (discussing a D.C. Circuit panel’s rejection of international law in al-Bihani). 
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of two ways, one weak and one strong. First, according to the weak view, 
LOAC must be considered when interpreting the AUMF (or, for that 
matter, when interpreting the scope of authority conferred directly by 
the Constitution).78 Consistent with the Charming Betsy canon, for ex-
ample, one would look to LOAC to flesh out the meaning of the 
AUMF’s “all necessary and appropriate force” language, as it relates to 
detention.79 Second, according to the strong view, LOAC might be 
treated as a legally binding constraint in its own right, independent of 
the best reading of the underlying domestic source of authority. 
 It is not clear that the difference between the weak and strong 
models matters in the context of the detention-scope issue. The differ-
ence might matter where the underlying domestic source is so clear 
that there is no occasion for an LOAC-based interpretation, thus mak-
ing the weak, but not the strong, model inapplicable. But that is hardly 
the case here, given the relative lack of clarity of the domestic sources 
involved.80 In this setting, rather, both the weak and strong models 
would direct us to look to LOAC to define the scope of the govern-
ment’s detention authority. 
 Nonetheless, LOAC is not automatically relevant in all circum-
stances; it is, however, applicable in circumstances of “armed con-
flict.”81 To determine LOAC’s field of application, one must identify 
and define the scope of “armed conflict” —tasks that generate consid-
erable disputes.82 Some scholars reference functional criteria involving 
the duration, intensity, and nature of the violence at issue,83 while oth-
                                                                                                                      
 
78 See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Com-
mander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 61, 74–75, 81 (2007). 
79 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 2088–2100; Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authori-
zations for Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 293, 
295–99 (2005) (under the Charming Betsy canon, “the courts construe acts of Congress to 
avoid violations of international law whenever possible”). 
80 See infra notes 103–131 and accompanying text (discussing the applicable domestic 
law and noting its lack of clarity). 
81 See Int’l Law Ass’n, The Hague Conference: Use of Force; Final Report on 
the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law 1 (2010) [hereinafter ILA Use 
of Force Report], available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/2176DC63- 
D268-4133-8989A664754F9F87. 
82 See infra notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
83 See, e.g., Marco Sassòli, Terrorism and War, 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 959, 965 (2006). 
As for the lower threshold of a non-international armed conflict, no clear-cut 
criteria exist, but relevant factors include: intensity, number of active partici-
pants, number of victims, duration and protracted character of the violence, 
organization and discipline of the parties, capacity to respect IHL, collective, 
open and coordinated character of the hostilities, direct involvement of gov-
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ers also emphasize the formal categorization of the asserted “enemy” in 
terms of its status as a “state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent group.”84 
Furthermore, even when one accepts that a state of armed conflict jus-
tifying application of LOAC exists in a particular location, there is con-
siderable disagreement as to whether and when any resulting rules can 
or must be applied in relation to persons in geographically distinct lo-
cations.85 Indeed, the most fundamental divide separating the legal 
positions of the Bush and Obama administrations from the views of 
critics in the international law community has to do with the proposi-
tions that (1) the activities of al Qaeda rise to the level of armed con-
flict in places other than Afghanistan, and (2) the existence of armed 
conflict in Afghanistan, in any event, permits reliance on LOAC con-
cepts against al Qaeda-related individuals in other locations.86 
                                                                                                                     
3. International Human Rights Law 
 The third model tracks the second, but looks to IHRL rather than 
LOAC. That is, one can advance both a weak (interpretation-based) 
and strong (independent force) model of IHRL’s relevance to the 
scope question. 
 Either way, the key point of departure for debate regarding the 
relevance of IHRL involves the question of extraterritoriality.87 For pre-
sent purposes, the most relevant IHRL treaty is the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),88 which, as discussed below, 
 
ernmental armed forces (vs. law enforcement agencies) and de facto authority 
by the non-state actor over potential victims. 
Id. 
84 Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to al Qaeda, 56 Cath. U. L. Rev. 759, 760 (2007). 
85 See, e.g., Declaration of Prof. Mary Ellen O’Connell at 7, al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-1469), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/O_ 
Connell_Declaration.100810.PDF. 
Armed conflict has a territorial aspect. It has territorial limits. It exists where 
(but only where) fighting by organized armed groups is intense and lasts for a 
significant period . . . . That the United States is engaged in armed conflict 
against al Qaeda in Afghanistan does not mean that the United States can rely 
on the law of armed conflict to engage suspected associates of al Qaeda in 
other countries. 
Id. 
86 See ILA Use of Force Report, supra note 81, at 25. 
87 See infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
88 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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contains language relating to detention.89 Article 2 of the ICCPR pro-
vides that a member state is bound to confer ICCPR protections on 
persons “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”90 The Unit-
ed States has long construed this language literally, such that ICCPR 
rules govern within the United States but not elsewhere.91 In contrast, 
many other states (including many European allies) and the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council) con-
strue that same language to encompass any person subject to a member 
state’s practical control, regardless of geographic location.92 An inter-
pretive stand-off results, with great risk of outright misunderstanding 
insofar as either side fails to appreciate that the other simply does not 
share its view. 
 Even if one accepts the U.S. position regarding the geographically 
bounded reach of the ICCPR, however, IHRL issues might still arise. 
After all, not all detentions occur outside U.S. territory.93 On three oc-
casions after 9/11, for example, the United States held persons in mili-
tary custody within the United States itself.94 And in the wake of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Rasul v. Bush in 200495 and Boumedi-
ene v. Bush in 2008,96 both of which emphasize the unique degree of 
U.S. control at Guantanamo, debate may yet arise as to Guantanamo’s 
status vis-à-vis the ICCPR’s jurisdictional provision. In any event, treaty 
law is not the only possible source of an IHRL obligation. Customary 
international law may contain norms comparable to those found in the 
ICCPR. The question then becomes whether any such norm entails a 
comparable geographic boundary. This, in turn, may require inquiry 
into the existence, in the overseas setting, of a pattern of state practice 
supported by opinio juris. The room for debate—and hence for misun-
derstanding—is ample. 
                                                                                                                      
89 See infra notes 162–168 and accompanying text. 
90 ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 2. 
91 See U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 76, at 1. 
92 See, e.g., Patrick Walsh, Fighting for Human Rights: The Application of Human Rights 
Treaties to United States’ Military Operations, 28 Penn. St. Int’l L. Rev. 45, 60 (2009). 
93 See infra notes 215–349 and accompanying text. 
94 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509–10; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004); al-
Marri v. Wright (al-Marri I ), 487 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc sub nom. al-
Marri v. Pucciarelli (al-Marri II ), 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated sub nom. 
al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.); see also notes 215–349 and accompany-
ing text. 
95 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004), superseded by statute, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
§§ 1001, 1003–1004, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000dd (2006)), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
96 553 U.S. at 755. 
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4. Deconfliction 
 The discussion grows still more complicated once one accounts for 
the potential of the LOAC and IHRL models to overlap and conflict. 
This potential overlap has occasioned an immense amount of scholar-
ship, with some characterizing the situation as encroachment by IHRL— 
for good or ill—on the traditional domain of LOAC.97 
 Here we confront the question of lex specialis. In brief, lex specialis is 
a choice-of-law concept in which the more specifically applicable body 
of law governs in the event of overlap.98 Unfortunately, a variety of 
views exist regarding just what that concept means in practice—enough 
to prompt the International Law Commission to undertake an effort to 
clarify the question.99 The U.S. government, for its part, takes the view 
that LOAC constitutes lex specialis in all circumstances of armed con-
flict, such that it entirely occupies the field to the exclusion of IHRL 
considerations.100 Some have taken a different view, treating lex specialis 
not as preempting all reference to another body of law, but rather as 
requiring the provisions of a competing body of law to be construed in 
harmony with the rules provided by the dominant body of law; IHRL, 
on that view, would be applicable, yet would be conformed to LOAC in 
its particulars.101 One might argue for a third position, a rights-
maximizing approach in which the controlling rule is whichever one 
most advantages individuals’ rights, rather than state discretion. Alter-
natively, one might advocate a specificity-oriented approach in which 
the governing rule is, literally, whichever rule speaks with greater speci-
ficity to the fact pattern (whether it is more rights protective or not).102 
                                                                                                                      
97 For a sampling of this scholarship, see J. Jeremy Marsh, Rule 99 of the Customary In-
ternational Humanitarian Law Study and the Relationship Between the Law of Armed Conflict and 
International Human Rights Law, Army Law., May 2009, at 18, 22; Marko Milanović, A Norm 
Conflict Perspective on the Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law, 14 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 459, 459 (2009). 
98 For a more thorough exposition, see Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Imple-
menting the Complementarity Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law—
Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulation of Internment in Non-International Armed Conflict, 40 
Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 437, 445–49 (2009). 
99 See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Int’l Law Comm’n, Study Grp. on Fragmenta-
tion, Fragmentation of International Law: Topic (a): The Function and Scope of 
the Lex Specialis Rule and the Question of ‘Self-Contained Regimes’; An Outline 
1 (2003), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/55/fragmentation_outline.pdf. 
100 See, e.g., Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liabil-
ity to Legitimacy, Army Law., June 2010, at 9, 37. 
101 See, e.g., Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 240 ( July 8). 
102 See, e.g., Olson, supra note 98, 446–49. 
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Deconfliction of LOAC and IHRL, in short, requires resolution of a 
complex and entrenched debate. 
 As if this were not enough complexity, it is possible that the best 
answer to the relevant-body-of-law inquiry will vary depending on the 
circumstances. That is, it may be that in one location LOAC is plainly 
relevant and IHRL is not, but in other locations the reverse is true or 
the question turns on domestic law instead. 
B. The Content Debate: Disagreement Regarding the Rules Themselves 
 Unfortunately, the opportunities for confusion and disagreement 
are not confined to the threshold determination of which body or bod-
ies of law matter. Even if we had consensus on that question, an equally 
intransigent set of disagreements emerges within each domain when we 
turn to the question of what that body of law currently has to say re-
garding the particular mix of detention predicates and constraints that 
a state can, or must, use. 
 In the abstract, there are several possible outcomes when one seeks 
to determine what rule a particular body of law supplies with respect to 
the detention-scope issue. First, the body of law may provide a determi-
nate and discernible rule that is narrower than the scope of detention 
authority asserted by the government. Second, the reverse may be true: 
the rule may permit at least as much detention authority as the gov-
ernment asserts. One can expect litigants to emphasize one or the oth-
er of these positions. But there are other possibilities. Most notably, and 
third, it may be that the body of law is simply indeterminate on the 
question of scope. In that case, an important question arises regarding 
the default state of affairs: Does the absence of a rule constitute an ab-
sence of affirmative authority for the government to exercise detention 
power? Or does it instead constitute an absence of constraint on the 
government’s exercise of such powers? This too can be a point of dis-
agreement. Fourth, and finally, it may be that the most complete an-
swer involves a blend of the aforementioned possibilities depending on 
the circumstances. 
1. Domestic Law 
 Consider first how these possibilities map onto the domestic law 
sources relevant to the substantive-scope question. One might begin 
2011] Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens 789 
with the September 18, 2001 AUMF, which introduces a series of inter-
pretive issues.103 
 The AUMF does not refer expressly to detention. Of course, it also 
says nothing express about killing or any other particular kind of mili-
tary activity. What it does authorize is the use of “all necessary and ap-
propriate force.”104 Thus, there is a threshold question as to whether it 
should be read to confer any detention authority at all. In the case of 
citizens, moreover, that inquiry is complicated by the existence of a 1971 
statute—the Non-Detention Act—providing that “[n]o citizen shall be 
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant 
to an Act of Congress,”105 as well as the Civil War-era precedent Ex parte 
Milligan, in which the Supreme Court, in 1866, employed broad lan-
guage in the course of holding that a civilian could not be subjected to a 
military commission trial if civilian courts were available.106 
 Assuming this obstacle is overcome, the next task is to determine 
against whom this authority may be directed. Here, the AUMF does a 
bit more of the work, as it refers to “those nations, organizations, or 
persons” that the President determines were responsible for the 9/11 
attacks, as well as those who harbor such entities.107 The Bush admini-
stration exercised this authority by identifying al Qaeda as the entity 
responsible for the attacks and the Taliban as having harbored them;108 
the Obama administration has continued that position,109 and there 
does not appear to be any serious doubt that it was appropriate to do 
so.110 Thus it seems settled that the AUMF refers at least to al Qaeda 
and the Taliban.111 
                                                                                                                      
 
103 See Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
104 Id. § 2(a). 
105 Act of Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347, 347 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4001(a) (2006)). 
106 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121, 127 (1866). But see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45–46 
(1942) (permitting military commission jurisdiction over an American citizen who was 
part of the German armed forces in World War II, and distinguishing Milligan on the 
ground that Milligan had not actually been part of the enemy force). 
107 AUMF § 2(a). 
108 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. 
109 See Hamlily Memorandum, supra note 73, at 1. 
110 See also infra notes 350–586 and accompanying text. 
111 The level of consensus with respect to the objects of the AUMF, even at this 
group/organizational level, should not be overstated. There is ample room for disagree-
ment regarding the degree of institutional affiliation with al Qaeda or the Taliban that is 
necessary for other, arguably distinct, entities to be deemed subject to the AUMF as well. 
There are numerous entities in the Af-Pak theater, for example, that are engaged to vary-
ing degrees in hostilities against the United States or the Afghan government, yet do not 
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 Even if we had consensus regarding precisely which entities fall 
within the scope of the detention power authorized by the AUMF, how-
ever, we would still have to grapple with disagreement at the individual 
level. The AUMF is entirely silent with respect to the mix of detention 
predicates and constraints that suffice to link a particular person to an 
AUMF-covered group for purposes of detention or otherwise.112 
 This is, in fact, typical of AUMFs (and declarations of war, for that 
matter).113 Yet no one in prior conflicts thought such silence to be sig-
nificant.114 Why does it matter so much now? First, most prior conflicts 
involved nation-states as the enemy, and hence the question of deten-
tion largely arose in relation to enemy soldiers who were both readily 
identifiable (through uniforms and through their overt presence on a 
conventional battlefield) and eager to be identified (in order to ensure 
prisoner-of-war (“POW”) treatment and qualification for the combat-
ant’s privilege to use force).115 Second, even where prior conflicts in-
volved a substantial amount of hostilities with guerrilla forces—as in 
Vietnam—the question of how the United States resolved any incipient 
detention issues simply did not receive anything remotely resembling 
                                                                                                                      
constitute subsidiaries of either al Qaeda or the Taliban. See Jeffrey Dressler, Haqqani Net-
work Influence in Kurram and Its Implications for Afghanistan, CTC Sentinal (Combatting 
Terrorism Ctr., U.S. Military Acad., West Point, N.Y.), Mar. 2011, at 11, 11–12, available at 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss3.pdf; Rasool Dawar, Pakistan Tali-
ban Claim CIA Turncoat in Afghanistan, HuffPost World ( Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.huff- 
ingtonpost.com/2010/01/01/pakistan-taliban-claim-ci_n_409201.html. The Haqqani Net-
work provides an example, as might the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (not to be confused with 
the original Afghan Taliban commanded by Mullah Omar, now best referred to as the 
Quetta Shura Taliban). See Dressler, supra, at 13. Arguments can be made that AUMF-based 
authority extends to such groups as co-belligerents of al Qaeda and the Taliban, but the 
AUMF itself does not speak to the issue. Similarly, consider the al Qaeda “affiliate” sce-
nario represented by the Algerian extremist group once known as the Groupe Salafiste pour 
la prédication et le combat (“GSPC,” or the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). Its 
activities are primarily directed toward the Algerian government, but Osama bin Laden 
may have provided funding or otherwise assisted when the GSPC originally broke off from 
the Groupe islamique armé in the 1990s. See Andrew Hansen & Lauren Vriens, Backgrounder: 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Council on Foreign Rel., http://www.cfr.org/ 
north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717 (last updated July 21, 2009). The 
GSPC leadership declared allegiance to bin Laden in 2003, and in 2006 it changed its 
name to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (“AQIM”) after Ayman al-Zawahiri formally an-
nounced its affiliation. Id. For an overview, see Hansen & Vriens, supra. When, precisely, in 
light of all this, did AQIM become sufficiently linked to al Qaeda to be considered within 
the scope of the AUMF, if ever? The AUMF itself does not provide guidance. 
112 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 2082–83. 
113 See id. at 2072–83. 
114 See id. 
115 See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and 
Military Detention Models, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1079, 1099–100 (2008). 
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the scrutiny that arises today (let alone litigation).116 Matters are oth-
erwise in relation to the use of detention under the AUMF, and thus 
the question of individualized detention predicates and constraints is 
far more significant than in the past. 
                                                                                                                     
 No other domestic law source suffices to prevent debate and dis-
agreement on these points. Congress, for its part, has not returned to 
the detention-scope question, at least not directly. The first post-AUMF 
legislation to address detention in any significant way was the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA),117 which, among other things, addressed 
federal courts’ jurisdiction over challenges to individual detention deci-
sions at Guantanamo.118 The DTA did not purport to define a substan-
tive standard as to who may be detained, however. Instead, it invited the 
D.C. Circuit to consider in particular cases whether the government’s 
assertion of detention authority was compatible with the “Constitution 
and laws of the United States.”119 
 The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA 2006”) came clos-
er.120 It did not purport to define the category of persons subject to de-
tention-without-charge under the AUMF (or otherwise). It did, how-
ever, define the personal jurisdiction of the military commission sys-
tem.121 Specifically, it stated that commissions could try cases involving 
any alien constituting an “unlawful enemy combatant.”122 It defined 
that phrase to encompass any person who is not part of a state’s regular 
armed forces (or a militia-type group obeying the traditional conditions 
of lawful belligerency), and who falls into one of three categories: (1) 
“has engaged in hostilities . . . against the United States or its co-
belligerents”; (2) “has purposefully and materially supported hostilities 
against the United States or its co-belligerents”; or (3) “is part of the 
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces.”123 
 The MCA 2006 thus introduced a series of necessary and sufficient 
conditions to bring a person within the jurisdiction of the new war 
crimes trial system—conditions that were narrowed only slightly with 
the subsequent passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (“MCA 
 
116 See id. at 1091. 
117 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 §§ 1001, 1003–1004, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 
2680, 2739 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)). 
118 Id. § 1005. 
119 Id. 
120 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600, 2600–31. 
121 See id. 
122 Id. (adding 10 U.S.C. § 948c). 
123 Id. (adding 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) and (2)). 
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2009”).124 The MCA 2009 replaced the verbiage “unlawful enemy com-
batant” with the less baggage-laden phrase “unprivileged enemy bellig-
erent.”125 It kept the criteria relating to participation in hostilities and 
material support of hostilities.126 It also kept the “part of” test, but nar-
rowed it to pertain only to al Qaeda—thus omitting the alternative of 
establishing personal jurisdiction over an individual solely on the 
ground of being part of the Taliban or an associated force.127 
 The MCA 2006 and MCA 2009 arguably shed some light on the 
substantive-scope question, but for at least two reasons they do not suf-
fice to end debate. First, neither statute actually purports to speak to 
that question.128 Perhaps they nonetheless do so by implication, on the 
theory that the boundaries of personal jurisdiction in the military 
commission system must extend at least as far as the boundaries of the 
authority to detain without criminal charge. But it is not obvious that 
the two questions have such a relationship to one another; one might 
expect the scope of personal jurisdiction to be wider than baseline de-
tention authority in some respects and narrower in others. 
 Second, the MCA criteria themselves are underspecified. In terms 
of predicates, the criteria include both past conduct considerations (in-
cluding both personal involvement in hostilities and the provision of 
support to AUMF-covered groups) and an associational status test (the 
“part of” test).129 The “part of” test is not further calibrated, however, 
leaving considerable room for disagreement. This is an important omis-
sion given the diffused, evolving, and informal organizational structure 
of non-state actors such as al Qaeda.130 As for potential constraints, 
moreover, the MCA criteria are silent with respect to considerations of 
geography and timing. 
 Complicating matters, some observers may take the position that 
the ambiguity of these statutes constitutes an implied delegation of au-
thority to the executive to provide whatever further criteria may be re-
                                                                                                                      
124 See Military Commissions Act of 2009 Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 
2574. 
125 Id. § 1802 (adding 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(7) (defining “unprivileged enemy belliger-
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126 Id. (adding 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7)). 
127 Id. 
128 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive 
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029, 2109 (2007). 
129 See Military Commissions Act of 2009 § 1802; Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600, 2601–03. 
130 See, e.g., John Rollins, Cong. Research Serv., R410780, Al Qaeda and Affili-
ates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy 
summary (2010), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/137015.pdf. 
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quired—and perhaps also that the executive branch is entitled to def-
erence from the judiciary in the event that its exercise of that authority 
should become subject to judicial review.131 This too becomes a point 
of departure for debate, as would any claim that the Constitution itself 
(via some combination of Article II powers, presumably) confers some 
degree of detention authority independent of what may be conferred 
by the AUMF or any other statute. As to the latter argument, it suffices 
to note that the problems of ambiguity associated with the language of 
the AUMF surely arise in equal if not greater measure under the Article 
II authority rubric. 
2. The Law of Armed Conflict 
 Assume for the sake of argument that LOAC is relevant in at least 
some post-9/11 circumstances involving detention. Unfortunately, it 
too is underspecified when it comes to individual detention predicates 
and constraints. 
 When it comes to the scope of detention issue, LOAC is most de-
terminate in relation to international armed conflict—i.e., an armed 
conflict involving on each side at least one High Contracting Party to 
the Geneva Conventions.132 In that traditional setting, the full range of 
Geneva Convention protections apply, including a host of provisions 
that expressly contemplate the use of non-criminal modes of detention 
in military custody.133 
 Under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War (“GPW”), for example, we find two articles confirming that a 
state may hold prisoners of war in custody without charge during hostili-
ties.134 GPW Article 4, moreover, provides a detailed definition as to who 
qualifies for POW status (and hence may be detained without  much 
controversy).135 Among other things, this includes any person who: 
1. is a member of the armed forces of a Party; 
2. is a member of an irregular unit that obeys the four condi-
tions of lawful belligerency (having a command hierarchy, 
                                                                                                                      
131 See, e.g., Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 
Yale L.J. 1230, 1232–33 (2007); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign 
Relations Law, 116 Yale L.J. 1170, 1218 (2007). 
132 See, e.g., GPW, supra note 1, art. 2. 
133 See id. 
134 Id. art. 21 (authorizing internment of POWs); id. art. 118 (requiring release and 
repatriation of POWs upon conclusion of hostilities). 
135 Id. art. 4. 
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wearing a distinctive sign, bearing arms openly, and obeying 
the laws of war); or 
3. is a member of regular armed forces belonging to a gov-
ernment that the detaining state does not recognize.136 
 The central concept in each category is membership.137 And as 
noted above, the concept of membership (or being “part of” a group) 
at least in some contexts can be a difficult concept to apply.138 Not so in 
this setting, however. The concept of membership in structured armed 
forces presents few definitional issues.139 The use of uniforms and the 
likelihood that a captured member of such a group will willingly con-
cede such status to obtain the benefits of POW treatment further rein-
force clarity.140 
 When a person does not qualify for POW status in the context of 
an international armed conflict, it does not follow that he or she can-
not be detained without criminal charge. On the contrary, the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (“GC”) expressly contemplates a non-criminal regime of “security 
internment” for persons who are not POWs but nonetheless pose a 
threat to security in relation to an armed conflict.141 And although the 
GC’s security internment provisions are largely silent with respect to 
the individualized criteria for triggering this authority, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross’s commentaries on the GC note that 
this omission was intentional on the part of the drafters.142 The GC’s 
drafters thought it best to leave the question of scope to the discretion 
of the detaining state—though the commentaries suggest that this au-
thority might be applied, as one example, to intern individuals based 
on their membership in a dangerous organization.143 The GC frame-
work, in short, endorses something in the nature of a generalized fu-
                                                                                                                      
136 See id. art. 4(a)(1)–(3) (listing these categories). Article 4 goes on to list various 
other scenarios in which a person is to be accorded POW status. See id. art. 4. 
137 See id. 
138 See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (discussing Babe Howell’s scholarship 
on gangs). 
139 See GPW, supra note 1, art. 4. 
140 See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 115, at 1099–1100. 
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256–58 ( Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958). 
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ture dangerousness inquiry, and does not demand particular forms of 
prior conduct or associational status.144 
 If the question of detention authority arose only in the context of 
international armed conflict, the existence and scope of detention au-
thority might generate little debate. Of course we might still debate the 
labels to be applied to detainees and the resulting benefits to be given 
them. In the event of a spy or saboteur, for example, one might debate 
whether the person should be treated as a POW, a security internee, or 
an unprivileged belligerent.145 But there would be little doubt as to the 
basic capacity to detain without charge, given the existence of express 
and sweeping treaty language.146 
 For armed conflicts that are not international in the sense de-
scribed above, however, the situation is quite different. Prior to 1949, 
no LOAC treaty instrument purported to apply beyond the confines of 
an international armed conflict. The 1949 Geneva Conventions broke 
new ground by including a single article—so-called Common Article 
3—imposing a handful of baseline humanitarian protections for per-
sons in the hands of the enemy during such conflicts.147 Additional Pro-
tocol II (“APII”) subsequently expanded upon those protections 
(though the United States is not party to that instrument).148 Neither 
instrument explicitly confers substantive detention authority, nor does 
either purport to limit or deny such authority.149 
 The resulting opportunities for disagreement are considerable. 
Some construe the silence as fatal for any effort to rest the existence of 
detention authority on LOAC, let alone to use LOAC to define the 
scope of that authority.150 On that view, both authority and definitional 
scope must derive from other bodies of law (domestic, IHRL, or 
                                                                                                                      
144 See GC, supra note 141, arts. 27, 42, 43, 78. 
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150 See, e.g., Gabor Rona, A Bull in a China Shop: The War on Terror and International Law 
in the United States, 39 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 135, 148–54 (2008). 
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both).151 Others, however, contend that the absence of affirmative con-
straint is equivalent to an authorization by omission, on the theory that 
LOAC on the whole is best understood to be a restraining body of 
law.152 On this view, anything that can be done in an international 
armed conflict a fortiori can be done as well during non-international 
armed conflict—including use of the detention principles noted 
above.153 Alternatively, some might take the position that some form of 
affirmative LOAC authority is needed, and that customary LOAC sup-
plies it (again by analogy to the forms recognized by treaty in the inter-
national setting).154 
 For those drawn to either of the latter two arguments, further is-
sues emerge. Insofar as a state seeks to bring to bear detention author-
ity akin to the GPW-based power to detain members of the enemy 
armed force,155 for example, applying the “membership” concept will 
not be a simple affair when used in connection with relatively disorgan-
ized non-state actors such as insurgencies or terrorist networks. The 
POW definition in GPW Article 4 will not provide much assistance in 
that circumstance, predicated as it is on the assumption of an organized 
armed force with a command hierarchy, uniforms, and the like.156 
 Of course, a state might seek to avoid such definitional difficulties 
by instead analogizing to the more sweeping detention authority associ-
ated with security internment under the GC.157 But the very feature that 
might make this attractive—the lack of any particular substantive crite-
ria—is sure to invite objections.158 Such objections no doubt will be 
muted if the context involves sustained, large-scale, combat violence. 
For example, the United States employed security internment to detain 
tens of thousands of individuals in Iraq over the years following the in-
ternational armed conflict and occupation phases in 2003 and 2004, 
without engendering any serious objections regarding the existence and 
scope of its detention authority.159 This pattern continues on a small 
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152 See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 10, at 49, 63–65. 
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scale today, long after the expiration of the U.N. Security Council Reso-
lutions that for a time provided an ad hoc positive law blessing for this 
arrangement.160 But one should expect the opposite if the setting in-
stead involves only episodic violence less associated with public concep-
tions of combat, and only an enemy “force” that is non-hierarchical or 
otherwise indeterminate in its structure and boundaries. In that case, 
arguments could emerge as to whether the threshold of “armed con-
flict” has been crossed and, even if so, whether the broad discretion as-
sociated with the GC security internment system makes sense in the con-
text of this particular form of violence.161 
3. International Human Rights Law 
 Though IHRL refers to a diverse array of treaties and international 
customary law norms,162 for present purposes it suffices to focus atten-
tion on a single treaty and norm: the prohibition of arbitrary detention 
contained in Article 9 of the ICCPR.163 Article 9 provides that all per-
sons have a “right to liberty” and thus a state shall not deprive a person 
of liberty “except on such grounds and in accordance with such proce-
dure as are established by law.”164 That is to say, a state may not hold a 
person in custody on its own whim as opposed to doing so based on a 
claim that detention in that circumstance is authorized by law. 
 Or at least a state may not do so ordinarily. The ICCPR also pro-
vides that in the event of a public proclamation of an emergency 
“which threatens the life of the nation,” states may “take measures 
derogating” from certain ICCPR obligations, including the prohibition 
on arbitrary detention.165 Then again, the United States has not in-
voked the derogation option (presumably because the U.S. govern-
ment position is that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially and 
that LOAC, in any event, controls over the ICCPR by virtue of the lex 
specialis principle, as discussed above).166 
 Assuming that Article 9 is applicable, then, the question becomes 
whether U.S. government claims of detention authority after 9/11 
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161 Rona, supra note 158, at 501–03. 
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might violate that norm. The U.S. government presumably would ar-
gue that military detention conducted under the auspices of the AUMF 
satisfies Article 9, on the theory that the AUMF is a “law” establishing 
the “grounds” for such detention. In response, one might contend that 
Article 9 contemplates only criminal law as a source of detention author-
ity, but there is substantial reason to doubt that Article 9 requires such 
an approach.167 
 Assuming that some degree of non-criminal detention is compatible 
with Article 9 (or, if one prefers, with an equivalent customary norm 
against arbitrary detention), we must consider whether the govern-
ment’s claim of some particular mix of detention predicates and con-
straints violates IHRL. Here, however, IHRL seems not to have anything 
particular to say: no substantive definition of non-criminal detention 
authority is offered by the ICCPR, any other IHRL treaty to which the 
United States is a party, or any customary norm of IHRL.168 
C. Strategic Change, Convergence, and Balloon-Squeezing 
 Thus far we have examined two clusters of issues: one involving dis-
agreement as to the applicable bodies of law,169 and the other involving 
disagreement as to the content of whatever law may be applicable.170 
These are not the only issues that cloud the question of who lawfully 
may be detained, however. The prospect of legal change further com-
plicates the effort to identify the legal boundaries of detention authority. 
 Law is never entirely static. A given legal framework may change 
over time for any number of reasons and through any number of proc-
esses (though some processes raise more legitimacy concerns than oth-
ers). In light of the pervasive ambiguity described above, we may be 
especially likely to see pressure for change in this setting; the indeter-
minacy of the law relating to who may be held invites arguments for 
                                                                                                                      
167 See, e.g., Hakimi, supra note 10, at 383–89 (discussing administrative detention as an 
IHRL-compatible alternative to criminal prosecution in circumstances in which LOAC-
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168 See id. at 392–95 (“[P]ure security-based detention is permitted under the ICCPR, so 
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change that might reduce uncertainty.171 The ambiguity also makes it 
easier to cast reform-oriented arguments in descriptive terms—i.e., to 
portray normative arguments as if they are mere interpretations of al-
ready-existing law—and thereby to avoid legitimacy concerns for 
whichever institution is considering the argument. 
 None of which is to say that arguments for change are unwar-
ranted in the context of post-9/11 events. On the contrary, changing 
practical circumstances exert considerable pressure on the aforemen-
tioned legal frameworks.172 But it is important to understand the na-
ture of that pressure and how it relates to the ambiguities discussed 
above— especially for the judges who now are obliged to determine 
who lawfully may be held.173 
                                                                                                                     
1. Strategic Change 
 As Philip Bobbitt has argued, the constitutional order of a state ex-
ists in dynamic relationship with that state’s strategic circumstances.174 
On this view, changing strategic circumstances—or more specifically, 
changing perceptions thereof—may place pressure on the constitu-
tional structure to evolve in some particular direction.175 At the same 
time, however, the nature of the prevailing legal order—not to mention 
the extent to which the state actually adheres to it—can itself influence 
the strategic context.176 One might extend this observation beyond con-
stitutional structure, applying it to any legal framework associated with 
the state’s management of security affairs. 
 Michael Schmitt recently did just that in the course of examining 
LOAC principles governing the use of lethal force.177 Schmitt noted the 
increasing prominence of armed conflicts involving non-state actors that 
eschew compliance with LOAC, and the tendency of such groups to en-
 
171 See supra notes 70–168 and accompanying text. 
172 See Michael N. Schmitt, The Vanishing Law of War: Reflections on Law and War in the 
21st Century, Harv. Int’l Rev., Spring 2009, at 60, 65–68; infra notes 174–187 and accom-
panying text; see also al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 300, 314–21 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (quoting from Philip Bobbitt’s Shield of Achilles and embracing 
Bobbit’s concept of a dynamic relationship between law and strategic context); infra notes 
326–338 (discussing this aspect of Judge Wilkinson’s al-Marri opinion). 
173 See infra notes 188–212 and accompanying text. 
174 For extended treatments of this proposition, see generally Philip Bobbitt, The 
Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (2002) [hereinafter Bob-
bitt, The Shield of Achilles]; Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for 
the Twenty-First Century (2008). 
175 See Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, supra note 174, at xxii. 
176 See id. 
177 Schmitt, supra note 172, at 60, 65–68. 
800 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:769 
danger civilians, both by attacking them purposefully and by attempting 
to blend in amongst them.178 This “asymmetric warfare” trend, he as-
serted, posed a profound challenge to the standard LOAC framework in 
which force may be used against combatants at all times prior to cap-
ture, but never against civilians—unless they are directly participating in 
hostilities at the time.179 Schmitt notes that these pressures in recent 
years have found expression in the context of policies and laws relating 
to targeting and rules of engagement.180 For example, as a matter of 
policy judgment in pursuit of a particular vision of counterinsurgency 
strategy, the U.S. military imposed strict rules of engagement on itself in 
Afghanistan—stricter than required by LOAC, insofar as the U.S. mili-
tary is concerned.181 Schmitt notes, however, that critics who want the 
U.S. military to further restrain its targeting practices at times pitch their 
arguments in legal as well as policy terms, and he suggests that the law 
relating to targeting may yet adapt accordingly.182 
 The asymmetric warfare trend emphasized by Schmitt—involving 
the increasing strategic significance of non-state actors who eschew the 
principle of distinction in their targeting practices and in their efforts 
to conceal themselves—does not merely exert pressure on the law relat-
ing to targeting.183 It also applies pressure to the various legal frame-
works, discussed above, relating to detention.184 On one hand, non-
state actors who defy easy identification place tremendous pressure on 
any legal model that presupposes that enemies are readily identified via 
uniforms, citizenship, or their own admission.185 Opportunities for 
false positives necessarily are much higher in this context, undermining 
a key assumption of process-weak screening systems (like those associ-
ated with LOAC in international armed conflict).186 And, as noted 
above, the informal, decentralized nature of such groups similarly un-
dermines the utility of membership as a substantive detention crite-
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rion.187 On the other hand, the increasing strategic significance of at 
least some such actors pressures the state to incapacitate them. 
2. Convergence 
ation of these pressures generates a “convergence” 
en
werful expression over the past 
ve
                                                                                                                     
 The combin
ph omenon in which the familiar models of military detention and 
criminal prosecution gravitate toward one another en route to devel-
opment of a more tailored, hybrid model.188 This hybrid model is char-
acterized by intermediate levels of process (with neither the rigor of a 
criminal prosecution nor the discretion of the traditional military 
model) and fine-tuned substantive detention criteria, reaching beyond 
the concept of formal membership.189 
 The convergence trend found po
se n years in Iraq.190 The initial U.S. military intervention in 2003 in-
augurated an international armed conflict in which the baseline deten-
tion frameworks associated with LOAC—detention of POWs under the 
GPW and security internment of civilians under the GC—plainly were 
applicable, and this continued into the summer of 2004 during the oc-
cupation phase.191 Beginning in 2004, however, Iraq resumed its sover-
eignty, rendering the legal foundation for non-criminal detention far 
less clear.192 But with the insurgency mounting and the institutional 
capacities of the nascent Iraqi state still weak to nonexistent (especially 
Iraq’s security-related institutions), the strategic context nonetheless 
favored continuation of military detention in some form.193 The solu-
tion was to continue security internment—indeed, to expand its scale 
dramatically, with more than twenty-six thousand internees in custody 
at one point194—by mere analogy to the GC system, based on an ex-
change of diplomatic notes between America and Iraq that then were 
incorporated by reference in a series of U.N. Security Council resolu-
tions.195 Eventually, increasing attention to the strategic imperatives of 
 
187 See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (discussing Babe Howell’s scholarship 
on g
ney & Goldsmith, supra note 115, at 1100–01. 
, supra note 4, at 633–34; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Status of US 
Forc






es in Iraq from 2003–2008, 11 Chi. J. Int’l L. 1, 26–27 (2010). 
191 See Chesney, supra note 4, at 558–59, 563. 
192 See id. at 574–97. 
193 See id. 
194 Id. at 5
he War in Iraq: A Legal Analysis 411 (Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo ed., 2010)). 
195 Id. at 558–59. 
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counterinsurgency turned attention to the problem of false positives 
associated with this model; as a result, the security internment system 
was modified to afford greater procedural protections.196 At the same 
time, efforts to stand up the Iraqi criminal justice system as an alterna-
tive mode of detention for security threats accelerated.197 
 These trends developed further in 2009, after the last U.N. Secu-
ty 
 trend is now showing signs of emer-
enc
to the Guantanamo de-
                                                                                                                     
ri Council Resolution expired.198 At that point, the United States for-
mally agreed with Iraq to terminate its security internment system in 
favor of sole reliance on the Iraqi criminal justice system, at least in 
most instances.199 The agreement did contain a little-noticed provision, 
however, permitting some degree of detention-without-charge to con-
tinue.200 It seems that the United States has made use of this option to 
hold onto a small population of security internees, and it appears it will 
continue to do so for as long as it retains a military presence in Iraq 
because these individuals are ostensibly both too difficult to prosecute 
and too dangerous to release.201 
 Meanwhile, the convergence
g e in Afghanistan as well, as illustrated by both significantly en-
hanced procedural safeguards in the detention screening process and 
substantial efforts to establish the host-nation prosecution option.202 All 
of which is entirely to be expected given that the strategic environment 
in Afghanistan (like that in Iraq) involves non-state actors who are diffi-
cult to identify and yet pose such a threat that the pressure to afford a 
non-criminal detention option is significant.203 
 Convergence can also be seen in relation 
tainees. It emerged as early as the summer of 2004 with the military’s 
adoption of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal and Administrative 
 
196 Id. at 597–99; see infra notes 209–210 and accompanying text (defining “false posi-
tive” in this context). 
197 See Chesney, supra note 4, at 588–89. 
198 See S.C. Res. 1790, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007); Chesney, supra note 4, at 
599. 
199 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on 
the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities 
During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, art. 22, Nov. 17, 2008, Temp. State 
Dep’t No. 09-6 [hereinafter U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement]; Chesney, supra note 4, 
at 600. 
200 See U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement, supra note 199, art. 22(4); Chesney, supra 
note 4, at 600. 
201 See Chesney, supra note 4, at 625–26. 
202 Bovarnick, supra note 100, at 9–11, 19–22. 
203 Cf. id. at 15–16. 
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Review Board systems,204 and the Supreme Court’s decision to extend 
habeas jurisdiction to Guantanamo in Rasul.205 We see it as well in the 
2005 enactment of the DTA, which pushed back against the Rasul hold-
ing, yet called for at least some degree of judicial review of detention 
decisions.206 And we certainly see it in the Supreme Court’s 2008 hold-
ing in Boumediene, which established that the DTA review system was 
inadequate to supplant habeas review, in part because detainees must 
have the chance to put fresh evidence before a court.207 Federal judges 
ever since have been grappling with a host of procedural questions, in-
cluding disclosure and discovery obligations, the burden of proof, the 
rules governing protection of classified information, and the rules gov-
erning the admissibility of hearsay and potentially coerced state-
ments.208 The resulting screening system is still a work in progress, but 
already is a further manifestation—if not the apotheosis—of the con-
vergence trend insofar as questions of process are concerned. 
3. Balloon Squeezing: Resort to Alternative Mechanisms for 




                                                                                                                     
Neutralizing the Enemy 
The question at hand t
a find expression in the substantive grounds for detention. As we will 
see in the next Part, that is a central issue with which the judges in the 
habeas cases have been wrestling.209 Before we move on to survey what 
they have had to say, however, a final observation is in order concerning 
the dynamic relationships implicated by the non-state actor scenario. 
 The convergence thesis describes one manner in which law mig
re ond to the cross-cutting pressures associated with the asymmetric 
warfare phenomenon—i.e., the pressure to reduce false positives (tar-
geting, capture, or detention of the wrong individual) while also ensur-
ing an adequate capacity to neutralize the non-state actors in question. 
One must bear in mind, however, that detention itself is not the only 
system of government action that can satisfy that latter interest. Other 
options exist, including the use of lethal force; the use of rendition to 
place individuals in detention at the hands of some other state; the use 
 
204 Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 115, at 1110–12. 
205 542 U.S. at 484. 
206 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 §§ 1001, 1003–1004, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 
2680, 2739 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)); see Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 
115, at 1115. 
207 553 U.S. at 732–33. 
208 See Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supra note 25, at 10. 
209 See infra notes 213–586 and accompanying text. 
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of persuasion to induce some other state to take custody of an individ-
ual through its own means; and perhaps also the use of various forms of 
surveillance to establish a sort of constructive, loose control over a per-
son (though for persons located outside the United States it is unlikely 
that surveillance could be much more than episodic, and thus any re-
sulting element of “control” may be quite weak).210 




                                                                                                                     
th e options are likely to be far worse experiences than U.S.-
administered detention. In addition, all but the last are also likely to be 
far less useful for purposes of intelligence-gathering from the point of 
view of the U.S. government.211 Nonetheless, these alternatives may 
grow attractive to the government in circumstances where the detention 
alternative becomes unduly restricted, yet the pressure for intervention 
remains. The situation is rather like squeezing a balloon: the result is 
not to shrink the balloon, but instead to displace the pressure from one 
side to another, causing the balloon to distend along the unconstrained 
side. So too here: when one of these coercive powers becomes con-
strained in new, more restrictive ways, the displaced pressure to inca-
pacitate may simply find expression through one of the alternative 
mechanisms. On this view it is no surprise that lethal drone strikes have 
increased dramatically over the past two years, that the Obama admini-
stration has refused to foreswear rendition, that in Iraq we have largely 
(though not entirely) outsourced our detention operations to the Iraqis, 
and that we now are progressing along the same path in Afghanistan.212 
 Decisions regarding the calibration of a detention system—the
m agement of the convergence process, if you will—thus take place in 
the shadow of this balloon-squeezing phenomenon. A thorough policy 
review would take this into account, as should any formal lawmaking 
process. For the moment, however, our formal law-making process is 
not directed at the detention-scope question. Instead, clarification and 
development with respect to the substantive grounds for detention 
takes place through the lens of habeas corpus litigation. 
 
210 See generally Wittes, supra note 7. 
211 U.S.-administered detention in general is a superior option from the point of view 
of intelligence-gathering in that use of lethal force eliminates the option of asking ques-
tions of the target and use of rendition limits U.S. control over the questioning of the tar-
get (as the custodial state may or may not fully cooperate with U.S. requests). 
212 See Wittes, supra note 7, at 5–7. 
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III. Habeas Litigation and the Scope of the Detention Power 
 Against the backdrop of uncertainty described in Part II, federal 
courts have struggled for nine years to identify the mix of detention 
predicates and constraints permissibly defining the substantive scope of 
the government’s military detention authority at the level of the indi-
vidual. The range of resulting disagreements is remarkable. 
 This Part aims to provide a relatively comprehensive descriptive 
account of these doctrinal disputes. It proceeds in semi-chronological 
fashion. Section A considers the often-overlooked habeas opinions as-
sociated with the three individuals who were held as “enemy combat-
ants” within the United States after 9/11.213 Section B then reviews the 
pre-Boumediene Guantanamo habeas opinions; examines how post-
Boumediene Guantanamo habeas opinions treated the variables of per-
sonal dangerousness, membership, and support; and documents the 
many points of disagreement that persist.214 
A. The First Wave of Detention Criteria Case Law: Hamdi,  
Padilla, and al-Marri 
 For several years following 9/11, the judiciary largely was preoccu-
pied with questions of jurisdiction, not substantive law.215 Most detainees 
were noncitizens captured abroad and held outside the United States, 
after all, and as a result did not have a clearly established right to seek 
judicial review until 2008, when the U.S. Supreme Court conclusively 
resolved that question in its decision in Boumediene v. Bush.216 Nonethe-
less, judges did have occasion to address the matter of individual deten-
tion predicates and constraints in a handful of cases in the pre-
Boumediene era, including a trio of cases—discussed below—involving 
detainees held in the United States (one originally captured in a combat 
setting abroad, and two captured in the United States itself).217 
                                                                                                                      
213 See infra notes 215–349 and accompanying text. 
214 See infra notes 350–586 and accompanying text. 
215 See Azmy, supra note 10, at 504–14; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 2107–33; 
Goodman, supra note 10, at 51–60; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 10, at 2654–58; Hakimi, 
supra note 10, at 370–75; Sitaraman, supra note 10, at 1821; Waxman, supra note 10, at 17–23. 
216 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008). 
217 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 
430 (2004); al-Marri v. Wright (al-Marri I ), 487 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc 
sub nom. al-Marri v. Pucciarelli (al-Marri II ), 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated 
sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.). 
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1. The Scope of Detention Authority in Relation to Conventional 
Battlefield Captures Involving the Taliban 
 The sole post-9/11 instance in which the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the substantive-scope issue to any serious extent is its 2004 deci-
sion Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.218 In Hamdi, a majority of the Court concluded 
that (1) associational status—in particular, serving as an arms-bearing 
member of a Taliban military unit—sufficed as a detention predicate, 
at least where the detention occurred on the field in Afghanistan and 
while combat operations continue in that location; and (2) being a U.S. 
citizen does not exempt a person from being subject to such detention 
authority.219 
 Yaser Hamdi came into U.S. custody in Afghanistan after being 
captured by Northern Alliance forces in the fall of 2001.220 The United 
States initially believed that Hamdi was a citizen of Saudi Arabia but 
learned, after bringing him to Guantanamo, that he was born in Lou-
isiana and hence could claim U.S. citizenship.221 As a result, he was 
moved to a detention facility inside the United States and no longer 
faced the jurisdictional hurdles then preventing other Guantanamo 
detainees from obtaining habeas review.222 
 Hamdi’s case presented a relatively easy fact pattern from the 
viewpoint of the substantive-scope issue. He was not alleged to be an al 
Qaeda member or associate, and he was not captured in circumstances 
seemingly unrelated to conventional armed conflict.223 Rather, the gov-
ernment claimed, he was an arms-bearing fighter for the Taliban who 
had been captured with his unit and his weapon while fleeing the bat-
tlefield in Afghanistan.224 Hamdi denied that this was true, but for pre-
sent purposes the important point is that the allegations cleanly pre-
sented the question of whether a person meeting that description law-
fully could be held without criminal charge.225 
 The fact pattern actually posed two distinct substantive-scope ques-
tions. First, did the government have authority to detain any person in 
this situation—i.e., bearing arms for the Taliban in Afghanistan? Sec-
ond, if the government did have such authority as a general proposi-
                                                                                                                      
218 See 542 U.S. at 516–17. 
219 See id. 
220 Id. at 510. 
221 Id. 
222 See id. at 510, 512. 
223 See id. at 512–13. 
224 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512–13. 
225 See id. at 516. 
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tion, would the answer change if the person happened to be a U.S. citi-
zen? The Supreme Court splintered in response to these questions.226 
 A plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, up-
held both the government’s notional assertion of some authority to de-
tain and its claim that such authority extended at least to Hamdi’s al-
leged circumstances.227 Justice Thomas provided a fifth vote for these 
conclusions in a separate opinion.228 To begin with, the plurality 
framed the issue as turning on a question of domestic law informed by 
reference to international law: they focused on the meaning of the Sep-
tember 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) as 
construed in light of the law of armed conflict.229 As to the existence of 
some authority to detain, no treaty-based detention provision appeared 
directly applicable; Hamdi was not held as a prisoner of war or security 
internee, and, by 2004, the conflict in Afghanistan no longer appeared 
to be an international armed conflict in any event.230 Nonetheless, the 
plurality concluded that detention was a traditional “incident” of war-
fare and thus, presumably, a necessary part of whatever body of cus-
tomary law of armed conflict (“LOAC”) principles might govern in this 
setting.231 As for who precisely might be detained as a result, the plural-
ity concluded that detention authority at least extended to persons who 
engaged in a particular combination of past conduct and associational 
status: bearing arms as part of a Taliban military unit in Afghanistan.232 
                                                                                                                      
226 See id. at 509 (plurality opinion) (holding that the government had authority to de-
tain Hamdi under the AUMF); id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, 
and concurring in the judgment) (contending that the AUMF did not give the govern-
ment authority to detain Hamdi); id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hamdi 
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that the government had authority to detain Hamdi). 
227 See id. at 521 (plurality opinion); infra Appendix, Table 1. The same plurality also 
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Times, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1. 
228 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 587–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality 
that the government had authority to detain Hamdi, but arguing that Hamdi’s habeas 
petition should not be granted). 
229 See id. at 519–20 (plurality opinion). 
230 Id. 
231 See id. at 518. 
232 Id. at 518–19, 524 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942); In re Territo, 
156 F.2d 142, 148 (9th Cir. 1946)); id. at 592–93 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Quirin, 
317 U.S. at 45). 
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Furthermore, emphasizing that the point of military detention is pre-
ventive incapacitation, the plurality expressly rejected the idea that de-
tention might be justified on the collateral ground that a person may 
possess useful intelligence.233 
 The plurality pointedly did not express any view, however, as to the 
existence or scope of detention authority in other settings. It did not 
say whether detention authority extended beyond the Taliban to al 
Qaeda. It did not address the power to detain persons captured outside 
of Afghanistan, or persons who did not literally bear arms on a conven-
tional battlefield. It merely observed that “[t]he legal category of en-
emy combatant has not been elaborated upon in great detail,” and that 
“[t]he permissible bounds of the category will be defined by the lower 
courts as subsequent cases are presented to them.”234 The plurality did 
caution, however, that its “understanding is based on longstanding law-
of-war principles,” and that “[i]f the practical circumstances of a given 
conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the de-
velopment of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.”235 
2. The Scope of Detention Authority in Relation to Domestic Captures 
Involving al Qaeda 
 The Hamdi decision left open more questions than it answered. 
What conduct other than bearing arms on the battlefield might count 
as membership in an AUMF-covered group justifying detention? Would 
membership continue to be sufficient if a person were to be captured 
outside Afghanistan, or if the linkage was to al Qaeda rather than the 
Taliban? Could conduct aside from membership—especially providing 
material support—provide an independent sufficient condition for de-
tention in any location? 
 The cases of Jose Padilla and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri provided 
an early opportunity to address some of these loose ends.236 Unlike 
Guantanamo detainees, but like Yaser Hamdi, both were in a position 
to seek habeas review without much jurisdictional dispute.237 Padilla 
was an American citizen captured in Chicago and eventually taken into 
military custody on the ground that he was an al Qaeda sleeper agent 
who had come back to the United States to assist or even personally 
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234 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 n.1. 
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236 See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430; al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 163. 
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participate in terrorist attacks.238 Al-Marri, a Qatari citizen, likewise was 
arrested inside the United States and later transferred to military cus-
tody based on his alleged role as an al Qaeda sleeper agent.239 Neither, 
it initially appeared, was directly connected to the conventional battle-
field in Afghanistan or to the Taliban.240 
a. Padilla 
 The Padilla litigation moved forward quickly. Indeed, Padilla ex. rel. 
Newman v. Bush put the substantive detention authority question before 
Judge Mukasey of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York by December 2002.241 As an initial matter, he found (1) that 
the President had general authority to use military force against al 
Qaeda as a result of both the AUMF and Article II of the Constitution; 
and (2) that the substantive scope of the resulting detention authority 
could be determined at least in part by reference to LOAC (at least in 
the form of treaties to which the United States is a party, such as the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(GPW)).242 LOAC, Judge Mukasey concluded, permits the detention 
without charge of persons who qualify either as lawful or unlawful 
combatants.243 He did not elaborate on the conditions necessary to 
show that a person fits into one or the other category; that is, he did 
not specify whether lawful and unlawful combatancy turns on conduct, 
status, or both.244 He did, however, expressly reject the notion that Pa-
dilla should be exempt from detention simply because he was a citizen 
or because he was captured within the United States.245 In addition, he 
implicitly rejected the notion that detention authority extends only to 
persons who actually bore arms on a conventional battlefield.246 
 Padilla appealed and, in late 2003, prevailed in Padilla v. Rums-
feld—a decision of a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
                                                                                                                      
238 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430–31. 
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Second Circuit.247 For Judges Rosemary S. Pooler and Barrington D. 
Parker, the critical facts were Padilla’s status as a citizen and his arrest 
within the United States—i.e., away from a conventional battlefield.248 
In that specific scenario, they concluded, the Constitution requires that 
any power to detain be conferred expressly by statute, not implicitly.249 
The AUMF, on this view, lacked sufficient clarity.250 
 This set the stage for Supreme Court review, or so it appeared. In 
the end, however, the Court avoided the issue.251 In 2004, in an opin-
ion issued simultaneously with its Hamdi ruling, the Court held that the 
petition in Padilla’s case should have been filed in South Carolina (the 
state in which Padilla was held at the time he filed) rather than in New 
York (the state in which he initially had been held).252 Litigation thus 
had to begin anew at the district court level.253 
 On remand to the U.S. District Court for the District of South 
Carolina, under the name Padilla v. Hanft, Judge Henry F. Floyd adopt-
ed the Second Circuit’s view that detention authority did not apply to 
an American captured in the United States (absent a clear statement 
from Congress of its intention to convey such authority), but also add-
ed an additional reason to believe Padilla, in particular, could not be 
detained.254 The phrase “all necessary and appropriate force” in the 
AUMF, he concluded, should be construed rather literally: any exercise 
of force must be “necessary” in the strict sense that no adequate non-
military alternative is available.255 Padilla could not be detained militar-
ily, on this view, because he could be (and indeed for a time had been) 
incapacitated instead through the civilian criminal justice system.256 
                                                                                                                      
247 See Padilla II, 352 F.3d at 698, rev’d and remanded, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); infra Appen-
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 A few months later, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit reversed, albeit on somewhat unexpected grounds.257 
Referencing the Hamdi plurality opinion, Judge J. Michael Luttig ex-
plained that the ultimate question is whether the AUMF, as construed 
in light of LOAC, confers detention authority in a particular case.258 
Hamdi had settled the point as to a Taliban member captured in the 
field in Afghanistan,259 whereas the Padilla litigation seemed to present 
the question of whether the same result pertained to an al Qaeda 
member captured far from conventional combat.260 But, as restated in 
the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, the fact pattern in Padilla looked much 
more like that in Hamdi.261 Padilla, Judge Luttig emphasized, had re-
ceived military training at an al Qaeda facility in Afghanistan and was 
present there as part of an armed al Qaeda unit serving the Taliban at 
the time of the U.S. military intervention after 9/11.262 The only nota-
ble difference between Hamdi and Padilla, on this view, was that the 
latter managed to evade capture until far from the battlefield.263 In the 
panel’s view, this was no reason to deny the government’s detention 
authority, even when the capture occurred within the United States.264 
 Once more the stage seemed set for Supreme Court review. What 
would have occurred next remains a mystery, however, as the govern-
ment soon transferred Padilla back to civilian custody in order to pros-
ecute him in Florida.265 The move precipitated criticism in some quar-
ters, and a manifestly unhappy Judge Luttig denied a government mo-
tion to vacate the earlier decision.266 Nonetheless, Padilla’s special role 
as the vehicle for fleshing out the substantive law of detention had 
come to an end. Going forward, it seemed that it would be the con-
temporaneous al-Marri litigation that tested the boundaries of deten-
tion authority.267 
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b. Al-Marri 
 Like Padilla, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri initially pursued habeas re-
lief in the wrong jurisdiction, and as a result no judge addressed the 
merits of his case until 2005.268 Eventually he refiled his petition in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, and, like Padilla, 
his case came before Judge Floyd.269 As noted above, in Padilla’s case, 
Judge Floyd in early 2005 had construed the AUMF not to provide de-
tention authority.270 As he was deciding the same issue in al-Marri’s case 
just a few months later—and before the Fourth Circuit reversed his Pa-
dilla ruling—al-Marri no doubt expected a similar result.271 But it 
turned out otherwise: in al-Marri v. Hanft in July 2005, Judge Floyd 
drew a sharp distinction between citizens, such as Padilla, and nonciti-
zens, such as al-Marri—notwithstanding the latter’s lawful residence in 
the United States.272 Citizenship, on this view, had been not just an im-
portant but a necessary condition of Judge Floyd’s earlier, strict reading 
of the AUMF.273 For noncitizens, he insisted on neither express statu-
tory language conferring detention authority nor a strict reading of 
“necessity,” such that military detention is not permissible when crimi-
nal prosecution suffices as an alternative.274 Judge Floyd’s al-Marri opin-
ion thus emerged alongside Judge Mukasey’s Padilla opinion as a broad 
endorsement of detention authority away from the conventional battle-
field.275 
 Approximately one year later, in al-Marri v. Wright, a divided panel 
of the Fourth Circuit yet again reversed.276 The panel majority, written 
by Judge Diana Gribbon Motz, framed its analysis, at least at the outset, 
in terms of a domestic law consideration that would not necessarily ap-
                                                                                                                      
268 See al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 673 (D.S.C. 2005), rev’d sub nom. al-Marri 
v. Wright (al-Marri I ), 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc sub nom. al-Marri v. Pucci-
arelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. 
Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.). Al-Marri initially sought habeas review in Illinois but, like Padilla, 
eventually was obliged to refile in South Carolina. See al-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Supp. 2d 
1003, 1009 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that the petition had to be filed in the district in 
which al-Marri was held at the time of filing), aff’d sub nom. al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 
707 (7th Cir. 2004). 
269 See al-Marri, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 673; infra Appendix, Table 6. 
270 Padilla, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 686. 
271 See Padilla, 423 F.3d at 389. 
272 See 378 F. Supp. 2d at 676–77. 
273 See id. 
274 Id. at 679–80. 
275 See id.; Padilla I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 588. 
276 See 487 F.3d at 195; infra Appendix, Table 7. 
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ply to noncitizens captured outside the United States.277 Specifically, 
Judge Motz emphasized that al-Marri, though a noncitizen, was lawfully 
present in the United States at the time of his arrest and hence was 
able to invoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause.278 The manner in which she elaborated on the requirements of 
the Fifth Amendment in this context, however, had sweeping implica-
tions for the scope of the government’s detention power even in other 
settings.279 The Fifth Amendment, she explained, generally precludes 
detention other than pursuant to criminal conviction, subject only to a 
fixed number of narrowly defined exceptions.280 One such exception is 
the power to detain an enemy combatant during war,281 and the bound-
aries of that category must be ascertained by reference to LOAC.282 Her 
analysis of the Fifth Amendment issue thus became a vehicle for staking 
out a position regarding LOAC’s general approach to the substantive-
scope issue—a position that would carry implications for any detention 
carried out under color of LOAC, regardless of whether the detainee 
had Fifth Amendment rights or access to judicial review.283 
 What precisely did the panel conclude with respect to LOAC’s 
treatment of the detention question? The opinion began by asserting 
that LOAC “provides clear rules for determining an individual’s status” 
as either a “combatant” or a “civilian” in the context of international 
armed conflict.284 The panel asserted that civilians were categorically 
immune from military detention without criminal charge, failing to 
account for the security internment regime provided in the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (“GC”).285 LOAC, the panel concluded, contemplated detention 
solely for combatants.286 
 As to who constituted a combatant, the panel looked to GPW Arti-
cle 4, which defines eligibility for POW status.287 The panel equated 
eligibility for detention with eligibility for POW status, adding that 
                                                                                                                      
277 See al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 174–76. 
278 Id. at 174–75. 
279 See id. 
280 Id. at 175. 
281 Id. at 175–76. 
282 Id. at 178–79. 
283 See al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 178–79. 
284 Id. at 178. 
285 See id. at 178 n.8 (asserting that civilians under LOAC categorically are “not subject 
to military seizure or detention”). 
286 See id. at 178–79. 
287 Id. (citing GPW, supra note 1, Articles 2, 4, and 5 and GC, supra note 141, Article 4). 
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LOAC treats as “combatants” only those who fight for the military arm 
of a nation-state, not just any armed group.288 Indeed, the panel added, 
there simply was no such thing as “combatant” status—and hence no 
LOAC-based detention authority—outside the context of international 
armed conflict.289 
 This was fatal to the attempt to detain al-Marri.290 Hamdi had been 
detainable in theory because of his alleged affiliation with the military 
arm of the Taliban, with the Taliban functioning as the de facto gov-
ernment of Afghanistan.291 Padilla’s eligibility ultimately rested on the 
same ground (according to the Fourth Circuit at least, even if not 
Judge Floyd).292 Al-Marri, in contrast, was a “mere” al Qaeda member 
with no alleged prior role as a de facto Taliban battlefield fighter.293 At 
most he was someone associated with the enemy in a non-international 
armed conflict in which there simply was no LOAC-based detention 
authority.294 No al Qaeda member could be detained absent the coin-
cidence of having been in the field in Afghanistan in a context that 
could be described as bearing arms for the Taliban—whether later cap-
tured in the United States or not.295 
                                                                                                                     
 But the al-Marri litigation was not over.296 In al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 
the government successfully sought en banc review—resulting in a re-
versal of the panel by a narrow margin and a profound splintering of 
opinion regarding the substantive bounds of the government’s deten-
tion authority.297 Four judges, in a new opinion by Judge Motz, en-
dorsed the panel’s original rationale.298 Five other judges disagreed, 
albeit for different reasons.299 
 Judge William Byrd Traxler, in an opinion joined in relevant part 
by Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, concentrated on the language of the AUMF 
 
288 Id. at 179–82. 
289 Al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 184–85. 
290 See id. 
291 Id. at 179. 
292 See id. at 182; Padilla, 389 F. Supp. at 687–89 (holding that Padilla could not be de-
tained). 
293 Al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 183, 186. 
294 Id. at 183. 
295 See id. 
296 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 216. 
297 See id. at 218–19 (Motz, J., concurring) (plurality opinion); infra Appendix, Table 8. 
298 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 221–53; infra Appendix, Table 8. 
299 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 216 (per curium); see also id. at 253 (Traxler, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); id at 284 (Williams, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
293 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 341–42 (Niemeyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 351 (Duncan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); infra Appendix, Table 8. 
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itself, and in particular on its reference to the use of force against “or-
ganizations” as well as “nations” found to be linked to the 9/11 at-
tacks.300 In their view, the AUMF reflected a legislative intent to permit 
military force against al Qaeda, above all.301 They did not dispute that 
LOAC defined limits on how such force might be employed, but they 
rejected the panel’s conclusion that LOAC permitted detention only 
when dealing with members of the military arm of an actual nation 
state.302 
 Chief Judge Karen J. Williams, in a separate opinion joined by 
Judge Allyson K. Duncan, offered a view that was simultaneously broad 
and narrow.303 Like Judge Traxler, Chief Judge Williams rejected the 
claim that the detention authority conferred by the AUMF should be 
read to apply only to members of the military arm of a government.304 
But whereas Judge Traxler suggested that LOAC imposed no such limi-
tation, Chief Judge Williams accepted that the panel’s approach “may 
very well be correct” as a statement of LOAC.305 She simply did not 
think that any such LOAC-based restraints survived the AUMF’s explicit 
reference to the use of force against “organizations” as well as “nations” 
linked to the 9/11 attacks.306 Interestingly, however, Chief Judge Wil-
liams in another sense defined detention authority narrowly.307 Rather 
than refer to mere membership in or association with an enemy force 
as sufficient to justify detention under the AUMF, she advanced a con-
duct-based criterion: one must “attempt[] or engage[] in belligerent 
acts against the United States” on “behalf of an enemy force” in order 
to be subject to detention on this model.308 Further complicating mat-
ters, moreover, she (somewhat inconsistently) held open the possibility 
that detention authority might not continue to exist were the United 
                                                                                                                      
300 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 259–60 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment); infra 
Appendix, Table 8. 
301 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 260–61 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment). 
302 See id. at 261–62. 
303 See id. at 285–87 (Williams, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); infra 
Appendix, Table 8. 
304 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 285–86 (Williams, C.J., concurring). 
305 Id. at 286. 
306 Id. (noting the Charming Betsy canon favoring constructions of statutes to comport 
with international law but concluding that the AUMF is sufficiently clear so as to trump 
any contrary customary law rule). 
307 See id. at 285. 
308 Id. But cf. id. at 288 (emphasizing the allegation that al-Marri was a member of al 
Qaeda since 1996, as opposed to emphasizing his conduct in entering the United States to 
conduct or support an attack). 
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States no longer engaged in conventional combat operations in Af-
ghanistan.309 
 Then we have the distinctive opinion of Judge J. Harvey Wilkin-
son.310 His analysis began relatively conventionally, exploring whether 
the AUMF on its own terms could plausibly be read to limit detention 
authority to members of government-sponsored armed forces or per-
sons who literally fought on a conventional battlefield.311 Neither its 
broad terms nor the legislative intent giving rise to it could be squared 
with such limits, he concluded.312 
 Next, Judge Wilkinson considered whether the broad scope of de-
tention authority seemingly conferred by the AUMF could be recon-
ciled with any applicable constitutional limitations given that al-Marri 
had been lawfully residing in the United States.313 Citing Hamdi, Judge 
Wilkinson observed that the government may constitutionally detain 
persons who count as “enemy combatants.”314 The task at the heart of 
the constitutional inquiry, therefore, was to identify the contours of the 
“enemy combatant” category.315 Toward that end, Judge Wilkinson rea-
soned that one must look to “traditional law of war principles.”316 
LOAC was “not binding of its own force,” he cautioned, but mattered 
nonetheless because it “informs our understanding of the war powers 
in Articles I and II and of the enemy combatant category.”317 
 Having clarified his motivation for doing so, Judge Wilkinson pro-
ceeded to a lengthy discussion of LOAC’s treatment of the detention 
question.318 In accord with Judge Motz—and likewise without reference 
to the security internment framework in the GC—Judge Wilkinson ac-
cepted that LOAC permitted detention without criminal charge solely 
for combatants, not for civilians.319 He differed sharply from Judge 
Motz, however, with respect to the scope of the combatant category.320 
Whereas Judge Motz effectively equated combatancy with eligibility for 
                                                                                                                      
309 See id. at 287 n.5. 
310 Al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 293 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); infra Appendix, Table 8. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 293–303. 
313 Id. at 312. 
314 Id. at 313 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
315 Id. at 314. 
316 Al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 314. 
317 Id. at 315. 
318 Id. at 315–19. 
319 Id. at 319. 
320 Compare id. at 318–19 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), with 
al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 179–82. 
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POW status,321 Judge Wilkinson accepted the government’s contention 
that some individuals lose their eligibility for POW status by flouting 
LOAC, yet nonetheless remain “combatants” subject to targeting and 
detention.322 On that view, POW status is not the measure of com-
batancy, nor is any “single factor” a necessary or sufficient condition to 
establish that status.323 The most one could say, Judge Wilkinson rea-
soned, was that the category “traditionally included ‘most members of 
the armed forces’” as well as “those ‘who associate themselves with the 
military arm of the enemy government,’”324 and that key indicia in-
cluded self-identification through the wearing of uniforms, involvement 
in the command structure of a party to the conflict, or presence on the 
battlefield.325 
 At this point in his analysis, however, Judge Wilkinson introduced a 
distinguishing proposition: that LOAC is evolving in the face of asym-
metric warfare and mass-casualty terrorism, bringing with it corre-
sponding change to the concept of combatancy.326 He expressly em-
braced the proposition that law and strategic context exist in dynamic 
relationship,327 and suggested that LOAC in particular had “consis-
tently accommodated changes in the conduct of war and in interna-
tional relations.”328 In our own era, he observed, war was becoming 
“less a state-based enterprise” due to the diffusion of destructive tech-
nologies enabling super-empowered non-state actors to pose a strategic 
threat to states.329 “Thus,” he concluded, “while the principle of dis-
                                                                                                                      
321 See al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 179–82. 
322 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 318–19 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
323 Id. at 317. 
324 Id. at 316 (quoting Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 2114). 
325 Id. at 316–17. 
326 Id. at 319–21. 
327 Id. at 314–19. Judge Wilkinson made this point clear at the very outset of his opin-
ion, observing that the “advance and democratization of technology proceeds apace,” and 
that, as a result, “we live in an age where thousands of human beings can be slaughtered by 
a single action and where large swaths of urban landscapes can be leveled in an instant.” 
Id. at 293. The law must “show some recognition of these changing circumstances” and 
must “reflect the actual nature of modern warfare.” Id. 
328 Al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 314 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); see also id. at 319. Note that Judge Wilkinson elsewhere in the opinion quotes ex-
pressly from Philip Bobbitt’s Shield of Achilles, supra note 174, a central text supporting the 
notion of a dynamic relationship between law and strategic context—as well as the notion 
that non-state actors engaging in mass-casualty terrorism strongly implicate that relation-
ship. See id. at 300. Judge Wilkinson plainly was aware of, and in agreement with, this line 
of argument. See id. 
329 Id. at 319. 
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crimination and the category of enemy combatant surely remain a vital 
part of the law of war, they most definitely must accommodate the new 
threats to the security of nations.”330 
 Judge Wilkinson’s view raised two questions: Precisely how should 
LOAC evolve? And through which institutional mechanisms should 
such evolution be effectuated or recognized? 
 As to the latter point, Judge Wilkinson contended that the elected 
branches of the government already had expressed their opinion of the 
matter by expressly including “organizations” in addition to states in 
the AUMF’s text.331 But he also stated at the outset of his opinion that 
the time had come to “develop” a new, tailored legal framework to ac-
commodate LOAC to the evolving strategic climate,332 and he pro-
ceeded to offer his own thoughts as to how this could best be done.333 
Going forward, he concluded, combatant status ought to turn on a 
three-step inquiry: a combatant is a person who is 
(1) . . . a member of (2) an organization or nation against 
whom Congress has declared war or authorized the use of mil-
itary force, and (3) [who] knowingly plans or engages in con-
duct that harms or aims to harm persons or property for the 
purpose of furthering military goals of the enemy nation or 
organization.334 
The Wilkinson test, in short, combines a membership inquiry with a 
conduct test, thus arriving at a result not unlike that advanced by Chief 
Judge Williams.335 As to membership, Judge Wilkinson conceded that 
identifying a sufficient degree of association with a non-state actor 
would be more difficult than ascertaining citizenship.336 Nonetheless, 
he found that the concept could be measured with reference to criteria 
such as “self-identification with the organization through verbal or writ-
ten statements; participation in the group’s hierarchy or command 
structure; or knowingly taking overt steps to aid or participate in the 
organization’s activities.”337 As for the additional requirement of in-
                                                                                                                      
330 Id. 
331 Id. at 324. 
332 Id. at 293. 
333 Id. at 322–25. 
334 Al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 325 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
335 Compare id. at 285 (Williams, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), with 
id. at 325 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
336 See id. at 323 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
337 Id. 
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volvement in hostile conduct, Judge Wilkinson suggested that this crite-
rion would encompass both those who literally engage in hostilities and 
those who merely engage in preliminary steps toward such acts (as with 
a “sleeper terrorist cell”), but not other members of an enemy organi-
zation (such as an al Qaeda doctor).338 
 The net result of the Traxler, Williams, and Wilkinson opinions 
was a five-vote majority rejecting the proposition that the AUMF con-
ferred authority to detain solely those individuals who fought for the 
armed forces of a government or who fought on a conventional battle-
field.339 The five-vote block did not agree, however, on whether mem-
bership in a non-state organization such as al Qaeda must be joined 
with hostile individual conduct for detention authority to attach, and it 
was unclear what the four-vote block associated with the opinion of 
Judge Motz might think of that proposition.340 
 The al-Marri litigation would shed no further light on these ques-
tions.341 The Supreme Court did grant certiorari in the case, but, as 
had happened with Padilla previously, the government at that point 
mooted the case by transferring al-Marri to civilian custody to face 
criminal prosecution.342 This prompted the Supreme Court to vacate 
the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remand the case to be dismissed as 
moot.343 Thus ended the last of the suits challenging the government’s 
detention authority in the exceptionally complicated—and exception-
ally uncommon—context of U.S. citizen detainees and other persons 
captured inside the United States. 
                                                                                                                     
c. Substantive Standards for Detention Remain Unresolved 
 Although some things seem to have been settled along the way, 
others have not. The judges uniformly agreed that the AUMF con-
ferred some detention authority, including at least the authority to reach 
Taliban fighters—even U.S. citizens—captured on the battlefield in Af-
 
338 Id. at 324. 
339 See id. at 260–62 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 285–86 (Williams, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 293–303 (Wilkinson, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); infra Appendix, Table 8. 
340 Compare al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 259–62 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(not considering past conduct), with id. at 285 (Williams, C.J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (imposing past conduct tests), and id. at 325 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (same). See infra Appendix, Table 8. 
341 See al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. at 1545. 
342 See id. 
343 See id. 
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ghanistan.344 Beyond this, however, the judges disagreed sharply: some 
rejected the proposition that detention authority could extend to al 
Qaeda-linked captures,345 but others accepted that it could.346 Among 
those in the latter category, some thought membership in al Qaeda a 
sufficient condition for detention,347 while others concluded that 
membership was necessary but not sufficient, and that some showing of 
knowing conduct associated with violence was also required.348 Among 
those who found membership sufficient or at least relevant to the anal-
ysis, moreover, there was relatively little discussion of just what the indi-
cia of membership in a non-state actor like al Qaeda might be.349 None 
of the judges, finally, had occasion to address the scenario in which a 
person was not a member of an AUMF-covered group but had provided 
material support to one. 
B. The Second Wave of Detention Criteria Case Law: The Guantanamo Cases 
 The end of domestic detention litigation did not mean that courts 
going forward would have no further opportunity to consider these 
debates.350 The same questions of course arise in relation to the vastly 
more frequent scenario in which the military has detained noncitizens 
captured and held overseas.351 
1. Contesting the Substantive Scope of Detention Authority in 
Boumediene 
 Between the opening of detention operations at Guantanamo in 
January 2002 and the summer of 2004, the ability of noncitizens held 
there to obtain judicial review via habeas corpus was sharply con-
tested.352 That contest ended for a brief period in June 2004, however, 
when the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush held that the federal habeas 
corpus statute conferred jurisdiction as to the claims of the Guan-
                                                                                                                      
344 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–17; Padilla, 423 F.3d at 391–92; al-Marri, 378 F. 
Supp. 2d at 676–77. 
345 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 260–61 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment). 
346 See al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 183. 
347 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 259 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment). 
348 See id. at 285 (Williams, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 325 
(Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
349 See id. at 259 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment). 
350 See infra notes 352–586 and accompanying text. 
351 See infra notes 352–586 and accompanying text. 
352 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471–73 (2004), superseded by statute, Detainee Treat-
ment Act of 2005 §§ 1001, 1003–1004, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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tanamo detainees.353 Not long thereafter, however, Congress enacted 
the first of two statutes designed in part to overturn the statutory hold-
ing in Rasul, thus reviving the debate over jurisdiction that stood be-
tween the Guantanamo detainees and judicial consideration of any 
merits issues they might present—including arguments about the legal 
boundaries of detention authority.354 Yet in the months before Con-
gress acted, habeas litigation had moved forward in federal court in 
Washington, D.C., with two cases proceeding to the merits.355 
 Ultimately, these cases would come together in the Supreme Court 
under the name Boumediene v. Bush.356 When they were first heard by 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, however, they re-
mained quite distinct.357 On January 15, 2005, D.C. District Court 
Judge Richard J. Leon, in Khalid v. Bush, resolved the petition in the 
government’s favor without addressing the substantive scope of the 
government’s detention authority.358 Just two weeks later, on January 
31, 2005, D.C. District Court Judge Joyce Green took the contrary view 
in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases.359 
                                                                                                                     
 In In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Judge Green concluded that the 
detainees held at Guantanamo were entitled to the protections of the 
Fifth Amendment notwithstanding their status as noncitizens captured 
and held outside the United States.360 This, of course, raised constitu-
tional questions regarding the actual process the detainees had been 
 
353 Id. at 484. 
354 See Detainee Treatment Act, div. A, tit. X; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600, 2600–31. In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld held that the DTA did not apply to habeas petitions that were pending at the time 
the DTA was enacted, at least insofar as its military commission-related provisions were 
concerned. 548 U.S. 557, 575–80 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 
2006, § 3. Congress responded by enacting the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which in 
effect made the jurisdictional provisions of the DTA applicable to pending cases. § 3. This 
set the stage for the Supreme Court in Boumediene to hold that the MCA violated the U.S. 
Constitution’s Suspension Clause, and that the detainees were entitled to habeas review as 
a constitutional matter. See 553 U.S. at 732–33. 
355 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 445 (D.D.C. 2005), decision va-
cated sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), order vacated, 511 U.S. 1160 
(2007); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005), decision vacated sub nom. 
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), order vacated, 511 U.S. 1160 (2007). 
356 553 U.S. at 734–35. 
357 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 445; Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 
314. 
358 See 355 F. Supp. 2d at 321 (holding that detainees had no judicially enforceable 
substantive rights notwithstanding Rasul ). 
359 See 355 F. Supp. 2d at 464. 
360 See id.; infra Appendix, Table 9. 
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afforded.361 But it also raised a constitutional question regarding the 
substantive scope of detention authority asserted by the government.362 
The issue arose because one group of detainees in the litigation had 
argued that the Fifth Amendment precludes detention “based solely on 
. . . membership in anti-American organizations rather than on actual 
activities supporting the use of violence or harm against the United 
States.”363 Judge Green agreed, writing that it would violate due process 
if the government were to hold a person “solely because of his contacts 
with individuals or organizations tied to terrorism and not because of 
any terrorist activities that the detainee aided, abetted, or undertook 
himself.”364 In that respect, Judge Green’s opinion was akin to the view 
expressed by Judge Wilkinson in al-Marri; for both judges, detention 
could not be predicated on membership alone, but must include some 
showing of knowing involvement in violent activities (though not nec-
essarily direct participation in violence).365 
                                                                                                                      
361 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 464. 
362 See id. at 474–77. 
363 Id. at 475 (citing, inter alia, Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1961) 
(holding that criminal punishment of membership in a subversive organization would 
violate the Fifth Amendment unless the statute were construed to require proof that the 
defendant’s membership was more than merely nominal and that the defendant specifi-
cally intended to further the organization’s unlawful ends)). 
364 Id. at 476. Redactions in the opinion make it difficult to determine more about 
Judge Green’s reasoning, but the context strongly suggests that she was particularly con-
cerned that the government might be detaining individuals strictly for their intelligence 
value. See id. at 477. 
365 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 325 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 476. Perhaps it was not surprising 
that Judge Green would make a point of attempting to restrain the government’s capacity 
to detain based on associated ties. During oral argument in the case, she had posed a se-
ries of hypothetical questions to the government attorney, with the apparent aim of clarify-
ing the government’s conception of the outer boundaries of the ostensible authority to 
detain on the basis that a person provided support to an AUMF covered group. See In re 
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 475. Specifically, she asked whether this de-
tention criterion would be met by a “little old lady in Switzerland” who was duped into 
providing funds to a charity group that turned out to be an al Qaeda front. Id. One might 
have expected the attorney to answer no, as this fact pattern at a minimum does not in-
volve inculpatory mens rea. But it did not turn out that way; the government attorney in-
sisted, incredibly, that all were detainable. See id. The moment would go on to dubious 
immortality in Judge Green’s published opinion. See id. It has also become a standard cita-
tion in the secondary literature. See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 10, at 505; Bradley & Goldsmith, 
supra note 8, at 2113; Waxman, supra note 10, at 7. It would be hard to overestimate its 
iconic value as a symbol for those who feared that the post-9/11 assertion of detention 
authority had become detached from any real legal constraints. 
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 By the time the decisions by Judges Green and Leon were before 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,366 Congress had enacted 
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), which purported to elimi-
nate statutory habeas jurisdiction—thus reviving the pre-Rasul jurisdic-
tional debate, albeit with a twist.367 Instead of eliminating all judicial 
review, the DTA created an exclusive mechanism pursuant to which the 
D.C. Circuit could review individual detention decisions at Guan-
tanamo.368 In each case, its task was to determine whether the military’s 
screening system complied with the “Constitution and laws of the Unit-
ed States” and whether the military had actually complied with its own 
screening rules in a particular case.369 This model appeared to leave 
the D.C. Circuit in a position to consider the legal boundaries of the 
government’s detention authority, but at the same time the DTA ap-
peared to eliminate the habeas review system that had provided Judge 
Green the occasion for her ruling.370 
                                                                                                                     
 Several detainees—including many of the individuals involved in 
the cases before Judges Green and Leon—argued that this arrange-
ment was unconstitutional, reasoning that the Constitution required 
the existence of habeas corpus jurisdiction at Guantanamo and that the 
D.C. Circuit review alternative was not an adequate substitute.371 That 
much is widely appreciated, as their arguments did ultimately prevail in 
Boumediene.372 Many are not aware, however, that these litigants simul-
taneously pressed the substantive question of who lawfully may be de-
tained, and that this question was briefed and argued to the Supreme 
Court alongside the jurisdictional issue.373 
 The lead petitioners in Boumediene did not focus their arguments 
on Judge Green’s determination that the Due Process Clause requires a 
conduct-based rather than a membership-based test for detainability.374 
Instead, they concentrated on LOAC-based arguments that would con-
strain the government’s detention authority irrespective of whether a 
 
366 See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 994 (vacating In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. 
Supp. 2d 443 and Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311). 
367 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 §§ 1001, 1003–1004, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 
Stat. 2680, 2739 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)). 
368 Id. § 1005. 
369 Id. § 1005(e). 
370 See id. 
371 See Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners at 18, 26–33, Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (No. 
06-1195). 
372 See 553 U.S. at 732–33. 
373 See Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 371, at 36–44. 
374 See id. 
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particular detainee could claim Fifth Amendment protections.375 Their 
argument began with the premise that LOAC defined the outer 
boundaries of whatever detention authority the United States had.376 
Next, they argued that LOAC does not recognize combatant status in 
relation to armed conflicts between states and non-state actors; in that 
setting, they contended, everyone counts as a civilian.377 
 One might have expected them to stop at this point, echoing the 
view of Judge Motz in the al-Marri panel decision to the effect that civil-
ians simply are not subject to military detention.378 But they did not do 
so.379 On the contrary, they conceded that some civilians could indeed 
be detained consistent with LOAC.380 But which ones? The petitioners 
invoked the direct participation in hostilities (“DPH”) test, arguing that 
any civilian could be detained to the extent that he or she had engaged 
in DPH.381 As noted in Part I, DPH is a LOAC principle associated with 
the question of who may be targeted with lethal force.382 It reflects the 
notion that, whereas a “combatant” may be targeted at all times (so long 
as not hors de combat), a “civilian” may never be intentionally targeted 
unless he or she is engaged in DPH.383 DPH is not, in other words, a 
concept traditionally associated with detention authority. Nonetheless, 
in the context of a non-international armed conflict involving a clandes-
tine network whose members sought to obscure their identity, the idea 
of using DPH as a sorting standard appeals as a limiting principle for 
detention authority. From this point of view, their argument was rather 
in the spirit of Judge Wilkinson’s effort to craft a more tailored under-
standing of “combatant” for use in the same setting, except that in this 
case the argument was framed as a description of what LOAC already 
requires as a binding rule of international law in this context.384 
 Even assuming the Supreme Court was amenable in principle to 
using the DPH standard as the measure of detainability, a problem re-
                                                                                                                      
375 Id. 
376 See id. at 36–38. 
377 See id. at 39. 
378 See al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 178–79. 
379 See Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 371, at 39–41. 
380 See id. 
381 Id. 
382 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text; see also Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of 
the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law 41–68 (2009). 
383 See Melzer, supra note 382, at 61–62. 
384 See Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 371, at 39–41; see also al-Marri II, 
534 F.3d at 314–19 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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mained.385 Famously, the precise meaning of DPH is the subject of 
fierce and protracted disagreement.386 
 The petitioners would have to tread carefully in crafting their posi-
tion on this point. If they pushed for too narrow a definition, they 
might alienate those members of the Court inclined to recognize a rel-
atively broad amount of detention authority. If they advanced too broad 
a conception, on the other hand, they might confirm their own detain-
ability. Ultimately, and perhaps surprisingly, they erred on the side of a 
broad definition.387 
 As an initial matter, they conceded that immediate personal in-
volvement in conventional battlefield-type actions counts as direct par-
ticipation.388 That much is common ground for most if not all partici-
pants in the larger DPH debate.389 They did not stop there, however.390 
They also endorsed the view that a person can be deemed perpetually 
engaged in DPH—in effect, waiving the protections of civilian status— 
insofar as they engage in DPH on a repeated basis (a position rather 
like the “continuous combat function” theory of DPH advanced by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, among others).391 The peti-
tioners added, moreover, that this status would extend to leadership 
figures in al Qaeda; and, most remarkably of all, they suggested it might 
even extend to those actual members of al Qaeda who are subject to 
the group’s direction and control.392 In short, the petitioners offered a 
test that would leave the government with a substantial amount of de-
tention—and targeting—authority, while excluding those who at most 
provide support on a relatively independent basis to al Qaeda or the 
                                                                                                                      
385 See Melzer, supra note 382, at 12–13. 
386 See id.; see also ICRC Clarification Process on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Under International Humanitarian Law (Proceedings), Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, http:// 
www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-article-020709 (last updated 
Oct. 22, 2010) (providing a collection of materials generated in the fractious process of 
attempting to generate consensus that resulted in the ICRC’s publication). 
387 See Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 371, at 39–41. 
388 See id. at 39–40. 
389 See id. at 39 (noting that the United States “recently explained that it ‘understands 
the phrase “direct participation in hostilities” to mean immediate and actual action on the 
battlefield’”). 
390 See id. at 41. 
391 See id.; see also Melzer, supra note 382, at 16. 
392 See Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 371, at 41 (stating that DPH 
would “certainly cover Osama Bin Laden—and conceivably others who have submitted 
themselves to the direction and control of an organization like al Qaeda”). 
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Taliban.393 Presumably, the petitioners reasoned that the government 
could at most prove them to be in the latter category.394 
 Notwithstanding this invitation, the Supreme Court in Boumediene 
ultimately chose to say nothing at all about the question of detention 
standards, neither endorsing nor rejecting Judge Green’s objection to 
membership-based detention or the Boumediene petitioner’s DPH-based 
argument.395 All of this instead would be left for the district courts to 
sort out in the coming wave of habeas litigation.396 
2. Contesting the Substantive Scope of Detention Authority After 
Boumediene 
 Much has occurred in the Guantanamo habeas litigation during 
the two and a half years since the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumedi-
ene: between June 2008 and December 2010, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia has resolved the merits in habeas cases involv-
ing forty individual Guantanamo detainees, finding for the government 
in nineteen instances and for the detainee in twenty-one.397 Many of 
                                                                                                                      
 
393 See id. at 39–41. 
394 See id. at 40–41. 
395 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33. 
396 See infra notes 397–586 and accompanying text. 
397 See Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supra note 25, at 86–105 (summarizing deci-
sions as to twenty-four individuals whose petitions were resolved as of January 2010). The 
ten decisions denying relief between January and December, 2010 are as follows. Obaydul-
lah v. Obama, 744 F. Supp. 2d 344, 351–52 (D.D.C. 2010); al-Bihani v. Obama, No. 05-2386, 
slip op. at 18 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2010) (involving detainee Toffiq Nasser Awad al-Bihani); al 
Kandari v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 11, 48 (D.D.C. 2010) (involving detainee Fayiz 
Mohammed Ahmed al Kandari); Khan v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2010) (in-
volving detainee Shawali Khan); Sulayman v. Obama, 729 F. Supp. 2d 26, 53 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(involving detainee Abd al Rahman Abdu Abu al Ghayth Sulayman); Khalifh v. Obama, 
No. 05-CV-1189, 2010 WL 2382925, at *6 (D.D.C. May 28, 2010) (involving detainee Omar 
Mohammed Khalifh), appeal dismissed, No. 10-5241, 2011 WL 321713 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 
2011); Abdah v. Obama, 709 F. Supp. 2d 25, 48 (D.D.C. 2010) (involving detainee Yasein 
Khasem Mohammad Esmail); Naji al Warafi v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32, 45 (D.D.C. 
2010) (involving detainee Mukhtar Yahia Naji al Warafi); al-Adahi v. Obama, 698 F. Supp. 
2d 48, 66 (D.D.C. 2010) (involving detainee Fahmi Salem al-Assani); al-Adahi v. Obama, 
692 F. Supp. 2d 85, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (involving detainee Suleiman Awadh Bin Agil al-
Nahdi). The six cases where individuals prevailed on their habeas petitions between Janu-
ary and August 22, 2010 are as follows. Abdah v. Obama, No. 04-1254, 2010 WL 3270761, at 
*10 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2010) (involving detainee Adnan Farhan Abd al Latif); Almerfedi v. 
Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 18, 31 (D.D.C. 2010) (involving detainee Hussain Salem Moham-
mad Almerfedi); Abdah v. Obama, 717 F. Supp. 2d 21, 36 (D.D.C. 2010) (involving de-
tainee Mohamed Mohamed Hassan Odaini); al Harbi v. Obama, No. 05-2479 (HHK), 2010 
WL 2398883, at *16 (D.D.C. May 13, 2010) (involving detainee Ravil Mingazov); Abdah v. 
Obama, 708 F. Supp. 2d 9, 23 (D.D.C. 2010) (involving detainee Uthman Abdul Rahim 
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these rulings have been or may yet be appealed.398 By December 2010, 
the D.C. Circuit reached the merits in five of the nineteen cases won by 
the government at the district court level; the Circuit affirmed in four 
instances and reversed and remanded for further consideration in one 
other.399 Of the twenty-one cases won by the detainee at the district 
court level, the D.C. Circuit reached the merits in two by the end of 
2010, reversing with instructions to deny the writ in one instance400 and 
vacating and remanding for further consideration in another.401 Many 
of these appellate decisions themselves have been the subjects of peti-
tions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, and so the circum-
stances remain in flux.402 
 In addition to all of this, in 2008, very shortly after Boumediene was 
decided, the D.C. Circuit held in Parhart v. Gates that the government 
lacked authority to detain a group of seventeen Chinese Uighur de-
tainees because their alleged affiliation with the East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement did not bring them within the scope of the September 18, 
2001 AUMF.403 That ruling came under the auspices of the DTA, rather 
than the habeas corpus review mandated weeks earlier by Boumediene,404 
but the result, in any event, was a defeat for the government.405 
 For the most part, these decisions have turned on evidentiary is-
sues.406 That is, they turn on questions such as whether and to what ex-
tent to credit certain kinds of evidence, and above all whether the col-
lective impact of the government’s evidence suffices in a particular case 
                                                                                                                      
Mohammed Uthman); Salahi v. Obama, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2010) (involving 
detainee Mohammedou Ould Salahi), vacated and remanded, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
398 See Lyle Denniston, Primer: The New Detainee Cases, SCOTUSblog (Dec. 7, 2010, 7:47 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/12/primer-the-new-detainee-cases/. 
399 The four affirmances are as follows. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 869 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc denied, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-7814, 
2011 WL 1225807 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2011); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, No. 10-736, 2011 WL 1225732 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2011); Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 
416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2010); al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, No. 10-439, 2011 WL 1225724 (Apr. 4, 2011). The reversal occurred in Bensayah v. 
Obama. 610 F.3d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
400 See al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1001 (2011). 
401 See Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
402 For an overview, see generally Denniston, supra note 398. 
403 532 F.3d 834, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
404 Not long after the Uighur decision, the D.C. Circuit determined that DTA review 
should be discontinued in favor of the habeas proceedings mandated by Boumediene. See 
Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
405 See Parhart, 532 F.3d at 854. 
406 Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supra note 25, at 1–2. 
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to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a detainee is whom 
the government claims him to be.407 But along the way, the judges have 
had several occasions to grapple with the substantive scope questions 
left open by the combination of Hamdi, Padilla, al-Marri, and Boumedi-
ene.408 Perhaps predictably, they have disagreed on several key points.409 
 This subsection first surveys a handful of conflicting cases, which 
consider whether future dangerousness should be treated as a neces-
sary condition for detention; for the time being, at least, the answer to 
that question is no.410 It then takes up a line of cases that illustrate a 
strong consensus that membership counts as a sufficient condition for 
detention, but reveal considerable disagreement as to both the actual 
meaning of membership and whether support independent of mem-
bership can serve as an alternative sufficient condition.411 
a. Rejecting Personal Dangerousness as a Necessary Condition 
 On April 15, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle held in Basardh v. Obama that the 
government may not continue to hold a person in custody, regardless 
of whether he or she was a member or supporter of a relevant group at 
the time of capture, where that person is not likely to “rejoin the en-
emy” if released.412 The September 18, 2001 AUMF “defines the Execu-
tive’s detention authority in plain and unambiguous terms,” she con-
cluded, and “does not authorize the detention of individuals beyond 
that which is necessary to prevent those individuals from rejoining the 
battle.”413 Reasoning that the petitioner, Yasin Muhammed Basardh, 
had no prospect of rejoining any enemy of the United States as a result 
of “widespread public disclosure” of his cooperation with American in-
terrogators, Judge Huvelle held that he must be released.414 
                                                                                                                      
 
407 For a general overview of the issues broached in the cases, see id. passim. 
408 See infra notes 412–586 and accompanying text. 
409 See infra notes 412–586 and accompanying text. 
410 See infra notes 412–417 and accompanying text. 
411 See infra notes 418–586 and accompanying text. 
412 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2009) Several subsequent cases declined to follow 
this aspect of the decision. Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (Robert-
son, J.), aff’d, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-736, 2011 WL 1225732 (U.S. 
Apr. 4, 2011); Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010) (Hogan, J.); see infra 
Appendix, Table 10. 
413 Basardh, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 34. 
414 See id. at 35. Judge Huvelle’s opinion does not actually explain the nature of what 
had been widely disclosed to the public. A Washington Post article from February 2009 de-
scribes Basardh as having cooperated extensively with U.S. authorities, indicating that this 
had become known to other detainees and that Basardh was thought to be in danger from 
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 This approach amounts to the imposition of a particular kind of 
“future dangerousness” condition, above and beyond whatever criteria 
might be required to justify detention in the first instance.415 It did not 
prove popular, however, among other judges: two district judges explic-
itly rejected this aspect of Basardh;416 and, more significantly, the D.C. 
Circuit eventually did the same.417 For the time being, therefore, this 
aspect of the substantive-scope issue has been settled. 
b. Contesting Membership and Support as Sufficient Conditions 
 The bulk of the post-Boumediene cases dealing with the substantive-
scope question have focused on the role of membership and independ-
ent support as sufficient conditions for detention.418 Notwithstanding 
earlier claims to the contrary by Judge Green in In re Guantanamo De-
tainee Cases419 and Judge Wilkinson in al-Marri,420 these opinions reflect 
widespread agreement among the judges that associational status 
alone—i.e., membership in an AUMF-covered group—can serve as a 
sufficient condition to justify detention.421 Consensus breaks down, 
however, when it comes to fleshing out the meaning of membership,422 
and likewise when it comes to determining whether independent sup-
port—i.e., the provision of material support to an AUMF-covered group 
by a non-member—can serve as an alternative sufficient condition.423 
                                                                                                                      
them. See Del Quentin Wilber, Detainee-Informer Presents Quandary for Government, Wash. 
Post, Feb. 3, 2009, at A1. 
415 See Basardh, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 34–35. 
416 See Anam, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 4; Awad, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 24; infra Appendix, Table 10. 
417 See Awad, 608 F.3d at 11 (“Whether a detainee would pose a threat to U.S. interests 
if released is not at issue in habeas corpus proceedings.”); infra Appendix, Table 10. 
418 See, e.g., Salahi, 625 F.3d at 748, 753; Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 66–67 
(D.D.C. 2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2008). 
419 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 476. 
420 Al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 325 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
421 See, e.g., Salahi, 625 F.3d at 748, 753; Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 66–67; Boumediene, 
583 F. Supp. 2d at 135. 
422 See, e.g., al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 & n.2 (concluding that membership does not re-
quire participation in a chain of command and might be proven by attending a training 
camp or staying at a guesthouse); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(holding that membership in the chain of command of an AUMF-covered group must be 
illustrated by actual obedience to orders in a particular instance), vacated sub nom. Hatim v. 
Gates, No. 10-5048, 2011 WL 553273 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2011); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. 
Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that support may be proof of membership). 
423 Compare al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 (deciding that independent support is a sufficient 
condition), and Boumediene, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 135 (same), with Hatim, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 
12–13 (concluding that independent support is not a sufficient condition), and Hamlily, 
616 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (same). 
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 These issues arose initially before D.C. District Court Judge Leon, 
presiding over the merits hearing for the Boumediene petitioners on re-
mand from their Supreme Court victory.424 In October 2008, he issued 
an opinion characterizing both the petitioners and the government as 
having urged him to “draft” his own preferred legal standard regarding 
the boundaries of detention authority.425 This he refused to do, reason-
ing that his role instead was merely to determine whether the admini-
stration’s position was consistent with a pair of domestic legal consid-
erations: (1) the AUMF, and (2) any further authority the President 
might have under the “war powers” of Article II of the Constitution.426 
Without substantial elaboration, Judge Leon concluded that the gov-
ernment’s two-track standard was compatible with both.427 
 There things stood when the Obama administration came into 
office in early 2009. On the second day of his presidency, President 
Obama initiated a major review of detention policy by giving an inter-
agency task force six months to assess the full range of options associ-
ated with the capture, detention, trial, and disposition of persons in the 
context of combat and counterterrorism operations.428 But litigation 
deadlines do not respect plans for carefully paced policy deliberations, 
particularly not when years of jurisdictional litigation precedes the mer-
its. Long before the mid-2009 deadline for completion of the inter-
agency review, the administration had to decide not only whether it 
would defend its authority to employ military detention without crimi-
nal charge at Guantanamo, but also what it considered the correct sub-
stantive detention standard to be.429 
 It did this on March 13, 2009, when the Justice Department’s Civil 
Division filed a brief in Hamlily v. Obama before Judge John D. Bates of 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.430 To the surprise 
of some, the Obama administration asserted its authority to detain 
without charge pursuant to a substantive detention standard not much 
                                                                                                                      
424 See Boumediene, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 134–35; infra Appendix, Table 11. Recall that 
Judge Leon, years earlier, in Khalid v. Bush, had declined to reach this question on the 
ground that the detainees lacked any substantive rights supporting such an inquiry. 355 F. 
Supp. 2d at 321. 
425 Boumediene, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 134. 
426 Id. 
427 See id. at 135 (“An ‘enemy combatant’ is an individual who was part of or support-
ing Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a 
belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”). 
428 See Exec. Order No. 13,493, 3 C.F.R. 203 (2009). 
429 See Hamlily Memorandum, supra note 73, at 1. 
430 616 F. Supp. 2d at 67; Hamlily Memorandum, supra note 73, at 1. 
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different from the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) standard 
of the Bush administration.431 To be sure, it eschewed the baggage-
laden nomenclature of “unlawful enemy combatant” in favor of an ac-
ronym-less, generic reference to those persons subject to detention 
pursuant to the September 18, 2001 AUMF.432 And it also expressly 
embraced the relevance of LOAC for purposes of defining the particu-
lars of that authority.433 Those particulars turned out to be much the 
same as before, however, including preservation of the two-track ap-
proach encompassing either members or supporters of al Qaeda, the 
Taliban, or associated groups.434 The only substantive difference was 
the qualification—or clarification—that independent support must be 
“substantial” in order to trigger eligibility for detention, thus eliminat-




                                                        
435 
 Before Judge Bates had the chance to address the merits of the re-
vised position in Hamlily,436 D.C. District Court Judge Reggie B. Walton 
did so in Gherebi v. Obama in April 2009.437 As an initial matter, Judge 
Walton rejected the argument that LOAC provides no detention author-
ity outside of international armed conflict, and that the AUMF should 
be construed accordingly.438 LOAC, he reasoned, is best viewed as a re-
straining body of law rather than an authorizing body of law.439 Thus, 
though it is true that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions has 
no express language affirmatively authorizing detention, he understood 
this to mean merely that LOAC imposes no restraints on thos
fu  may be detained in non-international armed conflict.440 
 Any restraints instead must come from some other body of law, 
including the AUMF itself.441 In Judge Walton’s view, however, the 
AUMF most certainly did confer at least some detention authority.442 
“[W]henever the President can lawfully exercise military force, so, too, 
                                                              
lily Memorandum, supra note 73, at 1. 
ix, Table 12. 







434 See id. at 1–2. 
435 See id. at 2, 7. 
436 616 F. Supp. 2d at 67. 
437 See 609 F. Supp. 2d at 53; infra Append
438 See Gherebi, 60
439 See id. at 65. 
440 See id. at 65–6
441 See id. a
442 See i
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c he incapacitate the enemy force through detention rather than 
death.”
an 
 in DPH; 
dard, he would construe it to cover “all 
                                                                                                                     
443 
 That position of course was not enough to settle the legal bounda-
ries of AUMF-based detention authority.444 Judge Walton next had to 
confront the question of who counts as the “enemy force” when the 
United States is not contending with another state’s army.445 The de-
tainee in Gherebi, borrowing from the approach of the petitioners in 
Boumediene, urged Judge Walton to adopt DPH as the measure of de-
tainability446 but did not advocate the same conception of DPH as had 
the Boumediene petitioners.447 Specifically, the petitioner in Gherebi re-
jected the notion that the protections of civilian status might be waived 
on a sustained basis through continuous participation in hostilities, 
thus eliminating the need to determine whether a person was engaging 
in DPH at a precise point in time.448 Furthermore, he added that it 
would not be enough just to show that a person had engaged
in addition, he argued, the person must also have been “part of an or-
ganized armed force” rather than some independent actor.449 
 Judge Walton ultimately rejected the invitation to adopt one ver-
sion or the other of the DPH standard as a necessary condition for de-
tainability.450 He did not refrain from stating in dicta, however, that the 
continuous-combat function conception of DPH “while perhaps not 
quite broad enough, is a step towards the right answer,” and that if he 
were to accept the DPH stan
members of the armed forces of the enemy . . . at all times for the dura-
tion of their membership.”451 
 But he did agree that membership in an organized armed force is 
a necessary condition for detention authority—in fact, he concluded 
that it was a sufficient condition as well.452 His reasoning in support of 
this conclusion turned on the notion that the combatant category did 
indeed exist in non-international armed conflict.453 Again noting his 
 
443 Id. 
444 See Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 63. 
445 See id. 
446 See id. 
447 See Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 371, at 39–41; see also supra notes 
361–381 and accompanying text (discussing the Boumediene petitioners’ argument). 
448 See Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 63–64. 
449 Id. at 63. 
450 See id. at 64 n.15. 
451 Id. 
452 See id. at 66–67. 
453 See id. 
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view that LOAC is merely restrictive in nature, and hence that silence 
on a point does not deprive a state of the power to act in a particular 
way, Judge Walton explained that the silence of Common Article 3 with 
respect to the existence of a “combatant category” did not mean that 
no such category could be recognized in the non-international armed 




standard really depends on how one defines “membership” and “armed 
                                                                                                                     
it e asserted that the members of the enemy armed force can be at-
tacked at any time in non-international armed conflict “and, incident 
to that attack, ‘detained at any time.’”455 
 In recognizing the existence of a category of detainable combat-
ants in the non-international conflict setting, Judge Walton’s opinion in 
Gherebi was contrary to the views expressed by the Second Circuit in Pa-
dilla456 and Judge Motz’s panel decision for the Fourth Circuit in al-
Marri.457 By accepting that membership alone might establish this 
ground for detention, his opinion was contrary to D.C. District Court 
Judge Green’s decision in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases.458 And to the 
extent his opinion rejected the need to show a detainee had been per-
sonally involved in hostile conduct, it seemed contrary as well to the 
views expressed by Chief Judge Williams and Judge Wilkinson in the 
Fourth Circuit’s en banc opinion in al-Marri.459 It was most ak
th g, to Judge Mukasey’s original Padilla opinion for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York,460 and perhaps also to the concurrence of Judge 
Traxler in the Fourth Circuit’s en banc opinion in al-Marri.461 
 In any event, Judge Walton’s approach at first blush appeared to 
be a government-friendly one, insofar as it demanded only a showing of 
associational status.462 But whether this was in fact a flexible or narrow 
 
454 Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 58, 63. 
455 Id. at 66. 
456 Compare id. at 66–67, with Padilla II, 352 F.3d at 713–14. For discussion of the Padilla 
case, see supra notes 247–250 and accompanying text. 
457 Compare Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 66–67, with al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 184–85. For 
discussion of the al-Marri case, see supra notes 276–296 and accompanying text. 
458 Compare Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 66–67, with In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 
F. Supp. 2d at 475. To be fair, Judge Green’s position against association status as a permis-
sible detention predicate rested on the premise that the detainee had a Fifth Amendment 
Due Process right to invoke. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 475; 
supra notes 360–365 and accompanying text (discussing In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases). 
459 Compare Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 66–67, with al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 285 (Williams, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and id. at 325 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
460 See Padilla I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 592–98. 
461 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 259–62 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment). 
462 See Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 66–67. 
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force” —concepts with relatively clear meaning in a conventional 
armed conflict between the armies of states, perhaps, but most certainly 
ot 
d that the ultimate inquiry is whether the 
ers
plained, may turn instead on a particular functional inquiry: 
that it is not enough for a person to have been part of the chain of 
                                       
n in the context of conflict with a clandestine non-state network with 
indeterminate organizational conceptions.463 
 As to this question, Judge Walton turned explicitly to LOAC, stat-
ing that the “criteria” set forth in GPW Article 4 and Additional Proto-
col I (“API”) Article 43 constitute “templates from which the Court can 
glean certain characteristics” of an “armed force.”464 This was a chal-
lenging approach because, if there is anything that Articles 4 and 43 
emphasize as criteria for recognition as an armed force, it is adherence 
to LOAC—and whatever else one might say about al Qaeda and the 
Taliban, they neither comport their conduct with LOAC nor make any 
pretense of doing so.465 Taken literally, then, Judge Walton’s reference 
to the criteria in these provisions would produce precious little in the 
way of combatant detention authority in this particular context. But 
Judge Walton’s opinion did not highlight the LOAC-adherence lan-
guage in these articles. Instead, he highlighted their implicit emphasis 
on the existence of a hierarchical command structure.466 Treating for-
mal organizational structure as the hallmark of an armed force whose 
members might constitute detainable (and targetable) combatants, 
Judge Walton then conclude
p on in question had “some sort of ‘structured’ role in the ‘hierar-
chy’ of the enemy force.”467 
 Judge Walton was seemingly sensitive to the difficulties inherent in 
mapping that model onto decentralized networks such as al Qaeda, 
emphasizing that one must not be too rigid in looking for formal proof 
that a person occupied such a position.468 He noted that there usually 
will not be membership cards or uniforms.469 The “structured role” 
test, he ex
Did the person “receive and execute orders” from the “command struc-
ture”?470 
 But there was a further qualification.471 Judge Walton explained 
                                                                               
a note 115, at 1099–1100. 
, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 68. 
d. 
0. 
. Supp. 2d at 68. 
d. at 69. 
463 See Chesney & Goldsmith, supr
464 Gherebi
465 See id. 
466 See i
467 Id. 
468 See id. at 68–7
469 See id. at 68. 
470 Gherebi, 609 F
471 See i
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command of the organization as a whole.472 Rather, the person must 
have been part of the specific chain of command associated with “the 
enemy force’s combat apparatus.”473 To be sure, Judge Walton tried to 
make the point that even a logistics officer for al Qaeda could be de-
tained if he were part of al Qaeda’s military chain of command.474 And 
he also explicitly recognized that a person who at one point in time was 
performing a non-military function, may well be subject to orders to 
shift to a military function, and hence should not be treated as a non-
combatant.475 Nonetheless, this approach did necessarily embrace the 
notion of distinct “military” and “civilian” wings in such groups, with 
the personnel of the latter at least sometimes lying beyond the reach of 
the AUMF for any purpose, including not just detention authority but 
lso 
 this way, Judge 
                                                                                                                     
a the authority to target with lethal force.476 
 In this way, Judge Walton’s opinion in Gherebi at least partially sup-
ported the government’s assertion that the AUMF conferred authority 
to detain the members of groups such as al Qaeda and the Taliban.477 
As for the government’s claim that the AUMF also conferred authority 
to detain independent supporters of such groups, however, Judge 
Walton was less accommodating.478 He did not directly reject that claim, 
but he did insist that any support-based detention comply with the 
“structured role” test described above, which effectively folded the sup-
port inquiry into the membership standard.479 Put simply, no purely 
independent supporter could be detained under that test (or, presuma-
bly, targeted with lethal force).480 A contrary reading, Judge Walton as-
serted, would cause the AUMF to conflict with LOAC, and he was un-
willing to impute such a reading to the statute absent a clearer showing 
of legislative intent to accomplish such an end.481 In
 
n-
succ  job in the Italian army amounted to non-combat 
man t be held in detention. See 156 F.2d 142, 146 (9th Cir. 1946). 
 2d at 69. 
8–69. 
t 53, 69–70. 
. at 69–70 & n.17. 
472 Id. 
473 Id. 
474 See id. 
475 See id. This view is consistent with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 
1946 decision in In re Territo, a World War II case in which an Italian-American POW u
essfully argued that because his
ual labor, he should no
476 Gherebi, 609 F. Supp.
477 See id. at 53, 6
478 See id. a
479 Id. at 69–70. 
480 See id. 
481 Id
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Walton broke with the more accommodating approach of Judge 
Leon.482 
 Obviously Judge Walton’s approach embraced the relevance of 
LOAC and the premise that the United States, in at least some current 
settings, is involved in non-international armed conflict—and he of-
fered a highly specific interpretation of what LOAC has to say about 
o
i
wh  may be detained (or targeted) as a result.483 Indeed, driving home 
the point that his reasoning applied as much to targeting as to deten-
tion, he routinely cross-referenced targeting authority as turning on the 
exact same standards.484 
 Just a few weeks after Judge Walton’s opinion in Gherebi, Judge 
Bates issued his ruling in Hamlily.485 For the most part, his analysis fol-
lowed Judge Walton’s.486 He agreed, for example, that LOAC permitted 
detention based on membership status even in the non-international 
conflict setting, notwithstanding the lack of affirmative treaty language 
to that effect.487 And he agreed, too, that in this context “membership” 
boils down to whether the individual “receives and executes orders or 
directions” as part of an AUMF-covered group’s command structure.488 
Unlike Judge Walton, however, he did not distinguish between the mili-
tary and non-military wings of an organization, and thus did not restrict 
elig bility to persons subject to a military-specific chain of command.489 
Hamlily, in other words, is more akin to Judge Mukasey’s opinion for the 
Southern District of New York in Padilla 490 and, perhaps, Judge Trax-
ler’s concurrence in the Fourth Circuit’s en banc opinion in al-Marri.491 
 Whether Judges Walton and Bates differ with respect to non-
members who provide substantial support to AUMF-covered groups is 
less clear.492 On one hand, Judge Bates concluded that LOAC simply 
does not permit military detention of such persons (though, like all the 
                                                                                                                      
482 Compare Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69–70 & n.17, with Boumediene, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 
134
ebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 67–69. 
ppendix, Table 13. 
16 F. Supp. 2d at 68. 
3. 
pp. 2d at 592–98; see also supra 
not
207 and accompanying text (discussing 
Jud
herebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69–70. 
–35. 
483 See Gher
484 See id. 
485 616 F. Supp. 2d at 77–78; see infra A
486 See Hamlily, 6
487 See id. at 7
488 Id. at 75. 
489 Compare id., with Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69–70. 
490 See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75; Padilla I, 233 F. Su
es 241–246 and accompanying text (discussing Padilla). 
491 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 259–62 (Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment); Hamlily, 
616 F. Supp. 2d at 75; see also supra notes 205–
ge Traxler’s concurring opinion in al-Marri). 
492 See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75–77; G
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other judges to address this question, he did not address the potential 
relevance of the security internment option that would be available in 
such circumstances in the event of international armed conflict).493 On 
the other hand, he noted that membership in organizations such as al 
Qaeda may be more of a functional than a formal concept, and that 
conduct that one might describe as independent support could well be 
onc
t be detained and that membership ultimately turns 
 in al Odah v. United States in August 2009 
                                                                                                                     
c eived instead as evidence of functional membership in some in-
stances.494 That said, even a functional member must still be shown to 
be part of the group’s chain of command to be detained under the 
Hamlily model; truly independent supporters may not be detained no 
matter how important their aid is to the group.495 
 Gherebi and Hamlily thus are consistent on two points: that non-
members may no
on participation in a chain of command.496 They appear to differ, how-
ever, on whether detention authority is limited to the “military” chain 
of command within an organization—though the magnitude of that 
difference very much depends on how strictly one defines “military” in 
this context.497 
 Adding to the confusion, other U.S. district court judges have sub-
sequently disagreed over whether there is a genuine difference be-
tween Gherebi and Hamlily.498 In Anam v. Obama in September 2009, for 
example, D.C. District Court Judge Thomas F. Hogan found that there 
is not a substantial difference.499 D.C. District Court Judge Gladys Kess-
ler, on the other hand, stated
that there is a difference, and that she prefers the Gherebi approach.500 
Additionally, D.C. District Court Judge Ricardo M. Urbina in Hatim v. 
Obama in December 2009 articulated an understanding of the chain-of-
command test that very likely differs from what either Judge Walton or 
Judge Bates had in mind.501 
 
. Supp. 2d at 75–76. 
. Supp. 2d at 75, with Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69–70. See in-
fra A
tates, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-439, 2011 WL 
1225
 Gherebi, and 
that gely one of form rather than substance”). 
493 See Hamlily, 616 F
494 See id. at 76–77. 
495 See id. at 75–77. 
496 See id.; Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69–70; infra Appendix, Tables 12–13. 
497 Compare Hamlily, 616 F
ppendix, Tables 12–13. 
498 See, e.g., Hatim, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 5–6; Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 
(D.D.C. 2009); al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d sub 
nom. al Odah v. United S
724 (Apr. 4, 2011). 
499 See 653 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (stating that Hamlily is “not inconsistent” with
 any apparent difference “is lar
500 See 648 F. Supp. 2d at 6–7. 
501 See 677 F. Supp. 2d at 5–6. 
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 In Hatim, Judge Urbina explicitly adopted the Hamlily standard, 
including the notion that detention authority turns on whether the 
person in question occupied a role within a relevant group’s chain of 
command.502 According to Hatim, however, merely notional status with-
in a chain of command was not enough; one must have actually obeyed 
specific orders in the past to be a member in this sense, and hence to 
be detainable.503 Thus, according to Judge Urbina, it was not enough 
for the government to prove that a person knowingly attended an al 
ae
e truly was, became moot once 
e 
ncluding that LOAC simply has no bearing on the question 
f w
of the AUMF to be construed? As noted in Part II, the AUMF itself pro-
                                                                     
Q da training camp and that the individual believed that by doing so 
he had effectively joined al Qaeda.504 It may be that Judges Walton and 
Bates, or other judges following the Gherebi and Hamlily standards, will 
interpret the chain-of-command test in the same fashion. It seems 
equally if not more likely, however, that they will not. 
 In any event, the nuanced disagreement among Judges Urbina, 
Walton, and Bates, if disagreement ther
th chain-of-command question came before the D.C. Circuit.505 In a 
series of cases in 2010, the D.C. Circuit expressly rejected the proposi-
tion that one must be part of any chain of command—let alone that of 
the military wing of an organization—to qualify as a member subject to 
military detention under the AUMF.506 
 The D.C. Circuit first made this point in al-Bihani v. Obama, in Jan-
uary 2010.507 In that case, a divided panel offered a number of impor-
tant observations regarding the lawful scope of detention authority.508 
To begin with, the majority opinion by Judges Janice Rogers Brown and 
Brett M. Kavanaugh broke sharply with most of the prior detention 
cases by co
o ho lawfully may be detained without criminal charge in this set-
ting.509 That is to say, the al-Bihani court broke new ground in the ha-
beas litigation by holding that only domestic law sources should be con-
sidered in the course of determining the legal bounds of detention au-
thority.510 
 Absent reference to LOAC, however, how was the broad language 
                                                 
pendix, Table 14. 
panying text. 
; see infra Appendix, Table 15. 
ihani, 590 F.3d at 872–73. 
502 See id.; infra Ap
503 See Hatim, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 6–7. 
504 See id. passim. 
505 See infra notes 507–586 and accompanying text. 
506 See infra notes 507–586 and accom
507 590 F.3d at 872–73
508 See al-B
509 See id. at 871–72. 
510 See id. 
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vides some guidance at the group level but almost no guidance at the 
individual level.511 Other domestic law sources would be needed, there-
fore, to address what conduct or status sufficed to link a person to an 
nder the two MCAs a fortiori 
ou
ship and detainability.519 
hes
                                                                                                                     
AUMF-covered group for detention purposes.512 And according to the 
majority in al-Bihani, the personal jurisdiction provisions found in the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 and Military Commissions Act of 
2009 provided the necessary guidance.513 
 Those provisions clearly stated that military commissions may en-
tertain proceedings against noncitizens who are members of AUMF-
covered groups and also those who are non-members but who nonethe-
less provide support to such groups.514 Asserting that a person subject 
to military commission prosecution u
w ld be subject to detention under the AUMF, the panel majority in 
al-Bihani concluded that independent support thus constitutes a suffi-
cient condition for detention separate and apart from proof of mem-
bership in an AUMF-covered group.515 
 As for the meaning of membership, the panel majority rejected 
the view advanced by Judge Walton in Gherebi, Judge Bates in Hamlily, 
and Judge Urbina in Hatim to the effect that proof of membership re-
quires some kind of participation in a group’s chain of command.516 
But if the chain-of-command test could not define membership, what 
criteria would? Here the opinion was less clear, except as to two re-
markable points.517 First, al-Bihani asserted that a person should be 
deemed a member and hence subject to detention if he attended a 
training camp sponsored by an AUMF-covered group.518 Second, al-
Bihani raised the possibility that merely staying at a guesthouse associ-
ated with an AUMF-covered group’s recruitment process could also 
constitute adequate evidence of member
T e statements were dicta and hence not binding on the district 
court, yet they certainly signaled a broad conception of membership—
 
a notes 103–116 (discussing the AUMF’s role in the “content debate”). 




512 See al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872–73. 
513 See id. 
514 See id. 
515 See id. 
516 See id.; 
ebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 75–77. 
517 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2. 
518 See id. at 873 n.2. 
519 See id.
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arguably broader than anything previously endorsed in the habeas liti-
gation, either before Boumediene or since.520 
 Subsequent decisions by the D.C. Circuit largely reinforced al-
Bihani.521 To be sure, some of al-Bihani’s punch was diluted by the fact 
that a majority of the active judges of the D.C. Circuit, in the course of 
“denying” en banc review, declared the panel’s views about the irrele-
vance of international law to be mere dicta.522 The “dicta-fication” of 
that aspect of the panel opinion did not necessarily undermine its sup-
ort
0, in Barhoumi v. 
                                                                                                                     
p  and membership aspects, however, as the panel had also observed 
that it found “al-Bihani’s reading of international law to be unpersua-
sive.”523 More significantly, subsequent D.C. Circuit decisions have rein-
forced key aspects of the al-Bihani panel opinion.524 
 First, the unanimous opinion in Awad v. Obama—issued on June 2, 
2010 by Chief Judge David B. Sentelle and Judges Merrick B. Garland 
and Laurence H. Silberman of the D.C. Circuit—restated the point that 
one need not be part of a chain of command to be detainable.525 This 
would be useful evidence of membership, of course, but membership 
could also be shown by proof that a person self-identified as part of an 
AUMF-covered group or was captured in circumstances amounting to 
fighting on behalf of such a group.526 On June 11, 201
Obama, Judge Kavanaugh and Judges Douglas H. Ginsburg and David S. 
Tatel joined to state once again that the chain-of-command test is not a 
necessary condition for detention—though, in that case, it happened 
to be satisfied and counted as a sufficient condition.527 
 Neither Awad nor Barhoumi provided the D.C. Circuit with an op-
portunity to revisit or refine al-Bihani’s favorable treatment of inde-
pendent support as a distinct ground for detention. Many thought that 
the next decision—Bensayah v. Obama, decided by the D.C. Circuit on 
June 28, 2010—would do so.528 Bensayah himself was the last of the 
original Boumediene petitioners, the only one whom Judge Leon found 
 
520 Compare al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873–74, with al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 178–82 (adopting a 
sign
 at 720; Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 424–26; Awad, 608 F.3d at 
10–
5807 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2011). 
t 720; Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 424–26; Awad, 608 F.3d at 
10–
; infra Appendix, Table 16. 
ificantly narrower conception of membership), and Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. at 75 (same). 
521 See, e.g., Bensayah, 610 F.3d
12. 
522 See al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-7814, 2011 
WL 122
523 See al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 871. 
524 See, e.g., Bensayah, 610 F.3d a
12. 
525 See 608 F.3d at 10–12
526 See Awad, 608 F.3d at 10–12. 
527 See 609 F.3d at 424–26; infra Appendix, Table 16. 
528 See 610 F.3d at 720. 
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subject to detention after remand from the Supreme Court.529 And as 
noted above, Judge Leon had expressly approved reliance on inde-
pendent support as a ground for detention in that case.530 Indeed, he 
had found Bensayah subject to detention not for being an al Qaeda 
member but instead for having provided support to al Qaeda in the 
rm
thority to detain both members and non-member 





                                                                                                                     
fo  of facilitating the travel of would-be fighters to Afghanistan.531 A 
casual observer might have assumed, therefore, that the appeal would 
oblige the D.C. Circuit to give further consideration to the sufficiency 
of independent support as a detention ground. 
 A more rigorous observer, however, would anticipate that the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision would focus on the membership ground instead.532 
Several months earlier, Charlie Savage of the New York Times had re-
ported the existence of a “pronounced” disagreement among “top law-
yers in the State Department and the Pentagon,” as well as the Justice 
Department and other agencies, with respect to “how broadly to define 
the types of terrorism suspects who may be detained without trials as 
wartime prisoners.”533 According to Savage’s account, the debate arose 
initially when the government was obliged to develop its revised deten-
tion position in Hamlily.534 As noted above, the government ultimately 
chose to make some changes to its position but did not abandon the 
claim that it had au
supporters of AUMF-covered groups.535 This did not end the internal 
debate but instead merely delayed it until the admi
 the choice of whether to defend a specific case on independ
ort grounds.536 
The need to develop a position on appeal in the Bensayah liti
 Savage wrote, provided just such an occasion: 
The arguments over the case forced onto the table discussion 
of lingering discontent at the State Department over one as-
pect of the Obama position on detention. There was broad 
agreement that the law of armed conflict allowed the United 
 
529 Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub 
nom. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
530 Boumediene, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 135; see supra notes 424–427 and accompanying text. 
531 Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 198. 
532 Savage, supra note 22. 
533 Id. 
534 See id. 
535 Hamlily Memorandum, supra note 73, at 1–2; see supra notes 430–435 (discussing 
the Obama administration’s position). 
536 Savage, supra note 22. 
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States to detain as wartime prisoners anyone who was actually 
a part of Al Qaeda, as well as nonmembers who took positions 
tually pro-
uce
is case is 
best f’ al 
Qaid af-
                                                                                                                     
alongside the enemy force and helped it. But some criticized 
the notion that the United States could also consider mere 
supporters, arrested far away, to be just as detainable without 
trial as enemy fighters.537 
Assuming the accuracy of this account, the specific dispute involved the 
conjunction of the independent-support ground with the use of deten-
tion authority for captures away from the conventional battlefield.538 
Savage reported that the State Department’s newly arrived Legal Advi-
sor, Harold Koh, championed the view “that there was no support in 
the laws of war” for the claim of detention authority in that circum-
stance, while the Defense Department’s General Counsel, Jeh Johnson, 
disagreed.539 Savage indicated that the question was then put to the 
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, which even
d d an equivocal memorandum “stating that while the Office of Le-
gal Counsel had found no precedents justifying the detention of mere 
supporters of Al Qaeda who were picked up far away from enemy forc-
es, it was not prepared to state any definitive conclusion.”540 
 Nonetheless, a position was needed for the Bensayah appeal.541 Ac-
cording to Savage’s account, the solution was to “try to avoid that hard 
question” by “chang[ing] the subject” in Bensayah.542 Rather than de-
fend the decision below on the ground relied upon by Judge Leon— 
i.e, that Bensayah could be detained because he provided support to al 
Qaeda543—the government would instead seek affirmance on the 
ground that Bensayah was a functional member of al Qaeda.544 Thus 
the Justice Department’s Civil Division came to make a most unusual 
filing on the eve of oral argument in the case, explaining to the court 
in a brief letter that “[t]he Government’s position is that th
 analyzed in terms of whether Bensayah was functionally ‘part o








541 See id. 
542 Savage, supra note 22. 
543 Boumediene, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 135; see supra notes 424–427 and accompanying text. 
544 Savage, supra note
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firm  de-
bate
 forces, even though such persons 
theory.552 In any event, the litigation continues: the court re-
                                                                                                                     
ed solely on that ground.”545 In an indication that the internal
 had not yet been resolved, however, the letter added that 
the Government is not foreclosing its right to argue in appro-
priate cases that the AUMF, as informed by the laws of war, 
permits detaining some persons based on the substantial sup-
port they provide to enemy
are not themselves “part of” those forces. The Government 
continues to defend the lawfulness of detaining certain indi-
viduals who provide substantial support to, but are not part of, 
al Qaida or the Taliban.546 
 At the time he wrote, Savage did not know how this strategy would 
play out with the D.C. Circuit. Nonetheless, he concluded his account 
ith w a perceptive observation regarding the larger significance of the 
issue: “The outcome of the yearlong debate could reverberate through 
national security policies, ranging from the number of people the 
United States ultimately detains to decisions about who may be lawfully 
selected for killing using drones.”547 
 Some nine months later, in late June 2010, the D.C. Circuit re-
versed the district court’s holding and allowed detention in Bensayah.548 
But it is far from clear that the government’s decision not to advance 
the independent support argument caused that outcome, or that geo-
graphic constraints entered into the analysis. In addition to limiting its 
legal theory on appeal, the government had decided not to continue to 
rely on certain inculpatory statements that had been made by another 
detainee.549 The latter move appeared to be the decisive one.550 The 
panel held that the remaining evidence did not suffice to prove that 
Bensayah had engaged in the recruiting and logistical support activities 
that the government had alleged, and hence that the government had 
failed to show that Bensayah was a functional member of al Qaeda.551 By 
the same token, presumably, this same body of evidence would not have 
sufficed even if the government had advanced its original independent 
support 
 
545 Letter from Sharon Swingle et al., Civil Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice at 1, Bensayah, 610 
F.3d 537). 
. 
t 720, 722. 
t 722, 727. 
 718 (No. 08-5
546 Id. at 1–2. 
547 Savage, supra note 22
548 610 F.3d at 727. 
549 See id. a
550 See id. 
551 See id. a
552 See id. 
844 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:769 
m ded the case not with orders to grant Bensayah’s petition, but ra-
ther for Judge Leon to reconsider the merits including any new evi-





ren LeCraft Henderson, Kavanaugh, and A. Raymond Ran-
                                                                                                                     
553 
 Thus we are left with an unusual state of affairs. After the majority 
of the district judges to consider the question rejected the proposition 
that the government lawfully may assert authority to detain independ-
ent supporters of AUMF-covered groups,554 the D.C. Circuit took the 
contrary view.555 In the meantime, however, the executive bran
ap ars to have become internally divided on the question, and for the 
moment appears disinclined to take advantage of the court’s position 
on the matter—at least where the independent support occurs in a 
place geographically remote from a conventional battlefield.556 
 The D.C. Circuit has not had an opportunity to weigh in on the 
independent support question since al-Bihani and Bensayah.557 The 
court’s next two opinions instead touched lightly on other aspects of 
the substantive scope issue.558 Shortly after Bensayah, for example, in 
June 2010 in al Odah v. United States, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the de-
tention of an individual on membership grounds.559 The most notable 
aspect of the case, for present purposes, was the fact that the opinion by 
Chief Judge Sentelle and Judges Judith W. Rogers and Garland restated 
al-Bihani’s suggestion that training camp attendance alone might well 
be sufficient to make out the case for detention on membership 
grounds.560 Then, two weeks later, in al-Adahi v. Obama in July 2010, 
Judges Ka
dolph found that evidence of a detainee’s attendance at a training 
camp and guesthouse constituted powerful evidence of functional 
membership, and sharply criticized a district judge for suggesting oth-
erwise.561 
 
 at 12–13; Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75. 
; Savage, supra note 22. 
–73. 
t 17. 
ix, Table 17. 
d the next fact may be evaluated as if the 
first Table 17. 
553 Id. at 727. 
554 See, e.g., Hatim, 677 F. Supp. 2d
555 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 727. 
556 See Letter from Sharon Swingle et al., supra note 545, at 1–2
557 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 727; al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872
558 See al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105; al Odah, 611 F.3d a
559 611 F.3d at 17; see infra Append
560 See al Odah, 611 F.3d at 13, 17. 
561 613 F.3d at 1105 (criticizing the district court for appearing to “think that if a par-
ticular fact does not itself prove the ultimate proposition (e.g., whether the detainee was 
part of al-Qaida), the fact may be tossed aside an
 did not exist”); see infra Appendix, 
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 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit has had a chance since Bensayah to 
comment—albeit only implicitly—on the question of geographic con-
straints, at least in the context of membership-based detention.562 In 
Salahi v. Obama, in November 2010, a D.C. Circuit panel dealt with a 
Mauritanian detainee whom the government alleged to be an al Qaeda 
member, but who was not captured in Afghanistan nor alleged to have 
been involved in combat in or near Afghanistan (at least not after the 
early 1990s).563 The appellate panel expressed no concerns about the 
theoretical assertion of detention authority in such circumstances, but 





                                                                                                                     
under a different standard.564 Implicit rejection of geog
st nts in the membership setting, of course, does not compel the con-
clusion that geographic constraints also must be rejected with respect 
to independent support 
c. That Which Is Now Clear and That Which Remains Contested 
 As a result of the foregoing string of D.C. Circuit decisions, an im-
portant aspect of the government’s detention authority appears set-
tled—at least at a high level of generality and at least for the moment. 
Specifically, the D.C. Circuit has developed a consensus that member-
ship in an AUMF-covered group is a sufficient con
ti 565 But other questions remain. What precisely counts as member-
ship in a clandestine, diffused network such as al Qaeda? Does inde-
pendent support provide an alternative ground for detention? Does the 
location of a person’s capture or the person’s underlying activities mat-
ter under either the membership or support criteria? 
 With respect to the detailed meaning of membership, some things 
have been made clear. The cases clearly establish that proof of partici-
pation in a formal chain of command is sufficient, but not necessary, to 
demonstrate membership.566 They are relatively clear, moreover, that 
training camp participation is highly significant to prove membership, 
if not a sufficient condition.567 The cases further suggest, albeit with 
less force, that the same may be true for guesthouse attendance in at 
 
x, Table 17. 
3. 
e, e.g., Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 424–26; Awad, 608 F.3d at 10–12; al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 
872–
e, e.g., al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105; al Odah, 611 F.3d at 13, 17; al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 
873
562 See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 748, 753. 
563 See id. at 748; infra Appendi
564 See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 75
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least some contexts.568 Absent those elements, however, it remains un-
clear which forms of involvement with the affairs of an AUMF-covered 
group distinguish those who can be detained from those who cannot. 




Judg  in 
Sept
h and by focusing on 
bstantial weight to the fact that a detainee attended a Tal-
an
                                                                                                                     
ression conveyed by the totality of the circumstances, measu
nst unspecified—and potentially inconsistent—metrics of affiliat
 by particular judges.569 Consider, for example, the way in wh
e Bates, writing for the D.C. District Court, summarized the task
ember 2010, in the post-al-Bihani case Khan v. Obama: 
“[T]here are no settled criteria,” for determining who is “part 
of” the Taliban, al-Qaida, or an associated force. “That deter-
mination must be made on a case-by-case basis by using a 
functional rather than formal approac
the actions of the individual in relation to the organization.” 
The Court must consider the totality of the evidence to assess 
the individual’s relationship with the organization. But being 
“part of” the Taliban, al-Qaida, or an associated force requires 
“some level of knowledge or intent.”570 
 Even when the training camp or guesthouse elements are present, 
moreover, it is not clear that they will always suffice.571 Indeed, Almerfedi 
v. Obama—which, in July 2010, was one of the first D.C. District Court 
opinions to emerge against the backdrop of the D.C. Circuit’s interven-
tions—directly challenged the relevance of guesthouse attendance; it 
reasoned that (1) the connotations of guesthouse attendance vary de-
pending on the house in question, and (2) residence at the guesthouse, 
in that particular case, was not necessarily inculpatory.572 On the other 
hand, Sulayman v. Obama, also decided by the D.C. District Court in July 
2010, gave su
ib -controlled guesthouse (particularly when viewed in combination 
with evidence that a Taliban recruiter gave the man money, a passport, 
and a ticket for air travel) and that the man twice went near the front 




 See, e.g., Sulayman, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 44–45, 53; Almerfedi, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 23 & 
n.2. 
568 See, e.g., al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2
569 See, e.g., Khan, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 5. 
570 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
571
572 See 725 F. Supp. 2d at 23 & n.2. 
573 See 729 F. Supp. 2d at 44–45, 53. 
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 Note that similar disagreements could yet emerge in connection 
with the training camp variable.574 Like guesthouses, training camps 
can vary in terms of their provenance and connotations. Some clearly 
were or are operated by al Qaeda or the Taliban, but not all were; fact 




eas).579 The question is at least as pertinent in the detention context.580 
     
e .575 Of course, it may be that no further refinement of the variables 
defining membership is possible in this setting, and that the status quo 
represents the realistic maximum when it comes to defining this crite-
rion (though it should at least be possible to clarify the geographic 
question).576 
 In any event, the status quo certainly has not settled the separate 
question of whether detention may be predicated on a showin
d ndent support to an AUMF-covered group. It also has not settled 
the question of whether, if such a criterion is legitimate, it must be lim-
ited to persons who were captured or who acted in certain geographic 
locations—or whether it must be confined only to certain types of sup-
port or to support rendered with certain specific mental states. 
 Finally, the question of geography continues to loom large in the 
substantive-scope debate.577 Recent litigation associated with alleged 
plans to conduct a targeted killing of an American citizen in Yemen, on 
the ground that the individual was an operational leader of al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula, has sharpened the debate as to whether LOAC’s 
field of application is strictly limited to geographically defined battle-
fields of a conventional nature.578 It raises the issue of whether, instead, 
any LOAC-related authority to use force attaches to at least some en-
emy-affiliated personnel, wherever they may travel (or, more narrowly, 
to such persons when they are located in denied or ungoverned ar-
                                                                                                                 
574 See al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2. 
575 Cf. Superseding Criminal Complaint at 3–4, United States v. Maldonado, No. 4:07-
MJ-00125 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2007) (prosecuting defendant for receiving military-style 
training from al Qaeda, though the training was provided by al Shabab in Somalia), avail-
able ts/pdf/Maldonado_Complaint.pdf; see also Andrea 
Ellio
of the D.C. 
Dist  suit, al-Aulaqi v. Obama, on standing and po-
litic r 2010. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010). 
579 See Chesney, supra note 577. 
at http://www.foxnews.com/projec
tt, The Jihadist Next Door, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 2010, § 6 (Magazine), at 34–35. 
576 See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 748, 753. 
577 For an introduction to this debate, see Robert Chesney, Has Human Rights Watch 
Changed Its Position on Targeted Killing and the Scope of Application of IHL?, Lawfare (Dec. 9, 
2010, 12:26 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/has-human-rights-watch-changed-
its-position-on-targeted-killing-and-the-scope-of-application-of-ihl/. Judge Bates, 
rict Court, dismissed the targeted killing
al question grounds in Decembe
578 See al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 9–10. 
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As noted above, at least two of the Guantanamo habeas cases thus far— 
Bensayah and Salahi—involved detainees with remote or no linkages to 
any traditional battlefield, and the judges in those instances expressed 
o p
pply.585 In any event, as Part II illus-
trated, determining that a particular body of law applies does not en-
sure agreem  comes to 
selecting and calib  form the indi-
o be patient, leaving the 
matter in judicial hands, or instead should Congress intervene with leg-
islation? Fina he past dec-
e’
n articular concerns on that point—though they did not expressly 
address the issue.581 The earlier experience of the al-Marri litigation, 
meanwhile, suggests there may yet be judicial disagreement on the 
point.582 
 Overarching all these questions, finally, is lingering disagreement 
regarding which bodies of law actually govern.583 The al-Bihani panel 
opinion sought to resolve this dispute by forbidding reference to LOAC 
and other forms of international law.584 Though the D.C. Circuit major-
ity subsequently neutered that claim by declaring it dicta, the majority 
did not go so far as to issue a contrary holding to the effect that any 
such body of law does actually a
ent as to what that body of law requires when it
rating the variables that combine to
vidualized detention standard.586 
IV. The Significance of the Emerging Law  
Governing Detention Criteria 
 In the wake of this descriptive account, several questions arise. 
First, does it actually matter that the habeas process has not yet resolved 
the disagreements and unanswered questions noted in Part III?587 Sec-
ond, if this does matter, is it preferable simply t
lly, are there larger lessons to be drawn from t
ad s experience with the substantive law of military detention? This 
Part addresses each of these questions in turn. 
                                                                                                                      
580 See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 748, 753; Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 720; al-Marri I, 487 F.3d at 182–
83. 
581 See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 748, 753; Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 720. 
582 See 487 F.3d at 182–83. 
583 See al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 871; supra notes 70–212 and accompanying text. 
584 See al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 871. 
585 See al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 1. 
586 See supra notes 64–212 and accompanying text. 
587 See infra notes 588–613 and accompanying text. 
2011] Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens 849 
A. Does the Disagreement and Uncertainty Matter? 
 The persistence of disagreement and unresolved questions regard-
ing the substantive-scope issue in the habeas litigation is problematic 
on many levels. First, the uncertainty and disagreement may prove sig-
nificant with respect to the many as-yet undecided Guantanamo habeas 
cases. True, the vast majority of the Guantanamo habeas cases to this 
point have turned on other issues—above all questions of evidentiary 
sufficiency.588 Only Basardh v. Obama, in which D.C. District Court 
Judge Huvelle made an ill-fated attempt to limit detention authority to 
circumstances in which a person was likely to cause harm if released, 
clearly turned on an issue involving the scope of detention authority 
that the judge in question was prepared to recognize.589 But much 
orem  habeas litigation is to come, and hence this question may yet 
prove dispositive for some Guantanamo detainees. No one can say pre-
cisely how many cases may yet proceed to the merits, but it seems likely 
that we are not yet halfway through. We cannot know at this point 
whether the substantive scope question will remain marginal to the 
merits. If it does become central in these future cases, the continuing 
uncertainty surrounding the question is problematic both from the de-
tainee and the government perspectives. 
 Second, the pool of habeas cases eventually may encompass more 
than the Guantanamo detainees. Whether this will come to pass most 
likely depends, however, on whether the United States resumes the 
practice of taking long-term custody of individuals captured outside of 
states in which conventional armed conflict is occurring. This issue has 
been tested to some extent in the context of Afghanistan.590 Attorneys 
representing a group of U.S. military detainees in Afghanistan have 
been attempting for several years now to establish habeas jurisdiction 
over detention operations there.591 In al Maqaleh v. Gates in 2009, they 
met with mixed success in the D.C. District Court when Judge Bates held 
that non-Afghans may pursue habeas relief if captured outside of Af-
ghanistan and brought there for detention by the United States, where-
as none of those actually captured in Afghanistan could do so.592 A pan-
el of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit subsequently re-
ver f the attributes of a 
                                                           
sed on the first point only, explaining that “all o
                                                           
 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009). 
aqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207, 209–10 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d 605 
F.3d 0). 
588 See Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supra note 25, at 1–2. 
589 See 612 F. Supp. 2d
590 See al M
 84 (D.C. Cir. 201
591 See id. 
592 See id. at 235. 
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facility exposed to the vagaries of war are present in Bagram.”593 The 
U.S. detention facility in Afghanistan (then at Bagram, today in Par-
wan), the panel further noted, is in “territory under neither the de facto 
nor de jure sovereignty of the United States and within the territory of 
another de jure sovereign.”594 The panel did not, however, close the door 
to habeas jurisdiction entirely.595 It went out of its way to observe that 
there was no evidence in this case that the detainees had been brought 
into Afghanistan in order to evade judicial review as their transfer had 
occurred long before Boumediene v. Bush rendered Guantanamo subject 
to judicial review.596 The panel warned that if “such manipulation by the 
ext.600 It may be that the 
nit
                                                                                                                     
Executive” were proven in a future case, the outcome might be differ-
ent.597 In the course of remanding that case to Judge Bates for further 
proceedings, the D.C. Circuit noted that it might take a different view, 
even in that very case, should new evidence emerge regarding the na-
ture of U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan.598 
 Given that the United States is actively engaged in a process meant 
to culminate in the transfer of control over its long-term detention op-
erations in Afghanistan to the Afghan government (just as the United 
States already has transferred control of its detention operations in Iraq 
to the government there),599 and absent evidence that the United States 
is still in the business of capturing persons elsewhere and bringing them 
to Afghanistan for purposes of long-term detention, the prospects for an 
extension of habeas to Afghanistan are increasingly slim notwithstand-
ing these caveats. The more significant lesson from the Afghan habeas 
litigation, therefore, is that courts likely will be receptive to an extension 
of habeas to any location should the United States in the future resume 
the practice of taking and maintaining military custody of individuals 
captured outside of a traditional battlefield cont
U ed States will avoid that practice in the future, substituting some 
combination of rendition, host-nation detention,601 targeted killing, 
 
593 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 at 98–99. 
9. 
 
erties Union of S. Cal. (Aug. 18, 2010), https://www.aclu-sc.org/ 
rele
594 Id. at 97–98. 
595 See id.
596 Id. 
597 Id. at 9
598 See id. 
599 Chesney, supra note 4, at 599–601.
600 See al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98–99. 
601 We may yet also see litigation involving the scope of detention authority over U.S. 
citizens allegedly held by other states under U.S. direction or control—so called “proxy 
detention.” See ACLU/SC Suit Seeks Information on U.S. ‘Proxy Detention’ of American Citizen in 
the U.A.E., Am. Civ. Lib
ases/view/103037. 
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surveillance, prosecution, or inaction in its place.602 But if the practice 
of long-term detention for non-battlefield capture reemerges, so too will 
the questions surrounding habeas jurisdiction. 
 Even if habeas jurisdiction remains limited to Guantanamo, how-
ever, there are other reasons to believe the uncertainty associated with 
the substantive-scope jurisprudence is problematic. Most significantly, 
the struggle over who may be held matters not only for those detainees 
who already have or may one day receive the right to seek habeas re-
view, but also for any detention operations that ultimately depend upon 
the same underlying legal authority—i.e., the September 18, 2001 Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).603 That is to say, if judges 
determine in the habeas setting that the AUMF extends only to certain 
groups or fact patterns, commanders and policymakers must take that 
judgment into account whenever acting under that same authority— 
whether subject to habeas review or not. In practical terms, this means 
that the habeas jurisprudence can and presumably will impact all 
AUMF-based detention operations—including all detention operations 
in Afghanistan—even though very few detentions beyond Guantanamo 
are or likely ever will be subject to direct habeas review.604 Civilian gov-
ernment lawyers advising policymakers, and military judge advocates 
advising commanders in the field, have an obligation to take account of 
this case law in the course of devising policy and procedure regarding 
who may be detained prospectively and what standard should be em-
ployed when carrying out screening of detainees post-capture.605 In this 
ay, 
s worse, spillover effects from the Guantanamo ha-
eas
                                                                                                                     
w the detention-scope jurisprudence arising out of Guantanamo 
could come to impact a far greater number of detainees. Unfortu-
nately, policymakers and commanders at the moment lack clarity re-
garding the boundaries of their authority, yet have little choice but to 
proceed in the shadow of this uncertainty.606 
 Making matter
b  cases might not be limited to detention operations. The effects 
may extend to AUMF-based targeting decisions as well. That is to say, 
the detention-scope debate may overhang the decision to kill under 
 
602 See Wittes, supra note 7, at 5–7. 
603 See Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
604 See al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98–99. 
605 See, e.g., Ctr. for Law & Military Operations, supra note 3, at 30, 40–58 (stress-
ing that judge advocates needed to be prepared to advise the military on the law governing 
detention operations in Iraq and Afghanistan). 
606 See supra notes 565–586 and accompanying text. 
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color of the AUMF as much as it overhangs the decision to detain un-
der that authority. 
 The point is not immediately obvious; the power to kill and the 
power to detain are by no means coextensive. But they need not be co-
extensive for the Guantanamo habeas litigation to impact the legal 
bounds of targeting authority elsewhere. Again, the AUMF is the 
transmission mechanism.607 Suppose, in the course of the habeas litiga-
tion, courts ultimately determine that the AUMF must be construed to 
apply only to sworn members of al Qaeda and the Taliban who have 
received military-style training.608 Assume further that a commander 
subsequently desires to launch a missile from a drone into the window 
s that the issue, at the very least, would be 
ou
virtue of the fact that the judges in the course of resolving the deten-
                                                                                                                     
of a car being driven in Yemen by a local man whom he believes to act 
as a fundraiser for al Qaeda—but whom he also knows has not sworn 
an oath to al Qaeda or attended any training camps. The strike on its 
face would not be an exercise of force supported by the AUMF, what-
ever its consistency with the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”) or interna-
tional human rights law (“IHRL”).609 
 It may be that the strike could yet be justified, but the important 
point for present purposes i
cl ded by the narrowing construction of the AUMF produced via the 
habeas litigation. Thus military operations not directly subject to judi-
cial review610 nonetheless may be impacted indirectly by the develop-
ment of detention-scope jurisprudence. As in the detention context, 
the dynamic matters not so much because it exists, but rather because it 
is transmitting uncertainty. 
 Finally, the habeas litigation may also generate spillover effects by 
 
607 AUMF, 50 U.S.C. § 1541. 
608 Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (interpreting the scope of the 
government’s detention authority). 
609 Cf. al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9–10 (D.D.C. 2010). 
610 The American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights re-
cently made waves by filing a suit challenging the government’s claim of authority to use 
lethal force against Anwar al-Aulaqi, an American citizen alleged to be a member of al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. See id. That suit, al Aulaqi v. Obama, is remarkable pre-
cisely because such litigation is exceedingly rare. No earlier suit seeks to preclude the use 
of lethal military force against a particular individual. Prior attempts to restrain the gov-
ernment from exercising military force at a more general level, such as efforts to stop the 
use of military force in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, largely floundered in the face of 
justiciability objections. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1308–09 (2d Cir. 
1973); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147 (2d Cir. 1973); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 
1368, 1369 (2d Cir. 1971). And at least for the time being, so too has the al-Aulaqi litiga-
tion. See 727 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (dismissing the complaint on standing and political question 
grounds). 
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tion-scope issue have engaged with concepts that are both contested 
and likely to arise in future—unrelated contexts involving military 
force. This is most obviously the case with respect to the episodes in 
which judges have grappled with the meaning of “direct participation 
in hostilities” (“DPH”), in an effort to clarify the scope of the govern-
ment’s detention authority.611 The merits of referencing DPH for this 
purpose are considered above.612 For now, the important point is that 
when courts make use of DPH in this way, they may be obliged to de-
fine this deeply contested concept. And once they offer such a defini-
tion, their opinion will matter to some extent in any subsequent con-
text in which that LOAC concept matters—without regard to whether 
that subsequent context has anything to do with the AUMF. Any future 
armed conflict implic ich is to say, any fu-
re
indeed involve a substantial degree of disagreement 
tend to smooth out such discrepancies in the traditional common law 
fashion. This is, in fact, the argument advanced by a pair of advocacy 
gro n a docu-
me oven Capacity to Handle Guan-
     
ating the DPH question—wh
tu  armed conflict—henceforth would take place in the shadow of 
that earlier opinion. Much the same might be said for frequently em-
ployed statutory language like “all necessary and appropriate force.”613 
B. Should Congress Intervene? 
 Assume for the sake of argument that the emerging habeas juris-
prudence does 
and uncertainty with respect to individualized detention criteria, and 
that this disagreement and uncertainty is important in relation to fu-
ture cases and to other, collateral matters. It does not follow automati-
cally that Congress should step in with legislation designed to address 
the situation. 
 One might oppose legislative intervention on the ground that the 
process of refining the law in this area should be left in the hands of 
the judiciary.614 Judges, after all, routinely disagree about fine points of 
law concerning complex subjects, and appellate review over time will 
ups—Human Rights First and the Constitution Project—i
nt titled Habeas Works: Federal Courts’ Pr
                                                                                                                 
611 See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 64 n.15 (D.D.C. 2009). 
612 See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
613 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
614 See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 10, at 502–10 (expressing confidence in the capacity and 
propriety of relying upon federal courts to identify and apply the substantive rules govern-
ing the scope of the government’s detention authority). 
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tánamo Cases; A Report from Former Federal Judges.615 The report contends 
that the “lower courts are steadily progressing toward a workable deten-
tion standard,”616 and denies that judges have to “draft” a substantive 
standard or otherwise are engaged in a “lawmaking” process.617 What 
the judges are doing instead, the report argues, is merely “interpreting 
and applying,” informed by the laws of war, the detention standard es-
tablished by Congress and the President in the AUMF.618 To the extent 
that the report acknowledges any variation among the judges, it charac-
terizes that variation benignly as the mere “gradual exploration and 
shaping of the detention standard,” in traditional common law-like 
fashion.619 Habeas Works concludes that “there is no reason to doubt the 
ability of the three-level federal court system to develop a substantive 
ete
lay the primary role in 
d ntion standard.”620 
 That last claim no doubt is correct. As Judge Wilkinson’s concur-
rence in the Fourth Circuit’s 2008 decision in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli illus-
trates, judges can undertake to develop detention standards meant to 
conform to the peculiarities of the non-state actor context.621 Similarly, 
no one doubts that the common law process in theory can smooth out 
the many disagreements that actually arise when judges undertake to 
do this, much as courts in the past used case-by-case adjudication to 
develop and amend substantive rules for torts, contracts, and the 
like.622 But this is a straw man argument. The important question is 
whether it would be better for Congress to p
crafting the details of the detention standard. 
 There are several factors to consider in thinking about this ques-
tion. First, one could select between these approaches based on the 
normative desirability of the substantive standard one believes is most 
                                                                                                                      
615 Human Rights First & The Constitution Project, Habeas Works: Federal 
Courts’ Proven Capacity to Handle Guantánamo Cases; A Report from Former 
Federal Judges 13–16 (2010). In the interest of full disclosure, Habeas Works criticizes a 
report that the author of this Article co-authored with Benjamin Wittes and Rabea Ben-
halim, in which we contend that the judges in the habeas cases have been left by Congress 
and the President to craft most of the substantive and procedural law governing the ha-
beas proceedings. See id. at 27 (criticizing Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supra note 25). 
616 Id. at 13. 
617 Id. at 14. 
618 Id. at 7. 
619 Id. at 16. 
620 Id. 
621 al-Marri v. Pucciarelli (al-Marri II), 534 F.3d 213, 325 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (setting out a three-step inquiry), 
vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.). 
622 See Azmy, supra note 10, at 502–10. 
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likely to be produced in the end by each. On close inspection, however, 
the two options may be close to a wash along this dimension. 
 Those who would prefer to see greater restraints on the govern-
ment’s capacity to detain might at first blush be inclined to disfavor leg-
islation on the theory that Congress most likely would adopt a broad 
detention standard and that the judiciary over time will settle upon a 
more constrained approach.623 Proponents of a broad standard, by the 
same token, might favor legislation for the same reason. The Democ-
ratic-controlled Congress in 2009 and 2010 persistently used the power 
of the purse to make it more difficult for the President to close Guan-
tanamo, after all,624 and the Republican takeover of the House in 2010 
might be expected to tilt Congress still further toward erring on the 
side of facilitating rather than restraining military detention.625 But 
careful consideration of the trends in the case law described in Part III 
suggests that it would be unwise to assume that the judiciary in the end 
will adopt narrower tests.626 The sequence of D.C. Circuit opinions in 
2010, beginning but by no means ending with al-Bihani v. Obama, if any-
thing suggests the contrary.627 And it would be unwise to assume that 
the Supreme Court will both take up the substantive-scope question 
and adopt more constrained positions with respect to it: Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito are unlikely to be inter-
ted
considered position on the question is the democratic pedigree of the 
resulting rule set. That is, one might favor legislative intervention be-
es  in such a narrowing approach, while Justice Kagan is likely to be 
recused from these cases in light of her recent role as the Solicitor 
General and might well join that block of four in any event.628 Thus, 
fear of, or desire for, a broad detention standard accordingly does not 
point clearly in favor or against legislative intervention. 
 A second factor one might bring to bear in developing a well-
                                                                                                                      
623 See Charlie Savage, New Measure to Hinder Closing of Guantánamo, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 
2011  Act of 2005 §§ 1001, 1003–1004, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 
119 
ge, supra note 623. 
ty Cuba Prison, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 
2010
nc denied, 619 
F.3d
ovided Guantanamo detainees with sufficient process); id. at 
826–
, at A11; Detainee Treatment
Stat. 2680, 2739 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)). 
624 See Sava
625 See Charlie Savage, Vote Hurt Obama’s Push to Emp
, at A24. 
626 See supra notes 213–586 and accompanying text. 
627 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–73 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en ba
 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-7814, 2011 WL 1225807 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2011); see 
also supra notes 506–564 and accompanying text (discussing this sequence). 
628 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 818–19 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing) (finding that the DTA pr
27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not, and never has, run in 
favor of aliens abroad.”). 
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cause the lawmaking process would do more to contribute to a national 
debate and public engagement on the question, and the resulting rules 
would in any event bear a superior stamp of democratic legitimacy.629 
In response, one might note that we routinely have relied on common-
law processes to develop and refine rules in other important settings.630 
But it is not clear we ever have done so in a context that impacted con-
temporaneous military operations to this extent. Here, the question at 
issue is one that speaks directly to an issue of pressing national concern: 
Just who is it that the United States purports to be at war with? A strong 




e ge in a forthright national debate on this subject if we are to have 
military detention at all; indeed, that argument has been made, and it 
is rather convincing.631 
 Third, one might favor or disfavor legislation on grounds of speed 
and finality, in light of this Article’s argument that lingering uncertainty 
regarding the precise boundaries of detention authority is harmful. For 
example, one might argue that legislation will settle the substantive-
scope question more quickly than the ongoing process of common-law 
development. That process, after all, dates back at least to the initial 
decision by Judge Mukasey for the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in Padilla ex. rel. Newman v. Bush in late 2001,632 
and does not seem likely to end anytime soon. Anticipating this con-
cern, Habeas Works argues that some amount of residual ambiguity—
and thus some need for case-by-case clarification—invariably will re-
main even in the event of a legislative intervention.633 This is true, but 
the reduction in ambiguity via a statute (if carefully designed) could 
reduce the total amount of work left to be accomplished thr
h as lens. Then again, an inartfully drafted statute could achieve the 
opposite by introducing entirely new ambiguities and undoing points 
of consensus already established through the existing habeas jurispru-
dence. 
 Fourth, one might take account of the fact that legislative rulemak-
ing as a general proposition is more easily revisited than rules derived 
                                                                                                                      
629 See generally Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme 
Court at the Bar of Politics (2d ed. 1962). 
630 See Azmy, supra note 10, at 502–10. 
631 See Wittes, supra note 7, at 111–15 (advancing this argument). 
632 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush (Padilla I ), 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 587–91 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld (Padilla II ), 352 F.3d 695 (2d 
Cir. 2003), rev’d and remanded, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
633 Human Rights First & The Constitution Project, supra note 615, at 28. 
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through the habeas process. Should experience demonstrate that a 
statutory definition of the bounds of detention authority is too broad 
or too narrow, that definition can be revised in the ordinary course of 
further legislation. Inclusion of a sunset provision in legislation, more-
over, could guarantee periodic reassessment. Judicially crafted rules are 
not so readily altered, however. The judiciary is reactive rather than 
proactive. It must have a case or controversy in order to have the occa-
sion to take up a question, and hence the opportunity to revise the sub-
ant






hip in an AUMF-covered group 
i-
y, the unlawful ends of the group;634 
s unlawful use 
of violence; and 
                                                                                                                     
st ive-scope of detention authority may or may not be there even if 
the existing standard proves unwise. Even assuming a proper case aris-
es, moreover, the time lag between the beginning of a case and final 
judgment by th
particularly if it is necessary for the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene i
order to limit or reverse precedent. 
 These factors, taken together, strongly suggest that legislation 
the substantive-scope question would in fact be desirable, at least in t
act. In particular, it would be desirable to have express statut
 that: 
 confirms that members
is a sufficient condition for detention; 
 provides that participation in such a group’s chain of 
command, knowing attendance at a military-style train-
ing camp operated by such a group, and perhaps other 
factors constitute substantial, but not dispositive, ev
dence of membership; 
 articulates a mens rea standard for membership, such 
as a requirement that the individual not only knew the 
identity of the group but intended to become an active 
participant in its affairs and thereby to facilitate, di-
rectly or indirectl
 takes a clear position on whether the provision of sup-
port independent of membership can count as a suffi-
cient condition to justify detention, and articulates a 
corresponding mens rea element such as intent to fa-
cilitate, directly or indirectly, the group’
 
634 Cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 209 (1961) (permitting a criminal prosecu-
tion on membership grounds where a person is an active member of a group who intends 
to facilitate the group’s unlawful ends). 
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 specifies whether there are any geographic limitations 
as to the availability of detention (e.g., limiting deten-
tion to persons captured outside the United States, or 
limiting support-based detention to persons captured 
in connection with combat operations). 
 All that said, any serious discussion of legislative intervention also 
must account for the fact that in no plausible scenario would Congress 
address only the substantive-scope question. Rather, if it reaches this 
question at all, Congress almost certainly would simultaneously address 
any numbe al and ev-






certain features of asymmetric warfare and other strategically significant 
                                                  
r of other related matters, including the procedur
ules associated with habeas review. Depending on
e cts Congress to produce on those issues, then, even someone who 
supports the idea of legislation on the substantive-scope question may 
conclude that legislation on the whole is undesirable. 
C. The Larger Lessons of the Detention-Scope Narrative 
 Separate and apart from the debate over the details of the govern-
ment’s detention authority, the descriptive account in Part III also func-
tions as a case study in three larger phenomena. First, it illustrates the 
dynamic relationship between law and strategic context.635 Second, it 
draws our attention to the increasingly significant role that national 
courts—including lower courts—can play in developing the law re
to the use of military force.636 Third, and related to the second poin
the narrative highlights the increasing significance of domestic substa
tive law, and the prospect that such law may displace both LOAC and 
IHRL—normally thought to be in competition solely with one another 
in this arena—as the central body of law relevant to such issues.637 
1. On the Dynamic Relationship Between Law and Strategic Context 
 Part II described the theoretical claim that at least some legal 
frameworks exist in dynamic relationship with the prevailing strategic 
climate, such that the law both influences that climate and adapts in re-
sponse to changes in that climate.638 It further described the conver-
gence theory, which makes the related, but more specific, claim that 
                                                                    
635 See infra notes 638–656 and accompanying text. 
636 See infra notes 657–665 and accompanying text. 
637 See infra notes 666–672 and accompanying text. 
638 See supra notes 174–187 and accompanying text. 
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violence committed by non-state, clandestine organizations (such as al 
Qaeda) placed tremendous pressure on status quo legal frameworks to 
change.639 In particular, these features pressure existing frameworks to 
converge toward one another en route to formation of a hybrid, tailored 
legal framework more suited to this setting.640 And finally, Part II noted 
that the convergence phenomenon operates in the shadow of a balloon-
squeezing effect.641 That is, policymakers will substitute alternative and 
lati
 existence of the 
ic war-
re 
                                                 
re vely unconstrained policy options for incapacitating perceived 
threats—including drone strikes, rendition, and proxy detention—in 
the event that the convergence process oversteers to the point that U.S.-
controlled detention ceases to be a plausible option.642 
 The narrative in Part III provides support for the
dynamic-relationship theory as well as the convergence theory, illustrat-
ing the critical role that the judiciary can play in mediating these proc-
esses.643 At the same time, considering the narrative in light of the the-
ory of a balloon-squeezing effect is a cause for alarm. 
 The story of the judicial struggle to ascertain the legal boundaries 
of detention authority conforms nicely to the dynamic-relationship the-
ory. This is clear, for example, when we look at Judge Wilkinson’s opin-
ion in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli.644 As noted above, there is every reason to 
believe Judge Wilkinson was quite conscious of the dynamic-relationship 
theory at the time he wrote, and at the very least we can say he con-
sciously strove to develop a doctrinal framework for detention opera-
tions that conformed to the particular features of clandestine entities 
such as al Qaeda.645 Most other opinions recounted in the narrative 
were far less self aware on their face, yet taking the lot of them together 
one cannot help but see the overall set in terms of an ad hoc, collective 
process of coming to grips with the disruptive impact of asymmetr
fa and other forms of non-state actor violence.646 The multiple opin-
ions of the D.C. district and circuit courts dealing with the significance 
                                                                     
tes 209–212 and accompanying text. 
639 See supra notes 188–208 and accompanying text. 
640 See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 115, at 1100–01. 
641 See supra notes 209–212 and accompanying text. 
642 See supra no
643 See supra notes 213–586 and accompanying text. 
644 See 534 F.3d at 314–19 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
645 See id.; see also supra notes 326–330 and accompanying text. 
646 See Khan v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010); supra notes 569–571 and ac-
companying text. 
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of training and guesthouse attendance, for example, smack strongly of 
tailoring a new framework to these unorthodox circumstances.647 
 That does not mean that all the judges were pulling in the same 
direction, of course. Some judges were resolute, for example, in insist-
ing that detainees be categorized as “civilians” who could be neither 
targeted nor detained absent direct participation in hostilities— some-
thing that could be viewed as an effort to insist upon adherence to the 
formal categorical distinctions and associated rule sets applicable to 
more traditional conflict scenarios.648 None of those opinions, however, 
rv
rio.652 At the same time, it is quite plain too that the process 
 
su ived.649 One comes away with the impression that whatever ulti-
mately may come from the habeas litigation, it will not be an endorse-
ment of an approach that simply involves rote application of a more 
traditional legal framework. 
 Which leads to the relationship of all this to convergence. The es-
sence of the convergence phenomenon is that strategic context pres-
sures the legal system to adjust, to eschew existing frameworks in favor 
of something more carefully tailored to the circumstances.650 Though 
the process remains in progress for now, we can at least see that it is 
driving towards the development of a set of detention criteria more 
carefully tailored to the problem posed by clandestine, networked enti-
ties such as al Qaeda.651 In the end, it is difficult to imagine that the 
government will end up with quite as much detention authority as it 
would like, let alone the full breadth it might claim were the courts 
mindlessly to map conventional armed conflict detention criteria onto 
this scena
will not outright reject the claim of non-criminal detention authority, 
and further that the government in the end will at least have a substan-
tial amount of authority to detain persons based on associational status 
alone.653 
                                                                                                                      
647 See, e.g., al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 1001 (2011); al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
No. 10-439, 2011 WL 1225724 (Apr. 4, 2011); al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2; Sulayman v. 
Obama, 729 F. Supp. 2d 26, 44–45, 53 (D.D.C. 2010); Almerfedi v. Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 
18, 
v. Obama, 615 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75–77 (D.D.C. 2009); Gherebi, 609 F. 
Sup
t. denied, No. 10-736, 2011 WL 1225732 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2011); al-Bihani, 
590 
companying text. 
3d 718, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
23 & n.2 (D.D.C. 2010). 
648 See Hamlily 
p. 2d at 69–70. 
649 See Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 424–26; Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 10–12 
(D.C. Cir. 2010), cer
F.3d at 872–73. 
650 See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 115, at 1100–01. 
651 See al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872–73; supra notes 514–516 and ac
652 Cf. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.
653 Cf. GPW, supra note 1, art. 4. 
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 Finally, a cautionary observation regarding the aforementioned 
balloon-squeezing effect: as noted above, the habeas jurisprudence 
quite possibly will have spillover effects for AUMF-based detention op-
erations in Afghanistan—effects that most likely would find expression 
in the form of additional constraints on detention authority.654 This 
implicates the balloon-squeezing dynamic in that the military, as a re-
sult of such spillover effects, may be incentivized to opt for lethal force 
over capture when both options lawfully are available—though, if the 
spillover effect extends to targeting, this may not be an option either. 
resort 
 st
ts have to some extent sup-
lan
 The variation on this trend illustrated by the habeas litigation is 
the utility of domestic courts—including lower domestic courts—toward 
this end. In the recent past the International Criminal Tribunal for Yu-
                                                                                                                     
Alternatively, the spillover effects may serve further to incentivize 
to ill another alternative method of incapacitation: Afghan custody, 
whether on a proxy basis or as a genuinely independent detention sys-
tem. Certainly there already is great interest in shifting to just such an 
approach.655 Whether this is in detainees’ interest is a difficult ques-
tion.656 
2. On the Increasing Significance of Domestic Courts for LOAC 
 The habeas litigation also offers lessons having to do more specifi-
cally with the legal regulation of military activity and the state’s pursuit 
of its national security interests. First, it illustrates an important varia-
tion of an otherwise well-recognized trend having to do with the devel-
opment of LOAC: the role of judicial institutions as mechanisms, not 
just to enforce LOAC, but to contribute in substantial ways to LOAC’s 
ongoing development.657 In this sense, cour
p ted, or at least have emerged as an institutional rival to, treaty mak-
ing. This is particularly important with respect to issues such as deten-
tion authority, where differences in interests and views among potential 
treaty partners is sufficiently broad so as to suggest that further treaty 
making is relatively unlikely in the near or mid terms. In that setting, 
the existence of an alternative mechanism for law development—a 
safety valve of sorts—matters a great deal. 
 
09 F. Supp. 2d at 55–66. 
654 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
655 See Wittes, supra note 7, at 5–7. 
656 See id. 
657 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 315–19 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); Gherebi, 6
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goslavia played an important role in developing LOAC,658 and the In-
ternational Criminal Court may yet do the same in the future. The IC-
Y w
such contro-
versies as the precise meaning of DPH.665 The habeas litigation in this 
ro e halls of diplomacy or the chambers of international tri-
n
T ill not serve that role going forward, however, and it remains to be 
seen how much of this role the ICC actually will play. In the meantime, 
domestic courts at times can take up the task, and in this instance they 
have done just that.659 
 To be sure, the habeas litigation has not always treated LOAC as 
relevant.660 Indeed, for a brief period the original al-Bihani opinion ap-
peared to hold quite to the contrary.661 But that aspect of al-Bihani is no 
longer with us,662 and in any event the decisions prior to that point had 
frequently prioritized LOAC in their analyses.663 Judge Walton’s Gherebi 
opinion provides a prime example, as do the various opinions by the 
Fourth Circuit in al-Marri (above all that of Judge Wilkinson, which ex-
pressly embraced the task of developing and adapting the law to chang-
ing circumstances).664 In these cases and others, the judiciary for better 
or worse has engaged with some of the most significant and deeply con-
tested concepts in LOAC, including meta-questions regarding LOAC’s 
field of application and more focused questions regarding 
respect is a reminder that we must look as much to the domestic court-
om as to th
bu als in order to stay current with LOAC’s development. 
                                                                                                                      
658 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for In-
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 111–127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugosla-
via 
es, Paper No. 10-31, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ab- 
stra
l-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 871–72. 
.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-7814, 2011 
WL
ilkinson, J., concurring in part and dis-
sen
ilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in p
ilkinson, J., concurring in part and dis-
sen
Oct. 2, 1995). 
659 Cf. David Weissbrodt & Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, The Role of the United States Supreme 
Court in Interpreting and Developing Humanitarian Law 4 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Legal 




662 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F
 1225807 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2011). 
663 See, e.g., al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 315–19 (W
ting in part); Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 55–66. 
664 See al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 315–19 (W
art); Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 55–66. 
665 See, e.g., al-Marri II, 534 F.3d at 315–19 (W
ting in part); Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 55–66. 
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3. n the Increasing Significance of Domestic Law Governing Military 
Activity 
 The other trend illustrated by the habeas litigation is related. It 
involves the increasing significance of domestic law itself—not just do-
mestic judicial institutions—as a component of the legal architecture of 
the use of military force in the transnational setting.
O
oted above, domestic law has 
come to play the dominant e notwithstanding these ref-
erences to LOAC—indeed, n the relative lack of domes-
                                                                                                                     
666 Indeed, a care-
ful observer of the habeas litigation could fairly conclude that domestic 
law matters as much or more as LOAC (and certainly more than IHRL, 
was has played virtually no role at all in the litigation). 
 On this view, the Guantanamo detention cases tell us something 
important about the bodies of law most relevant to the regulation of 
military operations, at least insofar as the United States is concerned. 
This not an unfamiliar question; scholars have grappled extensively 
with the question of priority among competing bodies of law in this set-
ting.667 In most instances, however, the competition is between con-
tending bodies of international law: LOAC on one hand, and IHRL on 
the other.668 At one level, the Guantanamo cases can be seen as taking 
the side of LOAC in this dispute. The decisions never speak of IHRL, 
let alone accord it any significance, while at least some of the judges—
along with the Obama administration—are at pains to assert the rele-
vance of LOAC to the analysis.669 But as n
substantive rol
otwithstanding 
tic materials on point.670 Domestic law has not so much been the vehi-
cle through which LOAC has displaced IHRL as it has been a third 
force supplanting analysis under both bodies of international law.671 
This trend resonates with larger trends in American law involving resis-
tance to international and comparative law as rules of decision in 
American courts;672 moreover, and hence, we should not be entirely 
surprised to see it now or going forward. 
 
666 See Milanović, supra note 97, at 461, 467–68. 
667 See id. 
668 See generally, e.g., Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interaction Between Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence?, 19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 
161 (2008). 
669 See Gherebi, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 55–56, 65–67. 
670 See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text. 
671 Cf. Gherebi, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 62, 68 (looking to LOAC principles to for guidance in 
interpreting the AUMF). 
672 See G. Brinton Lucas, Structural Exceptionalism and Comparative Constitutional Law, 96 
Va. L. Rev. 1965, 1965–66 (2010). 
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Conclusion 
 We lack consensus regarding who lawfully may be held in military 
custody in the contexts that matter most to U.S. national security to-
ay—d i.e., counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. More to the point, 
federal judges lack consensus on this question. They have grappled with 
it periodically since 2002, and for the past three years have dealt with it 
continually in connection with the flood of habeas corpus litigation aris-
ing out of Guantanamo in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 2008 
decision in Boumediene v. Bush. Unfortunately, the resulting detention 
jurisprudence is shot through with disagreement on points large and 
small. As a result, the precise boundaries of the government’s detention 
authority remain unclear despite the passage of more than nine years 
since the first post-9/11 detainees came into U.S. custody. 
 We should not be surprised at this disagreement. The conflicting 
efforts of the judges reflect the fact that the very metrics of legality are 
deeply contested in this setting. We do not agree which bodies of law 
should govern in the first instance and, even if we did, we then encoun-
ter indeterminacy and plausible disagreement with respect to what each 
body of law actually has to say, if anything, about the detention-scope 
question. Making matters worse, these difficulties arise in a context in 
which familiar legal frameworks experience substantial evolutionary 
pressures, making it difficult to distinguish descriptive and normative 
arguments about the legal limits of the government’s authority. Against 
this backdrop it becomes easy to see that the judges at times are speak-
ing past one another, much as occurs in the larger public debate. 
 Understandable or not, though, this state of affairs is problematic. 
Most obviously, it renders the prospects for success in the Guantanamo 
abeh as litigation uncertain for both the government and the detainees. 
More significantly, however, the failure to resolve the detention-scope 
question casts a shadow across an array of military activities that are not 
directly subject to habeas review. The mixed pronouncements overhang 
detention operations in Afghanistan that are not subject to habeas re-
view, insofar as those detentions depend on the same underlying claims 
of authority that undergird the government’s position in the Guan-
tanamo litigation. And by the same token, the habeas case law may have 
the same spillover effect on targeting operations—i.e., the use of lethal 
force—in places as varied as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. 
 It is important to bring these disagreements, their causes, and 
their consequences to the surface, and to push for their resolution. The 
Obama administration, after all, is not going to abandon the use of mil-
itary detention. The Guantanamo habeas litigation will not conclude 
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fo ears to come. The use of detention in Afghanistan will persist for 
some time. Even in Iraq—even after the supposed end of combat op-
erations—a small population of U.S.-controlled military detainees con-
tinues to exist, and will for some time. Uses of lethal force, via drone 
strikes and otherwise, will continue with respect to al Qaeda targets in 
various spots around the world for the foreseeable future. Were it all to 
end tomorrow, moreover, we could still expect future situations to arise 
in which another administration decides to employ m
r y
ilitary detention 
in a setting involving terrorism or insurgency, giving rise to the same set 
of issues. 
 Simply put, the problem is embedded in our evolving strategic 
context—particularly in the perception that non-state actors have be-
come increasingly empowered, to the point that some can pose a stra-
tegically significant threat. Insofar as law and strategic context exist in 
dynamic relationship with one another, then, the question is not 
whether the law will adapt to these circumstances. It will, sooner or lat-
er, more or less appropriately. The question, instead, concerns which 
institutions we will rely upon to mediate that process. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) 
Past Conduct  n/a 
Associational Status  Yes – Taliban member who bore arms on the battlefield. 
Collateral Utility  Not permitted. 
Citizenship Not relevant. 
Passage of Time  n/a 




Future Dangerousness n/a 
 
Table 2: Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
Past Conduct  Unclear. 
Associational Status  Unclear. 
Collateral Utility  n/a 
Citizenship Not relevant. 
Passage of Time  n/a 




Future Dangerousness n/a 
 
Table 3: Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) 
Past Conduct  n/a 
Associational Status  n/a 
Collateral Utility  n/a 
Citizenship U.S. citizenship, at least when combined with capture in the 
United States, requires a clear statement of detention authority 
from Congress. 
Passage of Time  n/a 
Location of Capture Capture in the United States, at least when combined with U.S. 





Future Dangerousness n/a 
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Table 4: Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005) 
Past Conduct  Unclear. 
Associational Status  Unclear. 
Collateral Utility  n/a 
Citizenship U.S. citizenship, at least when combined with capture in the 
United States, requires a clear statement of detention authority 
from Congress. 
Passage of Time  n/a 
Location of Capture Capture in the United States, at least when combined with U.S. 




Detention is not “necessary” if prosecution is available. 
Future Dangerousness n/a 
 
Table 5: Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) 
Past Conduct  n/a 
Associational Status  Yes – at least where the person was a member of an armed unit 
serving the Taliban. 
Collateral Utility  n/a 
Citizenship Not relevant. 
Passage of Time  n/a 




Future Dangerousness n/a 
 
Table 6: Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673 (D.S.C. 2005) 
Past Conduct  n/a 
Associational Status  Yes – al Qaeda membership suffices irrespective of whether the 
person had been on the battlefield. 
Collateral Utility  Not permitted. 
Citizenship Noncitizens—even those lawfully present in the United States—
are not protected to the same extent as citizens. 
Passage of Time  n/a 
Location of Capture Irrelevant, at least when dealing with noncitizens. 
Criminal Prosecution 
Alternative 
Irrelevant, at least when dealing with noncitizens. 
Future Dangerousness n/a 
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Table 7: Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d. 160 (4th Cir. 2007) (panel) 
Past Conduct  Participation in planning for a terrorist attack does not suffice. 
Associational Status  Mere membership in al Qaeda does not suffice. Membership in 
the armed forces of a nation-state is necessary. 
Collateral Utility  Not permitted. 
Citizenship Not relevant. 
 
Table 8: Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
Opinion Motz, J. 
(plurality)  
Traxler, J. Williams, C.J. Wilkinson, J. 
Past Conduct  Participation 
in planning 
for a terrorist 
attack does 
not suffice. 
n/a Must engage or 
attempt to en-
gage in a bellig-
erent act (includ-
ing plotting ter-























tion to a nation-
state’s military. 






Collateral Utility  Not permitted. n/a n/a n/a 
Citizenship Not relevant. n/a n/a n/a 
Passage of Time  n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Location of 
Capture 
n/a Capture in the 
United States 
not an obstacle. 
Capture in the 
United States not 
an obstacle, but 










n/a Not relevant. Not relevant. Not relevant. 
Future Danger-
ousness 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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Table 9: In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) 
Past Conduct  Must have participated in some way in violent activities. 
Associational Status  Fifth Amendment forbids use of membership alone as a criterion. 
 
Table 10: Decisions Concerning Future Dangerousness 
Case Basardh v. 
Obama, 612 F. 
Supp. 2d 30 
(D.D.C. 2009) 
Awad v. 
Obama, 646 F. 














tainee would not 
“rejoin the bat-
tle” if released. 
Expressly re-












Table 11: Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2008) (Leon, J.) 
Past Conduct  Independent support is a sufficient condition. 
Associational Status  Membership is a sufficient condition. 
 
Table 12: Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009) (Walton, J.) 
Past Conduct  Rejects independent support as a sufficient condition. 
Associational Status  Membership in the military chain of command of an AUMF-
covered group is a necessary condition. 
 
Table 13: Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (Bates, J.) 
Past Conduct  Rejects independent support as a sufficient condition, but notes 
support may be proof of functional membership. 
Associational Status  Membership in the chain of command of an AUMF-covered group 
is a necessary condition. 
 
Table 14:  Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (Urbina, J.) 
Past Conduct  Rejects independent support as a sufficient condition. 
Associational Status  Membership in the chain of command of an AUMF-covered group, 
illustrated by actual obedience to orders in particular instance, is a 
necessary condition. 
 
870 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:769 
 
Table 15: Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (panel) 
Past Conduct  Independent support is a sufficient condition. 
Associational Status  Membership is a sufficient condition, does not require participa-
tion in a chain of command, and might be proven by attending a 
training camp or staying at a guesthouse. 
 
Table 16: Awad and Barhoumi 
Case Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (panel) 
Barhoumi, 609 F.3d 416 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (panel) 
Associational Status Membership is a sufficient 
condition, does not require 
participation in a chain of 
command. 
Membership is a sufficient condi-
tion, and participation in a chain 
of command is a sufficient but 
not necessary condition to prove 
membership 
 
Table 17: al Odah, al-Adahi, and Salahi 
Case al Odah v. United 
States, 611 F.3d 8 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (pan-
el) 
Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 
F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(panel) 
Salahi v. Obama, 
625 F.3d 745 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (panel) 
Associational 
Status 
Membership is a suffi-
cient condition, and 
training camp atten-
dance might suffice to 
prove it. 
Membership is a suffi-
cient condition, and both 
training camp attendance 
and staying at a guest-
house might suffice to 
prove it. 





n/a n/a Location of capture 
or conduct not 
relevant. 
 
